Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Shehab Al-Makahleh
On October 18, Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled the outlines of a new Israeli security doctrine built around military superiority, pre-emptive action and the principle of striking perceived threats before they mature. Five days later, an attack in Hebron that killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded three others prompted a wave of inflammatory statements from Israeli officials, moves to impose a sweeping closure across the occupied West Bank, and renewed calls for retaliatory military operations against Palestinians.
The sequence exposed a fundamental contradiction at the heart of Israel’s strategic thinking. As Netanyahu presents his vision for reshaping the Middle East’s security order, events on the ground demonstrate the limits of military power. However overwhelming its arsenal, Israel cannot eliminate the political causes of a conflict through force alone. Nor can it bomb, besiege or intimidate an entire population into surrendering its national aspirations.
The central question is therefore not whether Israel can preserve its military advantage. It almost certainly can for the foreseeable future. The more consequential question is whether that advantage can deliver the political order Netanyahu seeks: an Israel whose security takes precedence over the sovereignty, rights and strategic interests of its neighbours.
From deterrence to regional dominance
Netanyahu’s doctrine goes beyond the conventional objective of defending Israel against immediate threats. It reflects an ambition to shape the regional balance of power by preventing potential adversaries from acquiring capabilities that could challenge Israeli freedom of action. Its underlying logic is that threats should be neutralised before they become imminent and that Israel’s military superiority must remain permanent.
The doctrine also expands the definition of the threat. Alongside Iran and the regional groups associated with Tehran, Israeli strategic thinking increasingly treats Türkiye’s growing regional influence and its political connections with Islamist movements as potential challenges. This approach risks turning separate disputes into a broader confrontation between Israel and an emerging collection of regional powers whose interests do not necessarily align.
Such a framework can become self-reinforcing. When every shift in a neighbour’s military capacity, diplomatic relationships or political influence is interpreted as a future danger, pre-emption becomes a standing justification for intervention. Deterrence gives way to a more expansive ambition: the ability to determine which military and political options remain available to other states.
But military dominance is not the same as regional stability. A state may destroy weapons, weaken armed organisations and disrupt its adversaries’ command structures without addressing the grievances, territorial disputes and political exclusion that sustain confrontation. Indeed, operations intended to eliminate threats can create new ones when their consequences include civilian suffering, displacement and the erosion of any credible political horizon.
The lesson of Hebron is not that military force has no effect. It is that tactical success cannot, by itself, resolve a political conflict. An attack may trigger a military response, but that response does not necessarily make the next attack less likely. Without a political strategy, the cycle can continue indefinitely.
A changing regional security landscape
Meanwhile, the Arab and wider Islamic worlds are exploring new arrangements intended to reduce their vulnerability and expand their strategic autonomy. Emerging defence initiatives involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, alongside other diplomatic and security understandings involving countries such as Qatar and Indonesia, reflect a growing recognition that the region’s security cannot depend indefinitely on a single external power.
Recent diplomatic contacts involving Türkiye, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and European countries also illustrate the breadth of the issues now connected to regional security, from Palestine and Yemen to the Strait of Hormuz and maritime trade.
These developments matter. They suggest that regional governments increasingly want greater influence over decisions affecting their security, energy supplies, shipping routes and political relationships. They also reflect concerns about the reliability and long-term priorities of the United States, whose attention is divided among several strategic theatres.
Yet the emergence of new partnerships should not be mistaken for the creation of a coherent alternative security order. Agreements, meetings and declarations can establish channels for cooperation, but they do not automatically produce a shared doctrine, a common assessment of threats or a mechanism for resolving disputes among the participants.
The differences are substantial. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pursued divergent policies in Yemen, particularly over the role of separatist forces and the future of the internationally recognised government. Their approaches to Sudan have also differed sharply, with Riyadh supporting state institutions and the Sudanese army while Abu Dhabi has faced persistent allegations of backing the Rapid Support Forces, allegations it has denied. Türkiye’s regional partnerships, meanwhile, coexist with disagreements involving Egypt and other Eastern Mediterranean states over maritime boundaries, Libya and competing regional interests.
These contradictions are not incidental obstacles. They reveal the central weakness of the emerging regional landscape: several governments are seeking greater strategic autonomy, but they have yet to agree on a common framework for managing their rivalries.
The result is a region with multiple centres of power but no effective collective security system. Countries may cooperate when their interests converge, then compete when those interests diverge. Such flexibility can be useful in diplomacy, but it is not a substitute for durable institutions capable of preventing disputes from escalating into crises.
