Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Mohammad Hassan Kahat
When the last American soldier leaves Iraqi territory, the complex questions that made the US military presence both a security necessity and a political taboo do not leave with him. Washington’s announcement on September 30 that its withdrawal is complete ends a long military mission, but it clearly opens a major and pivotal political test: can the Iraqi state transform the departure of a foreign force from a mere symbolic achievement into a practical gateway to lasting stability, managed by itself and with its own national tools?
As Baghdad celebrates the restoration of full sovereignty — suspending official work on Wednesday and Thursday, September 30 and October 1 — eyes turn with a certain anxiety toward the north, where Erbil asks plainly: who will protect its skies in the next phase? This fundamental question was put explicitly by the President of the Kurdistan Region, Mr. Masoud Barzani, in a televised interview last night on Al-Sharqiya channel. This sharp paradox — political jubilation over sovereignty in the capital versus legitimate security anxiety in the region — sums up the reality: between celebration and apprehension stands a state now required to prove that its field capacity for protection and care matches, exactly, its legal and constitutional right to independent decision-making.
For Baghdad, this withdrawal carries the most important opportunity to defuse one of the most prominent sources of internal polarization that has exhausted the political body, as well as to distance Iraq from the arena of exchanged armed strikes between Washington and its regional adversaries. The Iraqi government can present this withdrawal to public opinion as a strategic shift that moves the country toward a more equal and sustainable relationship with the United States, based on shared interests. At the same time, this step gives the federal authority a political and legitimate tool to demand that armed factions relinquish the main justification they have long used to retain their weapons outside the framework of the state.
Yet this promising opportunity collides with a complex structural paradox: the American exit, while withdrawing the main pretext from these groups, may in return give them a sense of implicit victory and the suggestion that it was they who imposed their will on foreign powers. At that point, the very process of reinterpreting the withdrawal transforms from a mere media controversy into an integral part of the battle to rebuild authority and determine who has the final say and the decision within the state.
The difficulty of this leadership test is clearly visible in the temporal and practical separation between the date of foreign troop departure and the date of restricting weapons to state hands. According to the Associated Press, the final deadline set by the Iraqi government to disarm non-governmental armed groups has been postponed to June 2027, after influential armed factions refused to hand over their weapons or set political and security conditions for doing so.
The political significance of this discrepancy is clear and evident: the government in Baghdad can agree with relative ease with a foreign power on arranging the departure of its soldiers according to a specific timetable — as happened yesterday with the withdrawal of Italian forces ahead of schedule — but imposing unified security rules and enforcing the law on local armed forces within its national borders represents a far more difficult and complex challenge. Hence, the fears that dissipate among the public regarding direct external intervention quickly connect to a more dangerous possibility: the transfer of the center of gravity and influence from a declared foreign umbrella governed by international agreements to informal internal power centers that are difficult to subject to legal or political accountability.
As for the security risk resulting from the withdrawal, it is not measured only by the number of departing soldiers or the evacuation of bases, but by the direct impact on crucial intelligence and operational functions. Reuters indicates that American forces provided an intelligence umbrella and logistical support based on surveillance and aerial reconnaissance technologies important for pursuing the remnants of ISIS cells and paralyzing their capabilities. Reports cite serious fears that have unsettled Iraqi and Kurdish officials about the possibility of the organization exploiting these technical gaps during the transitional phase.
What confirms the validity of these field fears is the occurrence of the two recent bombings carried out by two ISIS elements in the Kobri (Altun Kupri) district of Kirkuk province. The real value of the departing foreign capabilities was not only in direct combat, but in their ability to detect threats and formulate early warning before danger turns into a tangible attack. Iraqi military forces may possess the human and combat capability to fight fierce battles, but they need more precise tools to know where and when these threats will launch. Hence, replacing these vital functions requires building an integrated system for collecting, analyzing, and rapidly coordinating information — not merely handing over a military base or raising a flag over it.
In the Kurdistan Region, this shared anxiety takes a more direct form, touching the daily life of the population. The Ministry of Peshmerga stated in an official statement issued on September 28 that the Region was subjected to more than a thousand attacks via drones and ballistic missiles during periods of American-Iranian confrontations, and clearly warned against the departure of American forces without providing an alternative and effective defense system. This alarming tally announced by the Ministry explains the fundamental reason why the Kurdish leadership views the withdrawal file from the angle of direct daily protection. A soldier can withdraw through a written political agreement; but a civilian living under the dangers of drone flight paths needs a practical and realistic answer about the next attack.
This concern is closely linked to the level of trust and cooperation between the federal government in Baghdad and the government in the Region; the Peshmerga statement reminded that Kurdistan’s airspace remains part of Iraqi airspace, and that responsibility for protecting it falls constitutionally and morally on the federal government. Here precisely, the legitimate Kurdish demand meets the actual and field meaning of comprehensive Iraqi sovereignty: protecting the Region is an indivisible federal duty, and Baghdad’s practical response to this duty can transform the withdrawal from a source of concern into a real opportunity to build trust. But if security protection remains hostage to political disputes, Erbil will inevitably be pushed to seek separate security guarantees, further fragmenting the security that the withdrawal is supposed to restore to unity and cohesion.
Despite these challenges, there is an objective basis for building mutual trust between the Region and the center, as confirmed by the Ministry of Peshmerga when it noted that a high-level meeting was held in Baghdad on September 6 addressing the strengthening of security and military cooperation and coordination within the joint brigades. However, what is required today goes beyond protocol; these official meetings must turn into security work arrangements that are testable and field-measurable. This requires establishing a regular intelligence information exchange system, defining clear responsibilities for protecting sensitive areas and sectors, and drawing up a comprehensive federal air defense plan that includes the Region. The success of this coordination is not measured by the image of leaders and officials around the meeting table, but by the speed of arrival of intelligence warning and the ability of field units to respond quickly without waiting for an exhausting political settlement.
On the other side, Washington also bears responsibility for making the new security relationship clearer and more defined. The Pentagon has announced the continuation of specific and targeted support in the areas of training and intelligence for Iraqi partners. This should be translated practically into understandable and framed commitments that allow Iraqis to plan for building their capabilities and prevent the withdrawal from turning into a sudden interruption in vital capabilities. Iraq at this stage needs a strategic partnership that helps its national institutions enter the stage of actual independence, subject to agreed national priorities and political accountability, instead of leaving cooperation suspended in the gray area between general promises and conflicting expectations between the two sides.
In the end, collapse will not be an inevitable result of the American withdrawal, just as stability will not become an automatic gain granted to Iraq merely because foreign forces have left. The final outcome depends entirely on Baghdad’s ability to combine three vital functions within the state: protecting the population, controlling and restricting weapons, and managing external partnerships with a balanced vision. As for the Kurdish fears, they reveal the most urgent and sensitive point of testing, but they are in essence a matter concerning all of Iraq and the future of its entity.
The most dangerous vacuum is not the vacuum resulting from the departure of military forces, but the extended distance between the declaration of responsibility and the ability to perform it. When this distance narrows through building national and institutional capabilities, the withdrawal becomes a real achievement of sovereignty; when it widens, armed forces and cross-border threats find ample space to fill it and expand within it.
Dr. Mohammed Hassan Kahat is an Iraqi writer.
