Why Jordan? Why Now?

By Hadi Elis

The attack on a Greek Orthodox church in southern Jordan raises a question that cannot be answered by looking at the crime scene alone: why Jordan, and why now?

According to accounts of the incident, armed assailants attacked mourners at St. George’s Greek Orthodox Church in Hammoud, in Karak Governorate, on Friday, 23 October 2026, killing nine people. If confirmed, the attack would represent more than an assault on a religious gathering. It would strike at a society whose stability has long depended on the ability of Muslims and Christians to live alongside one another, even as the region around them has been torn apart by war, extremism and sectarian violence.

The question is not simply who carried out the attack. It is whether the perpetrators acted alone, whether they had links to wider extremist networks, and whether the political and security turmoil across Jordan’s northern border has created conditions that threaten the kingdom itself.

Those questions deserve serious investigation. They also demand something that has often been missing from the international debate about Syria: a willingness to examine the consequences of empowering armed Islamist movements once they become politically useful.

Syria’s Unfinished Reckoning

Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024, Syria has entered a new and uncertain political chapter. The rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa and the authorities associated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has presented Western governments and regional powers with a difficult choice. They can pursue engagement in the hope of stabilising Syria, or maintain greater distance because of the new leadership’s origins in the jihadist movement.

That dilemma is real. So is the danger of confusing a change in political presentation with a complete transformation of an organisation’s ideology, personnel and networks.

Al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, led Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s former affiliate in Syria, before the group underwent a series of organisational and political transformations. HTS subsequently sought to distinguish itself from al-Qaeda and present itself as a Syrian political and military force. But a new name, a different public image and a leader wearing a suit do not, by themselves, settle questions about an organisation’s past or the loyalties of the people who helped build it.

The relevant questions are straightforward. Have former jihadist networks been dismantled? Have individuals implicated in serious abuses been held accountable? What guarantees exist for religious minorities? And can Syria’s new authorities demonstrate, through their conduct rather than their public statements, that they are prepared to govern a diverse country without imposing extremist rule?

For Jordan, these are not abstract questions of foreign policy. Syria shares a border with the kingdom, and instability there has direct consequences for Jordanian security, trade, refugees and the movement of armed groups.

Ankara’s Complicated Record

Türkiye’s role in Syria deserves particular scrutiny. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government has been one of the most influential external actors in the Syrian conflict, pursuing its own security interests, supporting selected opposition forces and intervening militarily. Ankara has also opposed Kurdish armed groups that it considers terrorist organisations, even when those groups have fought the Islamic State.

This history has produced difficult questions about consistency. In June 2016, Erdoğan publicly challenged Western governments over their distinction between Kurdish forces fighting ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, which also fought ISIS in some circumstances. His remarks drew attention to the competing definitions of terrorism that have shaped the Syrian war. Different actors have labelled armed groups according to their own security priorities, sometimes obscuring the groups’ histories, methods and ideological affiliations.

The broader issue is not whether every organisation that fought ISIS should be treated alike. It is whether governments have applied consistent standards when deciding which armed movements deserve support, protection or political engagement.

Claims that elements within the Turkish or Qatari governments provided material or logistical assistance to particular jihadist groups have circulated for years. Such allegations should be assessed against the underlying intelligence, official records and independently corroborated evidence rather than repeated as settled fact. The same standard should apply to claims about British involvement in shaping Syria’s post-Assad political order.

Yet the central policy question remains. If Western and regional governments engage with former Islamist insurgents because they believe those actors can deliver stability, what happens if the new authorities fail to protect minorities, contain radical networks or prevent violence from crossing international borders?

Jordan cannot afford to wait for the answer to emerge through another tragedy.

Britain’s Responsibility

Britain, like other Western governments, has had to navigate the tension between counterterrorism and the search for a political settlement in Syria. Diplomatic engagement with new authorities may be defensible if it helps prevent renewed conflict, protects civilians and reduces the space available to transnational terrorist organisations.

But engagement must come with conditions. Recognition, diplomatic access and international assistance should not become blank cheques for leaders whose movements have emerged from extremist backgrounds. Governments should be judged by whether they protect minorities, prevent sectarian reprisals, cooperate against international terrorism and establish accountable institutions.

The question for London is not whether dialogue with Syria’s new leadership should be ruled out under all circumstances. It is what evidence would justify confidence in that leadership—and what consequences should follow if its commitments are broken.

