Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Shehab Al-Makahleh and Natalie Collins
Key points
- The Democratic takeover of both chambers of Congress represents a significant political setback for Donald Trump, but not an automatic reversal of his foreign policy.
- The Middle East, particularly Iran, Israel and the Gulf, will face greater congressional scrutiny over war powers, military assistance and regional escalation.
- Ukraine and European governments may find new opportunities to influence American policy, although Washington’s strategic commitments remain politically contested.
- China will see a more complicated American political environment, but competition over Taiwan, advanced technology and trade is unlikely to disappear.
- Russia may attempt to exploit divisions between the White House and Congress, while Europe will be reminded that American security guarantees cannot be taken for granted.
- The wider lesson for the international system is that American power remains formidable, but its direction is increasingly vulnerable to domestic political conflict.
The ballot box enters the battlefield
American elections are often described as domestic contests with international consequences. The 2026 midterms suggest something more consequential: the domestic contest itself has become one of the principal variables shaping American foreign policy.
The Democratic victory, which has transferred control of both chambers of Congress from Republicans, is a substantial setback for Donald Trump. It does not remove him from office, reverse his executive authority or immediately dismantle the policies pursued by his administration. But it changes the political environment in which those policies must operate. For the remaining two years of his presidency, Trump will confront a Congress controlled by an opposition party with the power to investigate his administration, scrutinise military spending, challenge appointments and negotiate over the federal budget.
The result is therefore less a constitutional earthquake than a strategic complication. The president retains considerable authority over diplomacy, military operations and executive action. Congress, however, controls the purse strings, possesses oversight powers and can make the political cost of unilateral decisions considerably higher. The Council on Foreign Relations has already highlighted the importance of congressional control over appropriations, national-security oversight, sanctions and Senate confirmations. The scale of the Democratic victory will determine how effectively these powers are used.
The most important question is not whether Trump has lost control of American foreign policy. He has not. It is whether the world will now have to deal with two competing centres of American political authority.
The Middle East: a war under congressional examination
Nowhere will this tension be more immediate than in the Middle East. The war involving Iran has become a central political issue in Washington, with voters expressing dissatisfaction over its economic consequences, particularly rising energy prices. Trump himself has acknowledged that the conflict contributed to the Republican defeat.
A Democratic-controlled Congress is likely to demand greater scrutiny of the administration’s objectives, the legal basis for military operations, the financial costs of the conflict and the prospects for escalation. It may seek to impose limits through appropriations, oversight hearings and war-powers legislation. Yet a divided government does not necessarily mean an end to military confrontation. The president retains significant operational authority, and the absence of a veto-proof congressional majority will limit the opposition’s ability to impose sweeping changes.
For Iran, the election creates both an opportunity and a danger. Tehran may interpret the results as evidence that the American public has little appetite for an extended war. But it would be a mistake to assume that domestic political pressure automatically produces diplomatic restraint. A president facing legislative opposition may seek to demonstrate resolve abroad, particularly if he believes that national security remains an area in which the White House can act independently.
Israel will also be watching Washington with increasing concern. Congressional scrutiny of military assistance, arms transfers and the conduct of the war in Gaza could become more intense. Democratic politicians who have criticised Israeli government policy may gain greater influence over hearings and legislative debates. This does not mean that the historic American-Israeli relationship will suddenly disappear. It does mean that the political consensus supporting it may become more conditional and more publicly contested.
For the Gulf states, the central challenge will be to preserve strategic relations with Washington while preparing for greater uncertainty in American decision-making. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar will continue to pursue security, energy and diplomatic interests, but they may also deepen engagement with China, Europe and other international actors. Their objective will be diversification, not necessarily alignment.
Jordan, Egypt and Iraq face a different calculation. Regional escalation could place additional pressure on their economies, border security and domestic political stability. They will therefore have strong incentives to support diplomatic channels and prevent the Iran conflict from becoming a wider regional war.
China: the competition survives the election
Beijing is unlikely to interpret the Democratic victory as a fundamental change in American strategy. Competition with China remains one of the few areas where Republicans and Democrats share substantial strategic concerns. Taiwan, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, maritime security and access to critical minerals will remain central to the relationship.
The change may lie less in the objectives than in the methods. A Democratic Congress could scrutinise Trump’s negotiations with Beijing, challenge concessions that appear to weaken American strategic interests and demand greater transparency over trade arrangements. It may also press for a more coordinated approach with European and Asian allies.
