Setting the Record Straight: Al Mayadeen’s Misrepresentation of the PKK and Komala

Hadi Elis

Al Mayadeen should correct what appears to be a significant misidentification in its recent reporting concerning the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Iranian Kurdish political organizations. The article, “PKK Digs Trenches Along Iran Border After Redeployment,” appears to conflate the PKK with Komala, an Iranian Kurdish political movement whose history and organizational structure are entirely different from those of the PKK. This distinction is not merely semantic. At a sensitive moment in Kurdish regional politics, accurately distinguishing between Kurdish organizations operating in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria is essential for understanding the political and security dynamics of the region. The confusion appears to stem partly from the use of the name Abdullah: one reference concerns Abdullah Mohtadi, a leader of the Komala movement, while the other concerns Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the PKK. These are entirely different individuals and represent different political organizations and historical trajectories.

Komala itself has undergone significant organizational divisions over the decades. Among the principal contemporary currents are the organization led by Abdullah Mohtadi, generally known as Komala–Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran, and the organization led by Ibrahim Alizadeh, also commonly identified as Komala. The Mohtadi-led organization has participated in broader Iranian Kurdish political initiatives, including the Cooperation Center for the Iranian Kurdistan Political Parties, alongside other Iranian Kurdish parties. The PKK is not a component of that Iranian Kurdish political front. Nor should Abdullah Mohtadi be confused with Abdullah Öcalan, who founded the PKK in 1978. Öcalan has been imprisoned by Turkey since his capture in 1999 and is currently held on İmralı Island, where he has remained a central symbolic and political figure for the Kurdish movement. Conflating the two Abdullahs fundamentally changes the political meaning of the reporting and risks attributing the activities and alliances of an Iranian Kurdish political organization to the PKK.

The PKK also has a distinct historical trajectory. It was established as a Kurdish organization with its principal political and military conflict historically centered on the Turkish state. The organization formally launched its armed campaign against Turkey on 15 August 1984. It subsequently developed networks and operational structures extending beyond Turkey, particularly in northern Iraq, and its broader movement has had relationships with Kurdish organizations and movements in Syria and Iran. Therefore, describing the PKK simply as an Iranian Kurdish organization, or as a member of an Iranian Kurdish political coalition, is inaccurate. The Iranian Kurdish organization most directly associated with the broader ideological tradition of the PKK is PJAK (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê / Party of Free Life of Kurdistan), which has operated primarily in Iran and has been described as ideologically aligned with Öcalan’s political thought. PJAK and the PKK, however, should likewise not be treated as the same organization.

The timing of Al Mayadeen’s reporting makes the distinction particularly important. The PKK has been engaged in a significant political transformation involving a peace process with Turkey, following Abdullah Öcalan’s February 2025 call for the organization to end its armed struggle and dissolve itself. In May 2025, the PKK announced a decision to dissolve and end its armed struggle, although the implementation and political consequences of that decision have continued to develop. Consequently, reporting that presents the PKK as simply redeploying as an Iranian Kurdish armed organization risks obscuring the major political transformation underway between the PKK, Öcalan and Ankara. It also risks confusing the PKK’s current political trajectory with the activities of Iranian Kurdish organizations operating along or near the Iranian-Iraqi frontier.

As a sociologist and geopolitical analyst who has closely followed the Kurdish question and the PKK since the 12 September 1980 military coup in Turkey, including the PKK’s declaration of its armed campaign in 1984, I believe this distinction is particularly important at the present historical juncture. The Kurdish political landscape cannot be reduced to a single organization or treated as a homogeneous military bloc. PKK guerrillas, Iranian Kurdish Peshmerga organizations, PJAK and the various Komala factions have different histories, command structures, geographical theaters, political objectives and relationships with regional and international actors. Al Mayadeen’s reporting should therefore correct the apparent conflation and clarify that the organization associated with Abdullah Mohtadi is not the PKK and that Abdullah Mohtadi is not Abdullah Öcalan. This correction is especially important because inaccurate reporting can distort public understanding of Kurdish politics at a time when regional actors, including the United States, Iran and Turkey, are recalibrating their policies toward Kurdish organizations. The PKK and PJAK are both designated as terrorist organizations by the United States, while the broader Kurdish political landscape contains numerous organizations that do not share the same legal status or political objectives. Precision in identifying these organizations is therefore not optional—it is fundamental to responsible geopolitical reporting.

Reference: Al Mayadeen English, “PKK Digs Trenches Along Iran Border After Redeployment.”
Al Mayadeen article