Engineering Fear 4.0: The International Stabilization Force in Gaza – When International Troops Become a Tool for Conflict Management, Not Resolution

Introduction: From the Strait of Hormuz to Gaza

The previous installments of the Engineering Fear series argued that conflicts in the Middle East are increasingly managed rather than resolved. Ceasefires, economic pressure, strategic corridors, and political legislation have become instruments for containing instability instead of addressing its underlying causes. Together, these mechanisms create what can be described as a system of engineered fear—one that shapes political choices, military calculations, and regional alliances.

This fourth installment turns to the Gaza Strip, where proposals to deploy an International Stabilization Force (ISF)illustrate the next evolution of this model. Rather than ending the conflict, the force risks institutionalizing a fragile status quo by managing competing fears: Israel’s fear of a security vacuum, the international community’s fear of humanitarian collapse, and the Palestinians’ fear of both continued war and indefinite foreign oversight. Gaza has therefore become another testing ground for conflict management, where stability is pursued without resolving the political realities that sustain the conflict.

Part One: The Stabilization Force – Between the Illusion of Resolution and the Reality of Conflict Management

When the Israeli Security Cabinet approved the introduction of the “International Stabilization Force” into the Gaza Strip in July 2026, the decision was not merely an executive step within the Trump administration’s plan. It was a moment of transformation in the very concept of “peacekeeping.” The force, which begins with only 200 personnel from countries like Uganda and Morocco, operating in “full coordination” with the Israeli military, does not represent a separation force or peacekeeping in the traditional sense. At its core, it is an instrument for managing fear – Israel’s fear of a security vacuum, the international community’s fear of the complete collapse of the Strip, and the Palestinians’ fear of the continuation of war.

Herein lies the essence of “Engineering Fear 4.0”: the international force is not a solution but a temporary painkiller, through which fear is managed rather than its root causes eliminated. Israel clings to the “Yellow Line” and refuses to withdraw as long as Hamas has not been disarmed, while the force is assigned limited procedural tasks such as overseeing humanitarian aid and managing some basic services, without possessing any genuine sovereign authority. This is not stability; it is Fragile Stability in its most vivid form, where conflict is managed rather than resolved, and fear is distributed rather than removed.

Part Two: The Palestinian Position – Total Rejection or Conditional Acceptance Under the Weight of Fear?

The Palestinian position on the international force reveals a precise model of how fear is distributed at the national level. The official position of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, as articulated by Waseel Abu Yousef, adopts conditional acceptance: an Arab force that protects Palestinians from the “encroachment of the occupation,” operates under international supervision, while rejecting any form of trusteeship or separation between Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas and other factions, however, fundamentally reject any force that coordinates with Israel, viewing it as a “partner in implementing the occupation’s agenda.” The Palestinian street is divided between those welcoming the UN resolution in the hope of ending the war, and those warning that the force could become a permanent trusteeship.

This distribution in the Palestinian position is precisely what “Engineering Fear” describes: fear of war drives some to accept any solution, and fear of trusteeship drives others to reject any foreign presence. Israel, which imposes its conditions on the force, exploits this distribution to advance its agenda, just as American legislation is used to advance the exclusion of Turkey in the third installment of this series.

Part Three: Morocco – When a State Becomes an Instrument for Engineering Fear

Morocco’s involvement in the International Stabilization Force is a case study for a central concept in “Engineering Fear”: how states use their own strategic fears to market themselves as instruments for managing regional fear.

Morocco, which has bet on Washington’s support for its Western Sahara dossier, is offering its troops in Gaza in exchange for enhanced recognition of its sovereignty over the Sahara. However, this deal, as we have seen, carries a heavy price. Rabat conflates a national cause (the Sahara) with a regional agenda (Gaza), and finds itself a partner in an Israeli-American project aimed at disarming the resistance, which Palestinian factions reject. Just as we described in the third installment “the fear of geographic exclusion” that drives Turkey to reinvent its geography, Morocco is driven by fear of diplomatic exclusion to offer security concessions in Gaza, in exchange for sovereign gains that were already within its reach.

Here emerges the profound question we raised at the end of the third installment: “Can we engineer fear without ourselves, over time, becoming part of its machinery?” Morocco, through its involvement in this force, may become part of the fear machine it is trying to manage, transforming from a state seeking a solution to its cause into an instrument for implementing a regional agenda that serves neither its people nor its cause.

Part Four: Distributed Fear – Gaza as a Mirror of the New Middle East

What is happening in Gaza today is not isolated from the broader dynamics we analyzed in previous installments. The “Distributed Fear” we described in Lebanon and Syria in the third installment is now visible in Gaza in its most vivid forms:

• Israel fears a security vacuum that would reproduce Hamas, so it clings to indirect control through the international force.
• The United States fears the failure of its plan, so it pushes for an international force as cover for its gradual withdrawal.
• Hamas fears losing its weapon as a negotiating tool, so it rejects any disarmament.
• The Palestinian Authority fears marginalization, so it accepts the force with conditions.
• Morocco fears the erosion of American support for the Sahara, so it offers concessions.
• Arab states fear the anger of their populations, so they hesitate to participate.

This distribution of fear is what makes any genuine resolution impossible, and makes “Fragile Stability” the most likely scenario, just as was the case in the Strait of Hormuz (Part Two) and in the War of Corridors (Part Three).

The Broader Picture: When Does the Engineering of Fear Turn into Comprehensive Chaos?

At the end of the third installment, we left an open question: “When does engineered fear turn into genuine panic? And when do the tools of engineering themselves become a cause of chaos?”

The International Stabilization Force in Gaza offers a partial answer: when the tools of conflict management (international forces, legislation, corridors) become more complex than the conflict itself, and when everyone becomes part of the fear machine rather than a party to its resolution, then we have entered a new phase of Managed Chaos. And this chaos, as we saw in previous installments, benefits only the major players: the United States manages the conflict without resolving it; China and Russia watch from a distance; Israel consolidates its gains, while the smaller states (like Morocco and Jordan) pay the heaviest price.

Gaza remains, as it always has been, a mirror for the entire Middle East. What is happening there today is not merely a local crisis but a miniature model of “Engineering Fear” in its fourth era: the era of international forces that do not resolve conflict but manage it; the era of states that sell their strategic fear for illusory gains; and the era of peoples who pay the price while maps are redrawn in rooms far from their streets.

And the larger question remains open: Can this model endure, or will fear, once it reaches a certain threshold, transform into a spark of explosion that no international force can contain?

This article is the fourth installment in the “Engineering Fear” series, which previously examined:

• Engineering Fear 1.0: The New Middle East Truce – How ceasefires became sophisticated mechanisms for conflict management.
• Engineering Fear 2.0: From the Strait of Hormuz to the Streets of Amman – How the Iran War is reshaping the Middle East, from great power competition to the human cost on societies.
• Engineering Fear 3.0: The War of Corridors – How congressional legislation, land and sea corridors, and railway lines are becoming weapons for redrawing the map of fear in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The series explores how fear in the Middle East is no longer merely a feeling or reaction, but has become something engineered through the drawing of new lines on the map, the enactment of laws, the construction of infrastructure, and the deployment of international forces.