The limits of a state-centred security model
There is another, more fundamental problem. Many of the region’s emerging security initiatives share an emphasis with Netanyahu’s doctrine: the protection of the state, the preservation of military capabilities and the management of threats to national authority. Their political objectives may differ, but they risk reproducing the same state-centred conception of security.
Defence agreements can strengthen deterrence. Naval cooperation can protect shipping. Intelligence-sharing can help governments identify imminent threats. But none of these mechanisms necessarily addresses occupation, political repression, economic exclusion or the grievances that fuel civil conflict.
A region can become more heavily armed without becoming more secure. Governments may improve their capacity to defend borders while societies remain exposed to war, displacement, economic insecurity and the absence of political representation. The distinction between the security of states and the security of their populations is therefore not theoretical. It is central to whether new arrangements will produce lasting stability or simply reorganise the competition for power.
This is where the Palestinian question becomes decisive. Palestine cannot be treated as a secondary issue to be addressed after regional alliances have been consolidated or after Israel’s security requirements have been satisfied. Nor can it be reduced to a technical problem of counterterrorism, border control or military containment.
The conflict is inseparable from questions of occupation, sovereignty, national rights and political legitimacy. Any regional order that promises stability while leaving these issues unresolved will rest on fragile foundations. The absence of a political horizon does not make the conflict disappear; it leaves future generations with the consequences of a crisis that regional diplomacy has repeatedly failed to settle.
The attack in Hebron should be understood in this wider context. It does not justify attacks on civilians, collective punishment or indiscriminate retaliation. Nor does it establish that every Palestinian shares the same political objectives or supports the same methods. It does, however, underline the danger of treating the Palestinian issue as though it could be permanently managed through force while its underlying political dimensions remain unaddressed.
What should an Arab security doctrine look like?
The Arab and wider Islamic worlds do not need to replicate Israel’s doctrine with a larger military coalition of their own. They need to develop a more comprehensive conception of security—one that combines credible defence with diplomacy, economic resilience, political legitimacy and respect for the rights of peoples.
First, regional governments should establish a practical framework for consultation and crisis management. This need not begin with a grand alliance or a single command structure. Regular security consultations, reliable communication channels, maritime coordination and agreed procedures for managing disputes could reduce the risk that competition between partners undermines their collective interests.
Second, governments must be more realistic about strategic autonomy. Diversifying defence suppliers and international partnerships can reduce dependence on Washington, but autonomy cannot be achieved simply by replacing one external patron with another. It requires domestic technological capacity, sustainable economies, resilient infrastructure and the diplomatic ability to work with competing global powers without surrendering independent decision-making.
Third, regional security must include the protection of societies, not only governments. Investment in development, employment, education, public institutions and accountable governance is not separate from national security. It strengthens the social foundations on which states depend and reduces the vulnerabilities that armed groups, external powers and political spoilers can exploit.
Finally, the Palestinian issue must be placed at the centre of any serious regional settlement. Arab and Muslim governments should coordinate diplomatic efforts to end the occupation, protect civilians, oppose forced displacement and establish a credible political process grounded in Palestinian rights and self-determination. Such a policy would not eliminate every regional rivalry, but it would give collective diplomacy a clearer purpose and a stronger claim to legitimacy.
The region also needs a principle that applies to every state: security cannot mean unlimited freedom of action for the powerful and permanent insecurity for everyone else. A durable order must recognise that one country’s safety cannot be built indefinitely on the denial of another people’s rights.
Beyond military superiority
Israel may preserve its military edge. Arab and Muslim states may expand their defence cooperation and reduce their dependence on external powers. Neither development, on its own, will resolve the region’s fundamental conflicts.
The decisive test is whether regional leaders can move beyond a narrow contest over weapons, alliances and deterrence to build a framework that connects security with justice, development and political legitimacy. That requires more than stronger armies and more centralised military planning. It requires institutions that manage rivalries, diplomacy that addresses the causes of conflict, and a shared commitment to the rights and security of the people who live in the region.
The Arab and Islamic world possesses a deep intellectual, cultural and legal heritage from which to draw. It must also engage seriously with contemporary international law and the universal principles of human rights. Neither tradition can be reduced to rhetoric; both must inform policies that protect human dignity and create the conditions for lasting peace.
The question facing the region is not simply how to counter Israel’s security doctrine. It is whether Arab and Muslim governments can articulate a better one—an approach in which military strength serves a political settlement rather than substitutes for it, and in which national security is measured not only by the survival of states, but also by the safety, dignity and rights of their peoples.
Until that shift takes place, the Middle East risks remaining trapped in a cycle in which every new security doctrine promises stability while laying the groundwork for the next confrontation.
