Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
As Israel approaches its October 27 parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be adding a new adversary to his increasingly crowded regional threat narrative: Turkey. The latest confrontation between Jerusalem and Ankara over Syria is therefore about more than a military dispute over an airbase near Aleppo. It reflects the intersection of Israeli security calculations, Turkey’s expanding role in post-Assad Syria, and Netanyahu’s domestic political struggle. Following an Israeli airstrike on the Abu al-Duhur military airbase in northwestern Syria, Netanyahu acknowledged that Israel had struck the facility after warning Turkey against establishing a military presence there. He argued that Israel would not permit a Turkish military deployment extending southward because it would constitute a security threat. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz subsequently accused President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of dragging Turkey into “dangerous adventures” in Syria. Yet the timing is impossible to ignore. Netanyahu’s campaign has already placed Erdoğan among the international leaders portrayed as wanting him to lose the election. The transformation of Turkey from a strategic competitor into a prominent electoral antagonist therefore appears to serve two purposes simultaneously: deterring Ankara and mobilizing Netanyahu’s political base around another external threat.
The emerging Israeli-Turkish confrontation is particularly complicated because Turkey is not Iran. Ankara is a NATO member, maintains extensive relations with Washington, and possesses considerable diplomatic, economic and military weight. Erdoğan also maintains a relationship with President Donald Trump that could constrain Israel’s freedom of action. Unlike Iran, Turkey is embedded in Western security institutions and has substantial leverage over developments in Syria, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. Turkey was also historically one of Israel’s most important regional partners, and the two countries developed extensive trade, military and intelligence relationships before their relationship deteriorated dramatically following the Gaza war. Ankara subsequently suspended trade with Israel and adopted an increasingly confrontational political position toward Netanyahu’s government. This creates a strategic paradox for Israel: Turkey is simultaneously a potential adversary, an indispensable actor in Syria and a country whose confrontation with Israel could complicate Jerusalem’s relationship with Washington. Israeli opposition figures have already warned that military action against Turkish interests risks transforming a manageable strategic rivalry into a direct confrontation with a NATO member. For Netanyahu, therefore, the Turkish file carries considerably greater diplomatic risk than simply adding another hostile government to Israel’s regional threat matrix.
Syria is the arena in which these competing interests are now colliding. Turkey has invested heavily in the post-Assad political order and has supported the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, viewing a stable and unified Syria as essential to its security and economic interests. Ankara’s priorities include limiting Kurdish armed groups near its southern border, encouraging Syrian economic recovery and creating conditions under which millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey can eventually return. Israel has a different strategic conception of Syrian stability. Jerusalem wants Syria to remain sufficiently stable to prevent state collapse and uncontrolled militant activity, but it also seeks to prevent the emergence of a powerful military actor capable of threatening Israel from Syrian territory. This explains why Turkish military activity in Syria is increasingly viewed in Jerusalem through the same strategic lens previously applied to Iranian entrenchment. The problem is that Ankara does not see itself as another Iran. Turkey considers Syria part of its immediate security environment and views its involvement as legitimate strategic policy. Israel, meanwhile, sees the potential establishment of Turkish military infrastructure close to areas of Israeli operational interest as a development that could fundamentally alter the regional balance. Damascus therefore risks becoming the battlefield not only for competing Syrian visions but also for a larger contest between Ankara and Jerusalem.
Netanyahu’s political incentives make the situation even more volatile. His government faces criticism from opposition forces that Israel has not achieved all of its declared objectives from the wars and military campaigns of recent years. The unresolved Gaza conflict, the continuing challenge posed by Hamas and the failure to eliminate every dimension of Iran’s regional influence provide political ammunition to his opponents. Introducing Turkey into the security narrative offers Netanyahu another opportunity to present himself as the leader capable of confronting Israel’s enemies. The danger is that electoral securitization can narrow strategic choices. Once a foreign leader becomes part of a domestic political campaign, backing away from confrontation can become politically costly. Netanyahu’s portrayal of Erdoğan as part of an international coalition seeking his defeat may therefore create incentives for both rhetoric and military signaling to intensify. This is precisely why analysts have warned that further Israeli action against Turkey could make Netanyahu appear internationally as a leader willing to escalate conflicts for political survival. The United States represents the critical variable. Trump may support Israel strongly, but Washington also has strategic interests in maintaining NATO cohesion and managing Turkey’s regional role. Netanyahu cannot assume that American support for Israel automatically translates into unconditional American backing for confrontation with Ankara.
The strategic question is therefore whether Netanyahu is preparing Israel for a genuine long-term Turkish threat or transforming Turkey into the “new enemy” because it is politically and strategically useful. The distinction matters. Turkey undoubtedly represents a serious emerging challenge to Israeli freedom of action in Syria, particularly if Ankara establishes durable military infrastructure and deepens its partnership with Damascus. But treating Turkey simply as another Iran would be strategically misleading. Ankara has different interests, greater conventional capabilities, NATO membership, strong ties to the United States and its own considerable influence over Syria. For Syria, the immediate danger is that it becomes the arena in which Israeli and Turkish strategic competition is militarized. Damascus therefore faces a difficult balancing act: Turkey wants a unified and functional Syrian state, while Israel wants a stable Syria that remains below a military threshold capable of producing a new threat. The two objectives overlap but are not identical. Netanyahu’s challenge is to prevent this rivalry from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, particularly during an election campaign. If Turkey becomes a permanent feature of Israel’s threat narrative, the Middle East could be entering a new strategic phase in which the principal competition is no longer simply Israel versus Iran, but a triangular contest involving Israel, Turkey and the emerging post-Assad Syrian order. The irony is that Netanyahu may discover that turning Erdoğan into an electoral enemy could make Turkey a strategic enemy long after the ballots have been counted.
