Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Mustafa Al-Tal
Beyond “Engineering Fear”
In a previous analysis titled “Engineering Fear: The New Middle East Truce”, we argued that ceasefires in the Middle East are no longer mere temporary pauses in hostilities, but have evolved into sophisticated mechanisms for conflict management and deterrence – a concept we termed “Engineering of Fear.” That analysis concluded that deterrence is no longer bilateral, but an interconnected web of interests and anxieties, and that “Fragile Stability” is the most likely scenario for the region’s future.
However, what the subsequent weeks of the American-Israeli war on Iran have revealed is that this “engineering” is no longer confined to negotiation halls or military operations rooms. It has descended into the streets, into repair shops, into mobile phone stores, into people’s kitchens.
While major powers are preoccupied with redrawing maps of influence in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf, smaller states like Jordan are paying a daily price no less devastating than the cost of missiles and drones.
This analysis is an attempt to expand the “Engineering of Fear” framework to encompass three interconnected levels: the strategic level (great power competition for influence), the regional level (Gulf alliances and rivalries), and the human level (the societies bearing the cost). The war is no longer merely a struggle over energy and influence; it has become a “geopolitical earthquake” that has reshaped everything: from the price of car spare parts in Irbid, to the future of the Gulf alliance, to the global balance of power between America and China.
The Strait of Hormuz – “Partial Opening” as a New Deterrence Strategy
What is happening in the Strait of Hormuz today is not merely a continuation of the war; it is a microcosm of this new phase of conflict. It is a war that is not decided, but managed.
America cannot fully open the strait (militarily and politically impossible), but neither can it allow Iran to cement its closure. Hence, it devised a strategy of “partial opening”: escorting a limited number of ships through the strait under intense military protection, to prove that Iran does not exercise absolute control.
On May 4, 2026, Washington launched “Project Freedom.” The US said it destroyed 7 Iranian boats and thwarted an attack. Iran said none of its boats were hit, but rather that America attacked two civilian boats, killing 5 civilians. Two contradictory narratives, one reality: the strait was not fully opened, but neither is it completely closed anymore.
Herein lies the paradox: after just 48 hours, Trump announced a temporary suspension of “Project Freedom,” citing “significant progress toward a comprehensive agreement with Iran.” This is not hesitation; it is pure negotiating tactics. Trump is telling Iran: “I have the capability to open the strait by force, but I prefer a deal. Come to the table, or I will use this capability.”
In response, Iran expanded its “control map” to include the UAE’s coasts (Fujairah and Khor Fakkan), meaning it did not just defend, but attacked to widen its “prohibited zone.” Targeting the port of Fujairah – the only alternative port for exporting oil without passing through Hormuz – is a clear Iranian message: “We can close all Gulf energy outlets, not just the strait.”
The result: “controlled escalation” and a “war below the threshold of all-out war.” Everyone is testing each other’s capabilities, sending messages, and trying to improve their negotiating position, but without crossing the red line that would lead to a comprehensive explosion. This is precisely “Fragile Stability”: a state of “neither war nor peace,” where everyone lives on the edge of the abyss, but no one falls, because everyone knows that falling means destruction for all.
The Gulf – From “Strategic Alliance” to “Open Competition”
But the deepest repercussions of the war have appeared not only in Hormuz, but at the heart of the Gulf alliance itself. While Iran was targeting the UAE with 2,662 missiles and drones (more than any other country, even Israel), Abu Dhabi announced its withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+, a move analysts described as a “strategic rupture” with the Saudi-led oil management system.
This is the real “geopolitical earthquake.” The UAE did not just withdraw from an oil organization; it withdrew from an entire model of energy management led by the Saudi-Emirati “golden duo” for decades. The reasons are deep and not new.
In Yemen: Saudi Arabia supports the legitimate government and unity, while the UAE supports the Southern Transitional Council and separation. In Sudan: Saudi Arabia supports the army, while the UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces. In economics: Saudi “Vision 2030” competes directly with the Emirati economic model (financial and logistics hub). With Israel: The UAE normalized relations and cooperated security-wise (air defense systems, interceptors), while Saudi Arabia still hesitates.
The war on Iran did not create these disputes, but brought them to the surface and made them intractable. The UAE feels it paid the heaviest price (devastating Iranian attacks, damaged economy) without receiving sufficient security guarantees from either the US or Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, it decided to “bet on itself”: full normalization with Israel, a strategic partnership with China in renewable energy and technology, and complete independence in its oil decisions.
