Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Nadya Hilmi
China has not officially announced a detailed position on the United States’ designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a terrorist organization. However, Chinese intelligence circles view it with suspicion, seeing it as a tool for American pressure to increase influence. China is focused on Sudan’s stability and protecting its economic interests there and is apprehensive about the timing of the designation, which is linked to the war against Iranian militias and could exacerbate instability in the region. This is especially true after the United States announced on March 9, 2026, its designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity, with its intention to formally list it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization effective March 16, 2026. This decision aims to deprive the group of financial resources and freeze its assets, casting a shadow over the course of the Sudanese war and the relationship between the army and Islamist forces. Regarding the impact of the US designation on the course of the war in Sudan, this decision is expected to lead to fundamental changes in the military and political landscape through pressuring the Sudanese Army: The designation places the Sudanese Armed Forces leadership under intense international pressure to sever ties with Islamist militias, such as the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade fighting alongside it, in order to avoid broader sanctions or international isolation. (Drying up financial resources): The decision allows the United States to freeze assets and prohibit financial transactions with the group, which could weaken its ability to finance its military operations and purchase weapons. Furthermore, (A shift in the political balance of power): The decision gives momentum to civilian factions and the Rapid Support Forces, who welcomed the move, considering it an international recognition of the suffering of the Sudanese people, while the Sudanese Foreign Ministry (affiliated with the military) called for the Rapid Support Forces to also be designated as a terrorist organization. With accusations of Iranian interference, the US State Department, in its statement, linked the group to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, potentially transforming the war in Sudan into a wider regional and international arena of conflict between competing axes.
As for China’s expected stance on the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization within Sudan and its impact on the course of the war, it is characterized by neutrality and a principled stance from Beijing. China adopts a policy of non-interference in internal affairs and will treat this designation as an internal US-Sudanese matter, favoring political and negotiated solutions to end the conflict. However, China harbors suspicions about US objectives, viewing US terrorist designations as often a means to impose political agendas and justify military intervention, which could exacerbate the conflict in Sudan rather than resolve it. China believes this designation will not dramatically alter the course of the war, as the Sudanese problem extends beyond the Muslim Brotherhood, but it may complicate the prospects for a peaceful resolution among the warring factions.
Here, China’s perspective on the connection between the US designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization within Sudan and its relation to the current US-led conflict with Iran, as well as the timing of this designation, becomes clear. This is evident in China’s call for de-escalation rather than escalation: China considers Iran a strategic partner and believes that Washington’s escalation against Iran and its militias in the region hinders its economic interests (specifically, China’s Belt and Road Initiative). Therefore, China will seek de-escalation rather than fueling the conflict. This is further supported by Chinese intelligence analysis of the timing: Concerned circles in Beijing interpret the designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization as part of a broader US strategy to contain Chinese and Iranian influence in Africa and the Middle East, rather than as an independent counterterrorism measure. China prioritizes stability, preferring a stable government (even an Islamist one) to widespread chaos that threatens its investments and the well-being of its citizens. This makes China skeptical of the effectiveness of designations aimed at destabilizing specific entities. Ultimately, China will continue to advocate for dialogue and restraint, opposing any Western or American military intervention, and striving to maintain balanced relations with all Sudanese parties.
It is worth noting that the United States’ designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a terrorist organization in March 2016 represents a turning point in international pressure, while the Chinese position is moving in a completely different direction. The American designation is expected to alter the course of the war in several strategic aspects, including embarrassing the Sudanese military leadership. The American designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization places the Sudanese army in a complex position, as Islamists, such as the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade and others, are fighting within its ranks. The continuation of this alliance could expose army leaders to secondary sanctions for dealing with a terrorist entity. (Cutting off supplies): This designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization grants Washington legal authority to pursue the group’s financing networks and affiliated companies internationally, which could weaken the financial capabilities of its associated military wing. In addition to the impact of this designation on political legitimacy, the US decision strengthens the position of the civilian forces (the Progressive Forces) and the Rapid Support Forces in international forums, portraying the war as a struggle against ideological extremism rather than simply a military conflict, which could pave the way for broader international intervention. Furthermore, this designation gives a wider regional dimension, as Washington’s linking of the Muslim Brotherhood to Iran makes the Sudanese war a matter of global national security, potentially diminishing the ability of regional actors supporting the army to continue their overt support if the Brotherhood’s influence persists.
