Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Russia as It Is, Not as It Is Portrayed (Part I)

Lama Al-Rakad

In international politics, interests are rarely presented as such. They are dressed instead in the language of morality, civilization, or historical mission. Yet when crises hit and choices must be made, the true priorities of states become unmistakably clear. It is precisely in this gap between rhetoric and behavior that the contrast emerges between the ideological vision associated with Alexander Dugin and the hard-edged realism reflected in the analysis of George Friedman.

Dugin’s framework presents Russia as the bearer of an alternative civilizational project—one that resists “Western hegemony,” defends cultural pluralism, and champions the sovereignty of distinct societies. On paper, this narrative carries undeniable appeal, especially across parts of the Global South that have long experienced colonial domination and external intervention. It speaks to dignity, autonomy, and a multipolar world order that promises balance rather than domination.

The problem, however, is not the narrative itself. It is the widening gap between that narrative and observable policy.

A closer look at Russian behavior reveals a familiar pattern: alliances are fluid, commitments are conditional, and support is calibrated strictly according to immediate strategic interests. This is not uniquely Russian; it is, in fact, the standard operating logic of great powers. What makes the case notable is the persistent framing of such behavior as morally or civilizationally driven—as though Russia acts from principle rather than interest.

This is where the contrast with Friedman’s perspective becomes instructive. His analysis does not attempt to moralize power. It strips away ideological packaging and presents a blunt reality: states—especially major powers—act primarily to secure and expand their interests. Within this framework, even critics of U.S. foreign policy often concede that Washington, for all its contradictions, tends to articulate its motivations with greater transparency, however contentious or self-serving they may be.

The issue, then, is not that Russia recalibrates or repositions itself. That is intrinsic to the nature of international politics. The issue lies in how it markets those decisions. When a state builds its external narrative around defending the oppressed or safeguarding civilizational diversity, but its actions on the ground reflect narrow pragmatism, credibility begins to erode. Over time, the dissonance becomes difficult to ignore.

Had Russia more consistently aligned its conduct—even partially—with the civilizational respect and pluralism articulated in Dugin’s worldview, it might have accumulated genuine moral capital, not only among governments but among societies themselves. Instead, what often emerges is a high-register discourse paired with calculated, interest-driven policy.

In the final analysis, Russia is not an exception. It operates within a global system governed by power and interest. The distinction lies in presentation: some actors acknowledge this reality openly, while others prefer to cloak it in ideological language. Caught between these approaches are the regions most affected by great-power competition—where the consequences of this contradiction are not theoretical, but deeply lived.

About the Author: 

Lama Al-Rakad is a Syrian Journalist, Writer and Media Anchor.