Iran, for its part, is the biggest beneficiary. It watches the disintegration of the Gulf alliance with satisfaction and exploits it to enhance its influence in Yemen (through the Houthis) and in the region generally. The more fragmented the Gulf becomes, the more Tehran can deal with each country individually and impose its terms.
Jordan – A Miniature Model of “Engineering Fear” at the Small State Level
The most painful part of this war is what happens on the ground, away from oil deals and major alliances. Jordan, a state that is not a party to the war and declared its neutrality from the start, has paid a heavy price simply for being “on the way.”
Security-wise: Jordan was targeted by over 300 missiles and drones. The Jordanian military says these missiles were not “transiting” towards Israel, but “targeted vital institutions” in the kingdom. 39 missiles fell on Jordanian territory, causing injuries and material damage. When Jordanian air defenses intercepted these missiles to protect its sovereignty, Iran accused it of “siding with America,” while Jordanians said clearly: “We are no one’s border guards.” We are defending our citizens.
Economically: Supply chains through Hormuz were disrupted, and prices of basic goods skyrocketed. A computer technician in Irbid says spare parts prices have doubled. A car mechanic in Amman says spare parts prices have risen by 30%. A plumber says the price per meter of pipe jumped from 1.8 to 2.8 dinars. iPhones have become rarer and more expensive.
Humanely: The Jordanian government took unprecedented austerity measures: banning official delegations from traveling, banning the use of air conditioning in ministries, and suspending official hospitality. Tourism has declined, investments have frozen, and the ordinary citizen watches his savings melt before his eyes.
At the level of “Engineering Fear”: Here arises the most painful question of all: what after the war?
Jordan, far from siding with any party, realizes that any decisive outcome to this conflict will be catastrophic for it and the entire region.
In the scenario of an American-Israeli victory and the collapse of the Iranian regime, Jordan fears a wave of chaos and security turmoil on its eastern borders, the disintegration of state institutions in Tehran, meaning armed militias and Iranian proxies spinning out of control, and a new wave of refugees that could sweep the region. Jordan, which already hosts millions of refugees, would be at the forefront of affected states. This scenario means that “fear” would transform from “deterrence fear” to “fear of chaos.”
In the scenario of an Iranian victory, with Iran emerging from the war more emboldened and powerful, the risk of internal destabilization in Jordan would increase. A victorious Iran might expand its targeting to include Jordan more broadly, as part of “punishing Western allies” or as a message to those who cooperate with America. In this scenario, the “fear of entrapment” multiplies: will Jordan be dragged into a wider regional war? Can it withstand increasing economic and security pressures from a stronger, more aggressive neighbor?
Herein lies the genius of Jordanian “Engineering Fear.” Jordan does not want an absolute victory for any party. It wants everyone to remain in a state of “Fragile Stability” – neither victors nor vanquished, neither all-out war nor lasting peace – because any major shift in the regional balance of power would come at the expense of the small state at the heart of the storm.
For this reason, the Jordanian position was clear and decisive, as expressed by Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi: “Jordan will not be a battleground in any regional conflict, nor a launchpad for any military action against Iran.” At the same time, Jordan defends its sovereignty when missiles violate its airspace. This is not “bias” towards America or enmity towards Iran; it is a miniature model of “Engineering Fear” at the small state level, trying to stay afloat in a sea of turmoil, using all its diplomatic and military tools to manage fear, not eliminate it.
Jordan does not want enmity with Iran; history, geography, blood, and trade bind the two countries. But Jordan wants Iran to respect its sovereignty just as it respects Iran’s. Jordan manages its international relations according to its supreme strategic interests, achieving its higher goals in the Arab world and the region, while maintaining its firm constants regarding the Palestinian cause.
Amidst all this, there is another no less dangerous threat. In recent days, the National Cyber Security Center announced it had thwarted a cyberattack targeting the grain silo management system, attempting to manipulate temperatures to spoil the strategic stockpile. When strategic grain reserves are targeted, the message transcends technical tampering to an attempt to undermine the state’s food security and social stability. This is another face of the war on Jordan, a silent war whose sounds are not heard, but which could quietly disrupt daily life.
Thus, Jordan represents a miniature model of “Engineering Fear” at the small state level. It does not have the luxury of choosing the winner, nor the power to impose its terms. All it has is the ability to manage its fear of both scenarios, hoping that “Fragile Stability” remains the least bad option.
