Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Maya Berri
The relationship between the United States and Israel has long been described as exceptional, built on strategic cooperation, military assistance, shared political interests and close personal ties between leaders. Yet beneath that partnership lies a persistent tension: how far should either country go in influencing the domestic politics of the other?
President Donald Trump’s public support for Benjamin Netanyahu has brought that question back into focus. What was once managed largely through diplomatic convention and behind-the-scenes pressure has become increasingly visible, exposing the political risks of a relationship in which personal alliances can sometimes complicate institutional ties.
The history of US-Israeli relations offers several precedents. From George H. W. Bush’s confrontation with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in 1991 to Bill Clinton’s involvement in Israel’s 1996 election campaign and Netanyahu’s increasingly partisan approach to American politics, elections have repeatedly become a testing ground for the alliance. The difference today is the degree of openness with which political leaders appear willing to cross traditional boundaries.
An Exceptional Relationship, but Not an Unlimited One
The strategic partnership between Washington and Tel Aviv deepened significantly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and became more firmly established following the 1973 war. Over subsequent decades, the United States provided Israel with substantial military assistance, diplomatic support and political backing, including at critical moments in negotiations with the Palestinians and other regional actors.
Former US diplomat Aaron David Miller explored the political dynamics of this relationship in his book The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace. His account highlights the difficulties American administrations have faced in balancing support for Israel with broader diplomatic objectives and the pursuit of an Arab-Israeli settlement.
But strategic partnership has never meant the absence of disagreement. American presidents have sometimes challenged Israeli governments over settlements, negotiations and regional policy. The relationship has also been shaped by a long-standing expectation that Israeli leaders should maintain constructive ties with both major American political parties.
That convention served Israel’s interests. Because the US presidency and Congress can change hands, cultivating bipartisan support helped protect the relationship from the consequences of individual electoral victories and defeats. It also reduced the risk that Israel would become a partisan issue in American domestic politics.
For decades, this balancing act was an important, if imperfect, feature of Israeli diplomacy. More recently, however, the relationship has become increasingly entangled in the partisan divisions of both countries.
The 1991 Confrontation: Bush Challenges Shamir
One of the clearest demonstrations of the limits of the alliance came in 1991, when President George H. W. Bush clashed with Shamir over Israeli settlement policy and proposed US loan guarantees worth $10 billion.
Bush’s administration sought to use the guarantees as leverage in a dispute over settlements and Israel’s approach to the peace process. Shamir, meanwhile, sought congressional support for the financial assistance despite the White House’s objections.
According to accounts discussed in JJ Goldberg’s book Jewish Power, Shamir encouraged American Jewish organisations to mobilise activists to lobby members of Congress in favour of the guarantees. The campaign was designed to demonstrate that Israel and its supporters could exert considerable influence on Capitol Hill even when their priorities conflicted with those of the president.
On September 12, 1991, Bush publicly addressed the political pressure surrounding the dispute, highlighting the difficulty of advancing his administration’s position amid an organised lobbying campaign.
The confrontation became a defining moment in the relationship. It demonstrated that even a close strategic partner could face direct resistance from an American president when their policies diverged.
Shamir subsequently lost the Israeli election to Yitzhak Rabin in 1992. Some of his supporters argued that tensions with Washington had damaged his political position, although the election outcome cannot be attributed to the dispute alone. Bush, meanwhile, lost the US presidential election to Bill Clinton later that year. The suggestion that his confrontation with pro-Israel lobbying groups contributed to his defeat has appeared in political commentary, but the election had multiple causes, and the relationship between the dispute and Bush’s loss remains a matter of interpretation.
The episode nevertheless established an important precedent: disagreements over policy can spill into domestic politics on both sides, with consequences that neither government can fully control.
Clinton, Peres and the 1996 Election
The political sensitivities became visible again in Israel’s 1996 election, when Netanyahu challenged incumbent Prime Minister Shimon Peres.
Clinton’s administration was strongly invested in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the president’s meetings and public engagement with Peres were interpreted by some observers as favourable to the Israeli leader’s campaign. Former diplomat Miller subsequently discussed the broader question of American involvement in Israeli electoral politics, including in commentary published by the Los Angeles Times.
Netanyahu criticised the use of relations with Washington for domestic political advantage. The irony was striking: a politician who would later cultivate an unusually close relationship with Republican presidents was then warning against an Israeli leader appearing to benefit from American political support.
The episode underscored the difficulty of separating diplomacy from electoral competition. A presidential visit or high-profile summit may be intended to advance foreign policy, but when it occurs during an election campaign, it can be interpreted as an endorsement—even without an explicit declaration of support.
The lesson is not that every diplomatic engagement amounts to election interference. Rather, political timing and public presentation matter, particularly when a foreign leader’s electoral fortunes are closely tied to relations with Washington.
September 11 and the Personalisation of the Alliance
The September 11, 2001 attacks ushered in a new phase in US-Israeli relations. Under President George W. Bush, cooperation on counterterrorism and regional security became increasingly prominent. Israeli leaders presented their country’s struggle against Palestinian armed groups within the wider framework of the international campaign against terrorism, a framing that resonated with important elements of the Bush administration.
Personal relationships also played a role. Former US national security adviser Brent Scowcroft reportedly expressed concern about Bush’s close relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. In remarks attributed to him by the Financial Times, Scowcroft suggested that Sharon had considerable influence over the president’s thinking.
