Dr. Shehab Al-Makahleh
Two weeks after his initial critique, Robert Kagan returned on May 21 with a sharper, more consequential verdict on Donald Trump’s war with Iran. Following his first Atlantic piece, “Checkmate in Iran,” his latest article carries a far more telling title: “The End of Trump’s War Is Surrender.”
This rhetorical shift—from “checkmate” to “surrender”—is not merely stylistic. It reflects a profound reassessment by one of the leading voices of American neoconservatism. What was once framed as a decisive strategic move is now widely seen, even within pro-hegemony circles, as a strategic failure rooted in miscalculation and flawed assumptions.
Even if Trump opts for last-minute “demonstrative strikes,” the trajectory is clear: a declaration of victory followed by withdrawal under a face-saving agreement. Such an outcome underscores a fundamental reality—the war has failed to achieve any of its stated or unstated objectives, including regime change or realignment of Iran toward the Western camp.
More critically, the war has exposed the limits of American power. Despite overwhelming military superiority, Washington has been unable to translate force into strategic outcomes. Allies are unsettled, adversaries emboldened.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Iran’s growing leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has effectively transformed the strait into a strategic pressure point—threatening control, signaling potential toll regimes, and demonstrating its capacity to disrupt global energy flows. The implications are profound, particularly for Gulf economies.
The vulnerability of critical infrastructure—from oil and gas facilities to desalination plants and transport hubs—has amplified the risks. The potential disruption of the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline, which carries roughly 1.8 million barrels per day (nearly half of the UAE’s oil exports), illustrates the scale of exposure.
In this context, a striking conclusion emerges:
Control over Hormuz now outweighs uranium enrichment as Iran’s most effective strategic lever.
Kagan’s critique carries particular weight precisely because of who he is. A long-time advocate of American primacy and interventionism, his shift signals not ideological opposition, but internal recognition of failure within the very camp that championed such wars.
The repercussions are not limited to foreign policy. Domestically, the war has deepened fractures within the Republican Party and the MAGA base. Rising costs, economic strain, and political infighting have eroded cohesion. Trump’s increasing tendency to sideline dissenting voices suggests a shift toward a more centralized—and arguably coercive—style of leadership.
Ultimately, the war has not weakened Iran. Instead, it has:
- strengthened Tehran’s regional position,
- exposed the limits of U.S. military power,
- and accelerated a broader shift in the global balance toward competitors like China and Russia.
The question is no longer whether the war will end.
The real question is: at what cost—and to whose strategic advantage?
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