In this, Jordan intersects with the Gulf states fearing disintegration, with Europe fearing migration, and with Asia fearing energy cutoffs, in a single network of distributed fear, where no one is safe, and everyone is searching for a “tolerable level of risk.”
China and Russia – The Biggest Beneficiaries of “Managed Chaos”
Amid this chaos, two major players emerge who benefit without paying a noticeable price: China and Russia.
China follows the strategy of “never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.” The war on Iran, from Beijing’s perspective, is an American “strategic error.” It drains Washington militarily and economically, distorts its international reputation, and pushes regional (and global) states to search for alternatives. Here, China presents its alternative offering.
It controls 91% of rare earth element refining and 94% of permanent magnet production. These minerals are the heart of future military and civilian industries. It also possesses a strategic oil reserve of 1.3 billion barrels, imports oil from Russia and Iran through evasion mechanisms (“Tea Kettles”), and exports renewable energy (solar panels, batteries) to the world. And while America bombs Iran, China hosts the Iranian Foreign Minister, mediates between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and presents itself as the “voice of reason and stability.”
Russia adopts a different approach: “Managed Chaos.” Moscow does not want the war to end, because its continuation proves its thesis: that the unipolar world order has ended, and that no regional settlement can pass without its approval. It uses a mix of military presence (in Africa and Asia), strategic partnerships (with Iran), and exploiting vacuums left by America, to create “deterrence through complexity.” The more players increase and their interests intertwine, the more impossible and costly military resolution becomes for everyone, making Moscow a “non-excludable” player.
“Fragile Stability” – The Most Likely Scenario
In light of all these dynamics, we can outline the contours of the most likely scenario for the Middle East’s future: “Fragile Stability.”
In Hormuz, partial and managed opening with continued low-cost skirmishes (boats, drones, mines). No all-out war, no lasting peace. In the Gulf, disintegration of the Saudi-Emirati alliance, open competition for influence, and a redefinition of the “circle of trust.” For the smaller states (Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon), continued economic and security pressure, rising prices, erosion of the middle class, and increasing social fragility. As for the major powers, America is preoccupied with Iran and drained, while China and Russia exploit the vacuum and reshape the global order to their advantage.
But what is new in this analysis is that “Fragile Stability” is no longer a theoretical concept describing relations between states. It has become a daily reality in the lives of ordinary people. The rising cost of repairing your phone, the shortage of car spare parts, or the closure of your shop – all are part of the new “Engineering Fear.”
It is an “engineering” planned not only by strategists, but also contributed to by wholesale merchants hoarding goods, governments imposing austerity measures, speculators driving up prices, and everyone exploiting the state of uncertainty for quick profit.
The Broader Picture: When Fear Becomes a “Daily Commodity”
When this war began, the narrative was: “America against Iran, Israel in the background, and Russia and China watching.” Then it evolved into: “The Middle East is a proxy battlefield between great powers.” Today, after all these weeks of bombing, siege, negotiations, and economic collapse, we can add a new layer to the narrative.
The Middle East is no longer just a battlefield; it has become a “laboratory” for a new engineering of fear, stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the streets of Amman, from presidential palaces to humble repair workshops.
In this laboratory, humanity’s capacity to endure economic pain, adapt to commodity shortages, and redefine “necessities” in times of turmoil is being tested. Fear is no longer just a tool for deterrence between armies; it has become a “daily commodity” paid for by ordinary citizens, with war profiteers exploiting rising prices for vast gains.
“Project Freedom” may be suspended, may return, or may transform into something else. The Gulf may reunite or fragment further. China and Russia may deepen their presence in the region or retreat. But what seems certain is that the Middle East emerging from this war will be completely different from what it was before February 28, 2026. Not only in its alliance maps, but in its social and economic fabric.
The biggest question remains open: Can this region endure more “Fragile Stability”? Or will fear itself, once it exceeds a certain threshold, transform into the spark of explosion that everyone is trying to avoid?
In the end, wars are not won in negotiation halls alone; they are lost in people’s ability to rise from under the weight of fear.
The coming days, the outcomes of the Islamabad negotiations, the level of Gulf-Pakistani-Chinese coordination, and the resilience of the smaller states – all these factors will carry part of the answer. But the other part of the answer will be written by the ordinary citizen who decides, ultimately, that fear no longer justifies all these sacrifices.
