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How might the assassination of Iranian leaders backfire on America and Israel?
The blows backfire on them… America and Israel replace Iranian leaders with others more hardline in war and negotiation – Arabi Post
On Tuesday, March 17, 2026, Israeli officials boasted about the assassination of Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Iranian National Security Council, arguably the most important figure in Iran after the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several other leaders, calling it an “intelligence achievement” and proof of “military prowess.” Meanwhile, Iranians say Larijani was not in hiding and had been walking the streets in recent days.
However, the assassination of a seasoned and pragmatic figure like Larijani, who had engaged in dialogue with the West on several occasions, raises questions about whether Israel and the United States are replacing Iranian leaders—whose departures the regime could easily fill—with more hardline, inflexible, and defiant figures who would challenge Washington and Tel Aviv. This approach carries the risk of backfiring on America and Israel in unexpected ways and producing entirely counterproductive results. How so?
The strikes backfire: America and Israel are replacing Iranian leaders with even more hardline ones.
Despite the boasting in Tel Aviv and Washington about the killing of Iranian leaders like Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani, Ali Shamkhani, and others, many experts on both sides have warned that these strikes will backfire on America and Israel. Instead of weakening the Iranian regime, it will become stronger, more inflexible, and more defiant, based on the profile of each new leader who fills the void.
The New York Times argues that assassinating these leaders will not end the war anytime soon. It will weaken the room for diplomatic maneuver and diminish the number of voices with whom dialogue is relatively possible. This will bring to power leaders who will only engage with America and Israel through further conflict. For example, the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, who was known for his strategic maneuvering, or a pragmatic Iranian leader like Ali Larijani, will increase the chances of other, more hardline leaders against America and Israel, such as the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, Saeed Jalili, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and others.
This is what American intelligence confirms after Larijani’s assassination: that “assassinations are becoming counterproductive… the Iranian regime is hardening, and the Revolutionary Guard is becoming more entrenched and influential.” The Washington Post reports that current US intelligence assessments indicate the Iranian regime is likely to remain in place for the time being, perhaps weakened but more hardline, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) exerting greater control over decision-making.
Intelligence assessments indicate that the war is intensifying and its costs are mounting, reaching nearly $12 billion by March 16, in addition to the deaths of 13 American soldiers and injuries to dozens more, as well as damage to American bases in the region, some of it severe. Iran’s strangulation of the Strait of Hormuz has significantly slowed maritime traffic, causing a historic disruption to global oil supplies.
Western officials and analysts say they see little prospect in the near term of regime change ending the 47-year-old Islamic Republic, or of a more democratic government emerging. Quite the opposite, in fact. This latter goal has been mentioned by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and occasionally by US President Donald Trump, who stated that he would know the war was over “when I feel it deep down.”
As assassinations of senior leaders in Tehran continue, U.S. intelligence assessments issued since the start of the war predict that the Iranian regime will remain intact, and may even become stronger and bolder in taking unforeseen actions, according to two people familiar with these assessments, as reported by The Washington Post.
Meanwhile, a European official says the most likely post-war scenario is the emergence of an “Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps” in Tehran that will retain some nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as support for regional proxies, although the regime will be “deteriorated enough that we are in a better position than we were,” as he put it.
“The Revolutionary Guard Corps has economic power, political power, and an internal security apparatus. It is essentially the center of the power structure within the country,” said Richard Nephew, a senior advisor on Iranian affairs in the Biden and Obama administrations, who is now a scholar at Columbia University. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, the war and the assassinations have not weakened the Revolutionary Guard Corps; rather, they have likely strengthened its resolve. But he added: “This doesn’t mean that water and energy shortages and the economic crisis in Iran won’t reignite popular protests in a few months.”
Assassinations will make it harder for Washington to find a way out of the war.
Assassinating top leaders might confuse the Iranians for a short time, but it could reshape the power structure in Tehran in a way that narrows any diplomatic avenues. While Israel is betting on a “decapitation” strategy to dismantle the Iranian decision-making system and create chaos in the country, the opposite will happen.
American experts say that Larijani represented the hardline faction in the country, but he possessed a communication style with the West that few in the inner circle have. The difference for the Americans is having a figure capable of managing the balance between the military and security institutions and the political fronts, and of translating the regime’s messages to external channels, thus creating room for maneuver when Washington seeks ways out of the war or formulas for de-escalation.
The Wall Street Journal reports that Western diplomats described Larijani as combining “toughness” with openness to dialogue, and that he was one of the few who could push for contact with the West at a moment of compromise.
