Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim
Ukraine is emerging as an important supplier of counter-unmanned aerial system, or C-UAS, expertise to the Middle East. After defending its cities, military bases, and energy infrastructure against Russian-operated, Iranian-designed drones for years, Ukraine has extensive experience in detecting and intercepting—at around 80 to 85 percent—Shahed-type drones.
In March 2026, President Zelensky announced that over 200 Ukrainian experts had been sent to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan to support their drone defenses. Reports suggest that the Ukrainian team is providing training, command-and-control expertise, and drone-interception technology.
Some specific arguments about Ukraine’s deployments—which include radar locations, acoustic-sensor networks, and interceptor stockpiles within Qatar—have come from Russian military-affiliated sources and have not been verified. Nonetheless, the broader development is significant since Ukraine is exporting combat-proven methods for defeating inexpensive one-way drones.
However, Ukraine cannot offer everything that Middle Eastern countries wish for. Ukraine’s strength lies in battlefield adaptation, low-cost interceptors, and rapidly updated operational procedures. Meanwhile, South Korea can complement these capabilities with standardized sensors, mobile air-defense systems, electronic warfare, directed-energy weapons, and long-term industrial support.
From Battlefield to Sustainable Defense
Ukraine’s C-UAS model combines radar, acoustic sensors, visual observations, electronic warfare, and interceptor drones through a joint command network.
Its main advantage is cost-effectiveness. Instead of launching expensive surface-to-air missiles against all incoming drones, Ukrainian forces increasingly employ affordable interceptor drones and reserve advanced missiles for high-end threats such as cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.
Such an approach is particularly relevant to Gulf states. Although Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE operate sophisticated air- and missile-defense systems, their airports, desalination facilities, oil refineries, ports, and military bases remain vulnerable to low-flying drones.
Ukraine could teach Gulf forces how to manage repeated drone attacks. On the other hand, South Korea could help establish the permanent structure needed to sustain that effort.
Building a Dense Sensor Network
The first field in which South Korea needs to be involved is detection. Shahed-type drones fly at relatively low speeds and altitudesand potentially exploit the gaps in conventional radar coverage. Therefore, Gulf countries need a network that aligns small radars, electro-optical cameras, passive radio-frequency detectors, and acoustic sensors.
South Korean companies such as Hanwha Systems already produce drone-detection radars and electronic countermeasures.
These sensors could be linked with Ukrainian command-and-control software that categorizes incoming drones, predicts their flight paths, and allocates appropriate interceptors. By providing secure communications, standardized interfaces, and cybersecurity protection, South Korea could allow Ukrainian systems to be connected to existing U.S., European, and Gulf air-defense networks.
Gulf countries should construct defense clusters near critical infrastructure rather than attempting nationwide coverage.
Qatar should prioritize Ras Laffan, Hamad International Airport, Al Udeid Air Base, and major desalination plants. The UAE should focus on Fujairah, Jebel Ali, Ruwais, and key facilities near Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia should safeguard Ras Tanura, Jubail, Abqaiq, Yanbu, and core water infrastructure.
Matching Each Threat with the Appropriate Means
The resulting command network should decide the least expensive and most effective response to each threat.
Interceptor drones can engage most slow one-way attack drones. Electronic warfare could disrupt systems that depend on satellite navigation or radio control. Mobile guns and short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems can protect important facilities. Patriot, THAAD, and other advanced systems can continue to be used against ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
This could reduce the risk of wasting multimillion-dollar missiles against relatively inexpensive drones.
South Korea could offer mobile systems derived from the K30 Biho family. Upgraded versions could include programmable ammunition, improved radar cueing, short-range missiles, jammers, and remote operation.
These systems should form a terminal-defense layer near airports, command centers, air-defense radars, ammunition depots, LNG terminals, and desalination facilities. Ukraine could provide operational data on Shahed flight behavior, while South Korean manufacturers could adapt systems in accordance with the Gulf region’s high temperatures, dust, and maintenance needs.
Electronic Warfare and Lasers
South Korea could also provide electronic-warfare systems that could detect and jam small drones.
Although jamming could be effective against some systems derived from commercial technologies, it could be less reliable against autonomous drones using inertial navigation or hardened communications. Hence, it should complement, rather than replace, physical interception.
South Korea’s Cheongwang laser air-defense system could provide an additional point-defense layer. Lasers offer a low cost per engagement and can be useful in protecting fixed sites with sufficient electrical power.
Nonetheless, their performance could be undermined by dust, smoke, fog, and other unfavorable atmospheric conditions. These limitations are particularly important in the Gulf region. Thus, lasers should be operated alongside interceptor drones, guns, and electronic warfare.
Building Regional Sustainment Capacity
South Korea’s most important contribution would be its capability to transform Ukraine’s wartime model into an institutional system.
Ukraine can help deploy experienced instructors and establish operational procedures. South Korea could offer training simulators, maintenance programs, spare-parts inventories, and long-term technological support.
Each participating country should establish a C-UAS training and maintenance center. Ukrainian personnel could develop an initial combat education course, while South Korean firms could train technicians and establish certification and maintenance procedures.
Local production could start with interceptor-drone airframes, batteries, motors, and acoustic sensors. Saudi Arabia and the UAE could host production and maintenance hubs, while Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan could specialize in training, testing, and exercises.
By generating additional production capacity, such cooperation could also benefit Ukraine.
Complementary Partnership
Ukraine and South Korea should not compete to provide separate C-UAS packages.
Ukraine’s comparative advantage is combat experience. It understands how the aggressor varies routes, timing, altitude, and the composition of salvo attacks, and how defensive networks must adapt.
South Korea’s strength hinges on industrial sustainability. It could produce reliable systems at scale, integrate them into structured air-defense networks, and maintain them for years.
Taken together, both countries could present a comprehensive C-UAS solution to Middle Eastern countries that combines Ukraine’s battlefield knowledge with South Korea’s sensors, manufacturing capacity, and logistical support.
Ukraine can offer the operational brain of this system, while South Korea can supply the industrial backbone required to make it happen.
Author’s Bio:
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim currently serves as a President at the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly. He has been involved in numerous defense projects and has provided consultation to several key organizations, including the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, the Ministry of National Defense, the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, the Agency for Defense Development, and the Korea Research Institute for Defense Technology Planning and Advancement. He holds a doctoral degree in international relations from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan, a master’s degree in conflict management from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a degree in public policy from Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Public Administration (GSPA). Dr. Kim has written extensively on international security, diplomacy, and alliance management. His work has appeared in a wide range of respected outlets, including the Lowy Institute, The Strategist, CIMSEC, Britain’s World, The Diplomat, War on the Rocks, 38 North, Breaking Defense, Modern War Institute, Small Wars Journal, Geopolitical Monitor, The Geopolitics, Global Defense Insight, Global Taiwan Institute, RealClearDefense, Asia Times, Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, Central European Institute of Asian Studies, Visegrad Insight, Defense Opinion, SOF News, Irregular Warfare Initiative, WavellRoom, East Asia Forum, Pearls and Irritations, Institute for Security & Development Policy, Center for Maritime Strategy, Defense Daily, Fulcrum, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Maritime Executive, International Policy Digest, NK News, Korea Pro, E International Relations, Euromaidan Press, Institute for Diplomacy and Economy, the Australian Centre for International Studies, the Times of Israel, the Australian Naval Institute, Parley Policy Initiative, European Guanxi, Eurasia Review, and the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy.
