Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Winthrop M. Rodgers
The stalemate over government formation is affecting the semi-autonomous region’s ability to deal with the fallout of the Iran war – and eroding its autonomy.
More than 18 months have passed since voters in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq went to the polls in the region’s parliamentary election, but no new regional government has been formed. This deadlock has left the Kurdistan Region dangerously on autopilot as political and economic challenges pile up around it – not least those stemming from the Iran war.
At the heart of this impasse is disunity between the two main parties; the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Their rift prevents the Kurdistan Region from adhering to basic democratic governance, dilutes its ability to project influence, and leaves it increasingly irrelevant in the political calculations of other actors.
If the institutions and political arrangements that undergird the Kurdistan Region as a unified and coherent entity no longer function, it could be heading for a rupture that will only exacerbate the challenges it faces.
Why did cooperation between the KDP and the PUK break down?
Historically, relations between the KDP and the PUK have been characterized by extreme tension, but there have been periods of cooperation too. One such period in the mid-2000s allowed for Kurdish autonomy to be formally established into Iraq’s constitutional framework. This often-messy arrangement between the two parties – sealed by a strategic agreement in 2006 – now appears to be breaking down.
This is because the KDP and the PUK have fundamentally different assessments of their relative political status – and a new generation of leaders in both parties are not willing to compromise.
The KDP believes that it is the ascendent and primary force in Kurdistan, as reflected in its vote and seat totals in both federal and regional elections. It wants to abandon power sharing with the PUK – a view explicitly endorsedby its leader Masoud Barzani – and is also highly suspicious of PUK president Bafel Talabani’s leadership.
The PUK, meanwhile, wants to re-establish itself as the KDP’s relative equal after more than a decade of political aimlessness, factional infighting and challenges from opposition parties. Any government formation deal without substantive power sharing would be viewed as unacceptable. The PUK is also frustrated by the centralization of power around Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani of the KDP and is seeking assurances this will be addressed.
After months of deadlock over government formation, no political ties remain between the two parties. Meanwhile, this discord is undermining their ability to respond effectively to the serious domestic challenges and geopolitical crises currently facing the Kurdistan Region.
The domestic context and relations with Baghdad
In the wider Iraqi context, the battle between the KDP and PUK over the Iraqi presidency is the most visible recent manifestation of their disunity. Since 2005, the post of president been allocated to the Kurdish bloc under Iraq’s informal ethno-sectarian distribution system. The PUK has held the Iraqi presidency since this system was introduced.
However, over the past two election cycles, the KDP has used its status as the largest Kurdish party to argue that the presidency should no longer automatically go to the PUK, but be subject to intra-Kurdish negotiation. In 2021, this contributed to a year-long delay in federal government formation when it put up its own candidate for the post. There was a similar, albeit shorter, impasse after the 2025 Iraqi election.
If this rift was only about competing for political posts, the issue could be resolved relatively easily. But it has also facilitated the erosion of the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy. Over the past year, the Iraqi federal government has dramatically curtailed the KRG’s ability to manage its financial affairs. For example, federal authorities have taken charge of exporting oil via the pipeline to Turkey that runs through the Kurdistan Region, as part of a September 2025 deal to resume oil exports after a two-year suspension. In March, Masrour Barzani attempted to use the pipeline to gain leverage over the federal government, which was under severe economic stress due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. But he was unable to stand his ground, in part because of lack of support by the PUK and foreign partners. The federal government has also introduced a new country-wide customs system, known as ASYCUDA, that bypasses the KRG and means the Kurdish parties will no longer control revenue collection at the borders with Turkey and Iran.
The fallout of the Iran war
The parties’ diminished influence in Baghdad is reflected in the Kurdistan Region’s geopolitical position. Despite the strategic importance of its location, bordering federal Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, it is more at the mercy of other actors than ever before – as demonstrated by the Iran war.
The Kurdistan Region has experienced at least 695 Iranian attacks since the beginning of the war, including 48 since the beginning of the ceasefire, according to local war monitor Community Peacemaker Teams. 22 people have been killed and more than 100 injured, while critical infrastructure and US military and diplomatic facilities have repeatedly been targeted.
Mutual distrust between the KDP and the PUK prevents them from establishing a united front and projecting influence in Washington and Tehran to keep the Kurdistan Region out of the war, and in Baghdad to limit attacks from Iran-backed Iraqi militias. CPT estimates these militia groups are responsible for around 453 attacks on the Kurdistan Region since the beginning of the war. The attacks are primarily motivated by perceptions that the Kurds are aligned with the US, though tensions between Baghdad and Erbil contribute.