For China’s leadership, the difficulty is that a weakened president does not necessarily mean a more predictable American counterpart. Trump could pursue agreements to demonstrate diplomatic success, while congressional opposition could make those agreements harder to implement. Beijing may therefore find itself negotiating with an administration that has the authority to make commitments but faces growing domestic resistance to fulfilling them.
The Indo-Pacific will remain the decisive arena. Taiwan will continue to test American deterrence, while Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines will seek clarity about Washington’s security commitments. Any perception that American policy is becoming inconsistent could encourage regional governments to strengthen their own defence capabilities.
Russia and Ukraine: an opening, but not a guarantee
For Ukraine, the election offers a potential opportunity. A Democratic Congress may be more receptive to military assistance, intelligence cooperation and stronger sanctions against Russia. It could also challenge any diplomatic arrangement that Kyiv and European capitals consider excessively favourable to Moscow.
But expectations should be measured. Trump remains president and retains considerable influence over diplomacy and military assistance. Congressional majorities do not automatically translate into new weapons deliveries, and budgetary disputes could delay decisions. The war’s trajectory will continue to depend on battlefield developments, European contributions and the calculations of Moscow and Kyiv.
Russia, meanwhile, may seek to exploit the political divide in Washington. The Kremlin could attempt to portray Congress as an obstacle to negotiations or encourage the perception that American policy is too divided to sustain a long-term strategy. Moscow may also calculate that Trump, facing resistance at home, could become more determined to secure a foreign-policy legacy.
That possibility matters. An American president who feels politically constrained domestically may sometimes become more assertive internationally. The election may therefore complicate Russian calculations rather than settle them.
Europe: the return of strategic self-reliance
European governments have welcomed the possibility of stronger congressional support for Ukraine, but they should not confuse a Democratic victory with a restoration of the old transatlantic relationship. The deeper problem remains: American political commitments can change sharply between elections.
The European Union must continue strengthening its defence-industrial base, military readiness, intelligence cooperation and energy security. NATO remains indispensable, but European security cannot depend indefinitely on the assumption that every American administration will interpret its obligations in the same way.
Trade will be another source of friction. Congressional opposition may challenge elements of Trump’s tariff policy, but protectionism has become a wider feature of American politics. Europe should expect continued pressure over industrial subsidies, technology regulation, market access and defence spending.
Britain, France, Germany and Poland will face the task of coordinating European policy while managing different national priorities. The question is no longer simply how to keep America engaged in Europe. It is how to make Europe more capable of acting when Washington is distracted or divided.
Other theatres: the price of American distraction
The consequences will extend well beyond Europe and the Middle East. In the Indo-Pacific, North Korea may test the limits of American attention. In the South China Sea, maritime disputes could become more dangerous if regional actors conclude that Washington is preoccupied with domestic conflict.
In Africa, competition over minerals, ports, energy infrastructure and military partnerships will continue. Governments in the Sahel may exploit the uncertainty surrounding American policy to diversify their relationships with Russia, China, Türkiye and Gulf states. In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, instability will continue to connect regional conflicts with global trade and energy security.
Latin America will also watch closely. Trade, migration, sanctions and relations with Cuba and Venezuela could become subjects of congressional confrontation. Canada and Mexico, meanwhile, will be particularly sensitive to any change in the balance between presidential tariff powers and congressional oversight.
Climate diplomacy, international development and global health may also become more contested. A divided Washington could make long-term commitments harder to sustain, even where cooperation remains in the interests of American allies.
A superpower with two foreign policies?
The 2026 midterms have not ended Trump’s presidency. Nor have they produced a unified alternative foreign-policy programme. What they have done is expose the vulnerability of American strategic consistency to domestic political division.
The White House will continue to possess the instruments of global power: the armed forces, intelligence agencies, diplomatic network, financial system and the dollar’s central role in international finance. Congress, however, can influence how these instruments are funded, scrutinised and politically defended.
For America’s competitors, the temptation will be to exploit the division. For its allies, the temptation will be to wait for a more favourable political climate in Washington. Both approaches carry risks. American institutions can constrain the president, but they can also generate paralysis. A divided government may make abrupt policy reversals more difficult while making coherent long-term strategy harder to sustain.
The central message of the election is therefore not that America is retreating from the world. It is that the world must now account for a more contested America. In the Middle East, Europe and the Indo-Pacific, governments will have to distinguish between the commitments of the American state and the preferences of the administration currently occupying the White House.
That distinction may become one of the defining features of international politics in the next two years.