As for China’s stance on this designation, it consistently adopts a pragmatic political approach. Its position can be summarized as follows: (Rejecting unilateralism): China traditionally does not recognize the terrorism lists issued unilaterally by Washington, considering them tools of political pressure. It only recognizes lists issued by the UN Security Council. (Prioritizing the state over ideology): China deals with whoever controls state institutions (currently the military). For Beijing, the stability of Sudan and the protection of its investments in oil and ports are more important than the identity of the political faction participating in the government. Beijing also views the American designation as interference in internal affairs and will not alter the pace of its military or economic cooperation with the Sudanese government as long as the group remains part of the official or semi-official state structure. Furthermore, within the framework of competition with Washington, China may see American pressure as an opportunity to deepen its relationship with Port Sudan (the seat of the interim government), presenting itself as a partner that does not impose political conditions or interfere in ideological orientations. From this, we understand that while Washington uses the designation as a scalpel to isolate the Islamist movement from the army and alter the balance of power in the war, China adheres to the umbrella of dealing with the existing reality to safeguard its interests. This could create a new international polarization within the Sudanese crisis. The pressing question for Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies remains: Can the Sudanese army sacrifice its alliance with Islamist groups to avoid US sanctions?
Regarding China’s stance on the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, Chinese policy towards Sudan is characterized by the following constants: (The principle of non-interference): China adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. It does not classify the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization but rather deals with it as part of the political or historical fabric, as long as it does not threaten its direct interests. China prioritizes stability and investment, as it is keen to maintain stability in Sudan to secure its investments in the oil and infrastructure sectors. It tends to deal with the Sudanese state and its official institutions, regardless of the ruling ideology. China’s defense relations with the Sudanese army are also diverse. China has signed strategic and defense cooperation agreements with the Sudanese military (the most recent in September 2024), indicating that it prioritizes the legitimacy of the current military establishment, even with its Islamist influence, as long as it ensures the continuation of shared interests. China pursues a policy of diplomatic balancing, avoiding involvement in Western and American terrorist lists and preferring to advocate for comprehensive political solutions that include all Sudanese parties to end the conflict.
It is worth noting that the United States’ designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a terrorist entity in March 2026 is not separate from its overall strategy to contain Iranian influence in the region. A detailed analysis linking the timing, the Iranian axis, and the Chinese position can be presented here by understanding and analyzing the connection between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran in Sudan. Washington no longer views the Brotherhood in Sudan as a local political faction but rather as a logistical bridge for Tehran in terms of support with drones and weapons. American intelligence reports have linked the influence of Islamist elements within the Sudanese army to the facilitation of the arrival of Iranian drones (such as the Mohajer-6) and military experts in Port Sudan. Washington fears that the Brotherhood-Army-Iran alliance will give Tehran a foothold on the Red Sea, posing a maritime threat to Washington and completing the maritime blockade initiated by the Houthi group in Yemen. This is coupled with American apprehension about the unity of arenas, meaning that the American designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization aims to prevent Sudanese groups from joining the Iranian-led axis of resistance and to prevent Sudan from becoming a rear base for arms smuggling.
Here we can analyze the relationship between the United States’ designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in Sudan and the timing of this designation within the context of the broader US regional war on Iran and Chinese support for Iran. The timing of the US designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a terrorist group in March 2026 coincided with the peak of US-Israeli escalation against Iran’s proxies, which aims to tighten the noose around Iran’s allies everywhere. After launching intensive US strikes against other militias in (Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon), the designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization serves to close the African gap in the network of Iran’s allies. Washington also aims to send a message to the Sudanese army, presenting its leadership with a zero-sum choice: either partnership with the international community or being dragged down with the Iranian axis, which is designated as terrorist. Furthermore, the timing reflects the US administration’s desire to demonstrate firmness towards extremist political Islam linked to Tehran in order to strengthen its political position both domestically and internationally.
While China’s position is confined to pragmatism versus ideology, and while Washington uses the scalpel of terrorism to categorize allies, China operates on the principle of merchant and stability. China rejects the security link between the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and Iran, as it does not see the relationship between Sudan and Iran as a direct threat but rather as a matter of sovereignty. Therefore, it will not adhere to the American classification and will not change its dealings with Sudanese officials affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite China’s concern about the destabilization of the Red Sea and its desire to secure maritime routes, it prefers diplomatic solutions with Tehran and Khartoum over sanctions, which it sees as fueling the war. Here, China might exploit this classification to fill the void, as it seeks to present itself to the Sudanese army as a more reliable alternative that does not interfere with the identity of those fighting alongside it. This could deepen military cooperation between Beijing and Port Sudan (as demonstrated in the September 2024 agreements).
The pressing question for Chinese circles remains: Will Washington’s designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization change the course of the war? The answer is yes. The designation will transform the war from a local power struggle into a front in a global war against Iranian influence. On the ground, this cross-border funding of Islamist groups may weaken them, but politically, it could push the Sudanese army further into the arms of the (Chinese-Russian-Iranian) axis to escape Western pressure. There are also potential scenarios for China to provide greater military support to the Sudanese army to compensate for the shortfall that US sanctions might cause to its Islamist allies.
