Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Rania Al Horani
The most consequential outcome of the US-Israeli war against Iran may not be decided on the battlefield. It may emerge instead from the diplomatic calculations of the Gulf states, which are increasingly confronted with a difficult question: is the greater threat to their security Iran itself, or a widening war whose objectives, timing and costs are largely determined by Washington and Tel Aviv?
The conflict could push Iran’s Arab neighbours toward a new regional security arrangement. Such a development would not necessarily reflect renewed trust in Tehran. Rather, it could arise from a shared fear that the existing security framework is no longer sufficient to protect the region from the consequences of a war it did not choose.
The possibility presents a strategic paradox for the United States and Israel. A campaign intended to weaken Iran, constrain its regional influence and compel it to change course could instead encourage neighbouring states to engage Tehran diplomatically and consider a regional security framework that gives Iran a place at the table.
The limits of the American security guarantee
For decades, the Gulf states have relied heavily on American military power, intelligence cooperation, arms sales and security partnerships. US bases and deployments have been central to the regional balance of power, offering Gulf governments a measure of deterrence against external threats, including Iran.
Yet the presence of American forces does not eliminate vulnerability. In a major confrontation, military installations on Gulf territory can become targets, potentially exposing host countries to retaliation even when they are not direct participants in the conflict. The same arrangements designed to provide protection can therefore create additional risks when tensions escalate.
A senior Turkish diplomat argued that Washington’s posture has shifted from direct involvement toward a more distant approach, leaving regional governments with greater responsibility for their own security. The report also cites remarks by Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy for Syria and Iraq, about the limits of direct American control and the need for Middle Eastern governments to assume greater responsibility.
These statements point to a wider debate about the meaning of the American security commitment. Washington may not be preparing to abandon the region, but its priorities are changing, and its partners must consider whether American support will always be available on the scale and under the conditions they expect.
The distinction matters. A reduction in Washington’s willingness to undertake large-scale military interventions does not necessarily mean the end of American influence. The United States can retain extensive diplomatic, military and economic leverage while asking its regional partners to carry more of the burden. For Gulf governments, however, the challenge is to reconcile continued dependence on American capabilities with a growing need for strategic flexibility.
Strategic autonomy does not mean abandoning Washington
Türkiye has increasingly promoted the idea that regional states should reduce their dependence on external security guarantees and develop stronger mechanisms for managing their own crises. This approach does not require severing ties with Washington or replacing American power with another patron. It calls for a wider range of diplomatic and security options.
For the Gulf states, such autonomy could involve stronger coordination on air and missile defence, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, intelligence sharing and crisis communication. It could also mean developing channels through which regional governments can manage tensions with Iran before they escalate into direct confrontation.
The objective would not be to create an anti-American bloc. Nor would it necessarily require a formal military alliance that includes every regional power. Instead, it would involve building a more resilient security architecture in which regional states have greater influence over decisions that affect their survival and economic stability.
Such a framework would remain difficult to construct. Gulf countries have different threat perceptions, different relationships with Washington and different calculations concerning Tehran. They also compete for influence and leadership. A common interest in avoiding a regional war does not automatically translate into agreement on how to prevent one.
Nevertheless, the prospect of being drawn into a conflict with consequences for energy exports, shipping, infrastructure and investment could encourage cooperation that would otherwise be politically difficult.
Iran remains a threat, but war carries its own dangers
Any serious discussion of regional security must recognise the concerns that Gulf governments have expressed about Iran’s missile capabilities, drone operations and regional activities. A diplomatic opening would not erase these concerns, nor would it guarantee that Tehran would abandon policies its neighbours regard as threatening.
The more immediate question is whether military escalation can deliver lasting security or whether it will deepen the vulnerabilities it is meant to eliminate.
The report raises the possibility of attacks on critical infrastructure, including airports, desalination facilities, government institutions and digital communications networks. These scenarios should be understood as risks cited in the report, not as confirmed Iranian operational plans. Their significance lies in the exposure of modern Gulf economies: essential services, commercial activity and public confidence depend on systems that can be disrupted without the occupation of territory.
Water security is particularly sensitive. Gulf states rely heavily on desalination to meet their freshwater needs. Energy facilities, ports, shipping lanes and communications cables are similarly important to economic continuity. Any sustained conflict that threatens these assets could impose costs far beyond the immediate military theatre.