Britain should explain how it assesses the transformation of HTS, what safeguards it expects from Syria’s authorities, and how it intends to ensure that counterterrorism cooperation does not come at the expense of vulnerable communities. The same questions should be put to Ankara, whose influence over northern Syria gives it considerable leverage but also places responsibility on its decisions.

For Jordan, transparency is essential. Its security concerns should not be dismissed as an obstacle to diplomatic normalisation, particularly when the consequences of a miscalculation could be felt first along its own borders.

Jordan Knows the Cost of Extremism

Jordan is not a stranger to the threat posed by jihadist movements. Jordanian citizens have travelled to Syria to join armed factions, including Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. The Syrian war offered extremist recruiters an environment in which to exploit grievance, religious rhetoric and the collapse of state authority. The return, movement or reactivation of such networks remains a legitimate security concern for Jordan and its neighbours.

But it would be a mistake to treat every Islamist, every religious conservative or every supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist. Political movements, religious organisations and armed jihadist groups are not interchangeable categories. Conflating them weakens the analysis and risks alienating communities whose cooperation is important to national security.

The challenge is to identify those who advocate or organise violence, trace their networks and hold them accountable under the law. That requires intelligence, careful investigation and judicial process—not collective suspicion.

If investigators establish that the attack in Karak involved individuals connected to extremist networks operating in Syria, the implications would be grave. But the connection must be demonstrated, not presumed. The identities and affiliations of the attackers, their sources of support and any external direction should be established through evidence.

Jordan’s response must be firm, but it must also be precise. The kingdom’s strength lies not only in its security institutions, but in the public confidence those institutions must preserve.

The Danger Beyond the Border

Syria’s transition has left unresolved questions about armed factions, foreign influence and the future of security institutions. Reports concerning the transfer or release of ISIS detainees from facilities previously controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces have also raised concerns about the possibility of extremist networks re-emerging. Such developments require close scrutiny, because the consequences of prison breaks, weakened detention systems or the dispersal of experienced fighters could extend well beyond Syria.

For Jordan, the concern is not that every former insurgent will become a terrorist again. It is that a fragmented security environment can create opportunities for individuals and organisations that retain the capacity and intention to carry out attacks.

This is where the interests of Jordan, Türkiye, Britain and other external actors intersect. If the new Syrian authorities are to become credible partners, they must demonstrate that they can prevent armed groups from operating beyond the state’s control. They must also show that the country will not become a refuge for networks that threaten neighbouring states.

Any failure on these fronts would undermine the argument that political accommodation with former insurgent movements has produced stability. It would also place Jordan in the position of managing risks created by decisions over which it has had limited influence.

The international community should therefore demand clear answers about the status of former jihadist fighters, the treatment of detainees, the protection of minorities and the ability of Syria’s security institutions to control the territory under their authority.

Why Jordan, and Why Now?

The timing of the Karak attack, if the reported details are confirmed, will inevitably raise suspicions. But timing alone cannot establish a wider conspiracy, and the existence of extremist networks in Syria does not prove that the Syrian authorities directed or supported an attack inside Jordan.

The more productive approach is to ask what investigators have established, what remains unknown and whether any evidence points to a cross-border network. Jordan should pursue those questions with its partners while insisting that any findings be examined on their merits.

At the same time, the attack should prompt a broader review of the assumptions underpinning regional policy. Governments that supported armed factions during the Syrian war must explain how they assess the risks posed by those factions today. Those now engaging with Syria’s new authorities should identify the conditions attached to that engagement and the evidence required to show that the country is moving away from extremism.

No country should be asked to accept security risks simply because powerful governments have decided that a former militant movement is now a useful political partner.

Jordan has a particular reason to be vigilant. It has maintained relative stability through years of conflict in its neighbourhood, while absorbing the economic and social pressures created by regional wars. That stability should not be taken for granted, nor should Jordan’s security concerns be subordinated to the diplomatic priorities of other capitals.

The attack in Karak must first be investigated as a crime against innocent people. If wider extremist links are established, those responsible should face justice, and any external networks involved should be exposed. If no such links are found, that conclusion must also be respected.

But the strategic question will remain: can the region build a durable political order in Syria without repeating the mistake of treating armed extremists as acceptable partners whenever their immediate interests align with those of outside powers?

Jordan deserves a clear answer from Ankara, London and every government seeking influence in Damascus. Its citizens should not have to bear the consequences of a regional strategy that prizes short-term political convenience over long-term security.

The question is no longer merely what Syria’s new leaders say they have become. It is what they are prepared to prove. For Jordan, the difference could be measured in lives.