Such accounts illustrate a recurring feature of the alliance: personal chemistry between leaders can accelerate cooperation, but it can also raise questions about whether policy decisions are being driven by a sufficiently independent assessment of American interests.
This distinction is particularly important when decisions involve military force. Close relationships may facilitate communication and coordination, but they do not remove the need for each government to assess the strategic costs, risks and long-term consequences of its choices.
Netanyahu’s Partisan Turn in Washington
Netanyahu’s relationship with American domestic politics became more openly partisan in 2012, when he was widely seen as favouring Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney over Democratic President Barack Obama.
The tension intensified in March 2015, when Netanyahu addressed the US Congress in opposition to the Obama administration’s emerging nuclear agreement with Iran. The speech was arranged without the usual coordination with the White House and came just weeks before Israel’s own election.
Obama declined to meet Netanyahu during the visit, in part to avoid creating the impression that the administration was intervening in the Israeli electoral contest. The episode strained relations with congressional Democrats and challenged the convention that Israeli leaders should avoid becoming aligned too closely with one American party.
Controversy also surrounded the activities of OneVoice, a peace-focused organisation that had received US State Department funding for civil-society initiatives. Its infrastructure and activist networks were subsequently used in activities associated with the anti-Netanyahu V15 campaign.
A bipartisan Senate investigation examined the matter in 2016. According to the report described in the source account, OneVoice received approximately $349,000 from the State Department for peace-related activities, and resources developed through its work were later used in connection with V15. However, the investigation did not find that US grant money had been directly spent to influence the 2015 Israeli election, nor did it establish that the Obama administration had violated the law.
That distinction is essential. Political controversy and the appearance of indirect benefit do not, on their own, establish that a government deliberately financed an election campaign. The case nevertheless demonstrated how foreign-funded civic initiatives can become entangled in domestic political disputes, even when the original funding has a different stated purpose.
Trump and Netanyahu: A New Level of Visibility
The relationship between Trump and Netanyahu has taken this personal and partisan dimension further. The two leaders have often presented their political and strategic interests as closely aligned, particularly on Iran and regional security.
A book published in June 2026 by New York Times journalists Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, Regime Change: Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump, reportedly examines the internal deliberations surrounding major presidential decisions, including the influence Netanyahu allegedly exerted during discussions over Iran.
Such accounts raise an important question about the relationship between persuasion and decision-making. Foreign leaders routinely seek to influence American policy, just as US presidents press allies to support Washington’s objectives. The crucial issue is whether the American president’s final decisions reflect an independent assessment of US interests, including the potential military, economic and diplomatic consequences.
Netanyahu’s public support from Trump also raises a separate question: what happens when an American president openly backs an Israeli leader during an electoral contest? The significance lies not simply in the endorsement itself, but in the possibility that it further entangles the Israeli leader’s political standing with the fortunes of an American president.
The political consequences are difficult to predict. Some Israeli voters may interpret Trump’s backing as evidence of strong international support. Others may regard such intervention as an unwelcome attempt by a foreign leader to influence Israel’s domestic choices. Its ultimate effect depends on the electorate, the campaign context and the issues that dominate the election.
The Domestic Politics of the Alliance Are Changing
These developments are unfolding amid a broader debate in the United States about the country’s relationship with Israel. Public opinion has become more divided, particularly over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conduct of Israeli military operations. Support for Palestinian rights has also become more visible in sections of American political life, including among younger voters and some Democratic constituencies.
The political role of pro-Israel advocacy organisations, including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has attracted growing scrutiny. Critics argue that political spending and lobbying can complicate efforts to debate US policy toward Israel on its merits. Supporters of these organisations maintain that advocacy is a legitimate part of the American political system and that their activities represent the views of citizens who favour a strong US-Israel partnership.
These arguments should be examined through evidence rather than sweeping generalisations about any community or lobbying network. The United States permits organised political advocacy within a legal framework, and the existence of a lobbying organisation does not, by itself, establish improper influence. The relevant questions concern transparency, campaign finance, policy accountability and whether elected officials can make decisions without undue pressure.
For Israel, the challenge is equally practical. A relationship closely identified with one American party or president may appear advantageous in the short term, but it risks becoming more vulnerable when political power changes hands. The durability of the alliance depends not only on personal ties between leaders but also on support across Congress, the wider political establishment and the American public.
Beyond Personal Alliances
From Bush and Shamir to Clinton and Peres, and from Netanyahu’s confrontation with Obama to his close relationship with Trump, the history of US-Israeli relations demonstrates that electoral politics have never been entirely separate from strategic cooperation.
What has changed is the degree to which political leaders appear willing to make those connections explicit. The traditional preference for maintaining bipartisan relationships has weakened, while personal alliances have become more visible and more closely linked to domestic political competition.
The central question is whether this trend strengthens the alliance or makes it more vulnerable. Public endorsements can signal solidarity and reinforce cooperation between leaders, but they can also invite accusations of foreign interference, deepen partisan divisions and make long-term policy continuity more difficult.
For Washington, the test is whether decisions on Israel and the wider Middle East remain grounded in a clear assessment of American national interests. For Israel, it is whether a close relationship with one president can be maintained without alienating significant parts of the American political spectrum.
The alliance may remain exceptional, but no partnership is immune to changing public opinion, institutional constraints or electoral turnover. Its future will depend less on the personal bond between Trump and Netanyahu than on whether both countries can sustain a relationship that survives their leaders—and the elections that brought them to power.