This is why regional governments may be reluctant to join a broader war, even when they remain deeply concerned about Iranian actions. Their priority is not simply to choose a side. It is to prevent the conflict from spreading to their territory, damaging their economies and undermining the stability on which their development strategies depend.
The emerging importance of regional diplomacy
The conflict is unfolding across several interconnected arenas, including the Gulf, the Red Sea and Gaza, with Lebanon and Syria remaining potential sources of further instability. These theatres cannot be treated as entirely separate. Escalation in one can affect maritime security, energy markets, military deployments and diplomatic calculations elsewhere.
In this environment, regional diplomacy could become an instrument of crisis containment rather than a declaration of political alignment. Gulf states might seek arrangements with Iran that establish communication channels, reduce the risk of miscalculation, protect maritime traffic and clarify expectations regarding attacks on civilian infrastructure.
Such engagement would be pragmatic rather than sentimental. States can distrust one another and still recognise the necessity of negotiation. Indeed, diplomacy is often most important when confidence is limited and the consequences of misunderstanding are severe.
Any meaningful agreement would need to address the concerns of all parties. Gulf governments would seek credible assurances concerning missiles, drones, maritime security and attacks on civilian targets. Iran would seek recognition of its security concerns and protection against continued military pressure. The United States and other external powers would remain influential, but a sustainable regional arrangement would be difficult to impose without the participation of the countries expected to live under it.
Türkiye could play a role in facilitating dialogue, given its regional relationships and its interest in preventing a wider war. Other states with established channels to both Gulf capitals and Tehran could also contribute. The challenge would be translating shared anxiety into a diplomatic process with clear objectives, credible commitments and mechanisms for addressing violations.
A new regional order—or another cycle of confrontation?
The central strategic paradox is that a war intended to isolate Iran could make engagement with Tehran more necessary for its neighbours. If Gulf governments conclude that external security guarantees cannot fully protect them from the consequences of escalation, they may seek to diversify their partnerships and establish regional mechanisms that reduce their exposure to decisions made elsewhere.
That would not amount to an Iranian victory in any straightforward sense. Nor would it mean that Arab governments had forgotten previous attacks or accepted Tehran’s regional policies. It would reflect a calculation that geography cannot be changed: Iran will remain a major regional power, and long-term security cannot rest exclusively on the hope that military pressure will resolve every dispute.
The outcome will depend on what regional governments do next. If they respond to the conflict by deepening military coordination while preserving diplomatic channels, they may create a more balanced approach to deterrence and crisis management. If they become divided, or if attacks on civilian and economic infrastructure intensify, the region could instead face a more dangerous cycle of retaliation.
The United States also faces a strategic choice. It can encourage regional states to assume greater responsibility while supporting diplomatic mechanisms that reduce the risk of escalation. Alternatively, if its partners perceive that they are being asked to bear the costs of a conflict without meaningful influence over its direction, their confidence in existing security arrangements may erode.
For Israel, too, the consequences could extend beyond the immediate military campaign. A conflict that drives Gulf states toward greater coordination with one another and cautious engagement with Iran could complicate efforts to build a regional front against Tehran. Military pressure may weaken an adversary in specific domains, but it can also encourage threatened states to reconsider their relationships and strategic priorities.
The broader lesson is that regional security cannot be measured solely by the military damage inflicted on an opponent. It must also be judged by the political order that emerges afterward. A campaign may achieve tactical objectives while producing strategic consequences that its architects did not anticipate.
The Gulf states do not have to choose between unquestioning reliance on Washington and unquestioning accommodation with Tehran. Their more difficult task is to develop a security policy that protects their sovereignty, reduces the risk of regional war and preserves the diplomatic space necessary to manage competing interests.
If the current conflict accelerates that process, the result could be a more autonomous regional order—not necessarily one founded on trust, but one built on the recognition that no external power can permanently resolve the Middle East’s security dilemmas on behalf of the states that live with them.
The question is no longer simply whether Iran can be contained by military force. It is whether the war will leave the region more secure, or persuade its governments that the only sustainable path forward is a diplomatic framework in which even adversaries must find a way to coexist.
