Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Shehab Al Makahleh
Key Points
- The November 3 midterm elections represent a critical test of President Donald Trump’s political mandate during his second term.
- Democratic gains in the House of Representatives could significantly strengthen congressional oversight and constrain the president’s domestic agenda.
- Even if Democrats regain control of both chambers, they are unlikely to secure the two-thirds majority required to override a presidential veto.
- US foreign policy, particularly toward Iran, Israel and the Gulf, is likely to remain largely under presidential direction.
- The elections could expose divisions within the Republican Party while forcing Democrats to demonstrate that they can offer a credible alternative beyond opposition to Trump.
The Midterm Elections: A Test of Presidential Power
The US midterm elections, scheduled for November 3, carry implications that extend well beyond the traditional contest between Republicans and Democrats for control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. They represent a significant test of the political mandate enjoyed by President Donald Trump during his second term, as well as the ability of American institutions to impose meaningful constraints on a president who embraces an expansive interpretation of executive authority. Trump has repeatedly approached institutional checks and political conventions as obstacles to implementing his agenda. Against this backdrop, the elections offer Democrats an important opportunity to reclaim influence in Washington, obstruct or slow key elements of the president’s domestic programme, and restore a measure of institutional balance. Their capacity to transform American foreign policy, however, will remain considerably more limited.
The elections are taking place against a challenging political and economic backdrop for Republicans. Trump’s approval ratings have come under pressure, while substantial segments of the American electorate remain dissatisfied with the administration’s handling of the economy, the rising cost of living and inflation. These concerns have been compounded by the economic consequences of the war with Iran, including higher energy and fuel costs, as well as growing public anxiety over the possibility of a prolonged American military engagement in the Middle East. The financial and political burden of such involvement has become an additional source of pressure on the administration. Taken together, these factors have turned the midterms into an indirect referendum on Trump’s performance during the first two years of his second term and on the Republican Party’s ability to defend his policies before voters.
Democrats appear to have a stronger opportunity to regain control of the House of Representatives, while the Senate contest remains more complicated and uncertain. This distinction should not be underestimated. Winning the House alone would fundamentally alter the political dynamics in Washington, even if Republicans retain control of the Senate. A Democratic majority in the House would give the party extensive oversight powers, allowing it to launch investigations into the administration’s conduct, summon senior officials to testify before congressional committees, examine executive decisions and government expenditure, and demand explanations from the White House on a wide range of policy issues. The remainder of Trump’s term could consequently become a period of intensified congressional scrutiny and sustained institutional confrontation.
The significance of such oversight would extend beyond political embarrassment or damage to the administration’s public image. Congress possesses legislative, financial and supervisory instruments that can obstruct presidential initiatives, demand modifications to proposed policies, and increase the political and institutional costs of executive decisions. A Democratic-controlled House would make it more difficult for Trump to advance his legislative priorities and would restrict his ability to rely on a Republican majority to expand policies on immigration, government spending, taxation, civil rights and the functioning of federal institutions. Should Democrats also regain the Senate, their influence would extend to presidential nominations, including senior administration appointments and federal judicial positions, making governance increasingly dependent on negotiations between the White House and Congress.
Yet it is essential to distinguish between weakening Trump’s domestic agenda and fundamentally redirecting his foreign policy. Under the American constitutional system, the president enjoys considerable authority in conducting international relations, negotiating with foreign governments, setting diplomatic priorities and directing the armed forces as commander-in-chief. These powers are not unlimited, and Congress retains important constitutional responsibilities and oversight mechanisms. Nevertheless, a transfer of congressional control from Republicans to Democrats would not automatically transfer the centre of foreign-policy decision-making from the White House to Capitol Hill.
This is where the two-thirds threshold in both chambers becomes particularly important. Even if Democrats regain control of the House and Senate, they are unlikely to command the two-thirds majority required in each chamber to override a presidential veto. This constitutional reality is especially significant when considering the foreign-policy issues Democrats might seek to influence, including the war with Iran, relations with Israel, military and security assistance, trade policy and economic sanctions. Without the votes necessary to override a veto, the administration would retain considerable room for manoeuvre, even in the face of growing congressional opposition.
That does not mean, however, that the elections will have no impact on American foreign policy. Congress controls federal appropriations and therefore has substantial influence over the resources available to the administration. It can scrutinise military operations, debate the legal basis for the use of force, examine arms sales and foreign assistance programmes, and use hearings and investigations to increase the political cost of executive decisions. The Senate can also delay or reject presidential nominations. These mechanisms may not produce a fundamental strategic reversal, but they can constrain the president’s freedom of action, influence the timing of decisions and impose additional political conditions on their implementation.
These limitations are particularly evident in the Middle East. Even if Democrats regain control of Congress, there is no guarantee of a substantial change in American policy towards Iran, Israel or the Gulf states. Congressional pressure could intensify over the use of military force, compliance with international law, oversight of military assistance and the financial consequences of American involvement in regional conflicts. The White House may be required to provide more detailed explanations of its military and diplomatic decisions or take Democratic objections into account when formulating certain policies. But the ability to demand accountability is not the same as the ability to impose an entirely different strategic direction on the president.
The same distinction applies to the American approach to the war with Iran. Democratic lawmakers could use congressional oversight and appropriations powers to press for an end to American military involvement or to prevent further escalation. They could also demand a more substantive debate over the legal justification, strategic objectives and long-term consequences of the use of force. Nevertheless, Trump would retain significant executive authority in directing American foreign policy, while overcoming a presidential veto would remain politically difficult. The likely outcome, therefore, would be a change in the constraints and pressures surrounding presidential decision-making rather than an automatic transformation of the strategic calculations underpinning it.
Another important dimension concerns the future of the Republican Party itself. A Republican defeat, particularly in the House, would raise questions about the limits of Trump’s political influence within his own party and the willingness of Republican lawmakers to continue bearing the electoral costs of his policies. More voices could emerge within the party arguing that unconditional loyalty to the president threatens Republican prospects in future elections and that protecting the party’s broader political interests requires greater independence from certain aspects of Trump’s agenda. Nevertheless, it would be premature to interpret an electoral setback as evidence of the permanent decline of Trumpism. A protest vote against the party in power does not necessarily represent a lasting rejection of Trump’s political movement or an endorsement of a comprehensive Democratic alternative.
For Democrats, regaining congressional control would represent a significant political opportunity, but it would not absolve the party of the need to reassess its own performance and present a convincing economic and political programme. Winning seats because voters are dissatisfied with Trump does not necessarily mean Democrats have restored public confidence or demonstrated that they possess a coherent vision for governing the country. Their challenge will be to move beyond opposition and oversight towards a credible agenda addressing the concerns of ordinary Americans, particularly on the economy, social justice, immigration and the future of democratic institutions.
Ultimately, the midterm elections should not be viewed as a definitive referendum on Trump’s political future or as an opportunity for a comprehensive transformation of American foreign policy. Their principal significance lies in the possibility of restoring a degree of institutional balance within the American political system and providing Democrats with the congressional tools to constrain the president’s domestic agenda and subject his administration to more rigorous scrutiny. On foreign policy, however, the impact is likely to remain more limited. The president retains extensive executive powers, while Democrats are unlikely to secure the two-thirds majorities required to override his vetoes.
This is the central paradox of the November elections: Trump may find himself confronting a more hostile Congress at home, one capable of challenging his domestic priorities and scrutinising his administration more aggressively. Yet he is likely to retain substantial freedom to pursue his foreign-policy agenda according to his own strategic calculations and political priorities. The elections may therefore place meaningful limits on presidential power without fundamentally changing who directs America’s engagement with the world.
