Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Antonia Dimou
Syria’s energy sector undergoes a transformative process after a decade of conflict, transitioning from severe damage toward a delicate recovery.
The downfall of the Assad regime and the instatement of the transitional government in Syria revealed several challenges pertaining to the Syrian energy sector. The first challenge is a shortage of energy due to damaged infrastructure and reduced production of roughly 120,000 barrels per day (b/d) as of late 2025 compared to 400,000 b/d in 2011, with adverse effects on businesses and the economy.
The second challenge is that offshore oil and gas exploration is not feasible because the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between Syria and neighboring countries is still pending. Syria and Lebanon have yet to resolve their overlapping claims to a 750 square kilometer maritime area that lies between Lebanese Blocks 1 & 2 and Syrian Block 1. In addition, offshore exploration and development are further complicated by the unsettled maritime boundaries between Syria and Cyprus, as well as between Syria and Turkey. For the delineation of the latter’s Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelves, secret discussions were held throughout 2025, allegedly sidestepping the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in favor of tailored solutions. It is also noteworthy that maritime blocks off Syria’s East Mediterranean coast, once awarded to Syrian subsidiaries of Russian companies, namely Kapital LLC, Velada LLC, and Mercury LLC, have been canceled by the Syrian interim government, raising renewed interest about future bidding.
The third challenge is the shortage of electricity, with many regions receiving only two to four hours of power per day. There is profound urgency for the restoration and modernization of Syria’s electrical infrastructure, given the widespread destruction of power plants, theft of equipment, and years of neglect attributed to over a decade of war. Electricity-generating ships from Turkey and Qatar offer a short-term solution, but electricity interconnections with neighboring countries, like Jordan and Turkey, can guarantee a supply of power to Syria for the medium-to-long term. To this end, the World Bank approved a 146-million-dollar grant financing to Syria from the International Development Association (IDA) under the “Syria Electricity Emergency Project” that will enable the rehabilitation of damaged transmission lines and transformer substations. The end goal is for Syria to be connected to regional electricity networks, reducing blackouts and improving grid stability.
Gas supply and third-party guarantees
Electricity interconnections and gas supply from neighboring countries for the generation of electricity by major power plants in north and south Syria constitute parts of an unfolding international strategy to empower Syria’s energy sector. Azerbaijan, through the state-owned SOCAR, started exporting gas to Syria as of August 2025 through the Turkey-Syria Natural Gas Pipeline, under an agreement that foresees the supply of 1.2 billion cubic meters of gas annually to power plants in Aleppo and Homs with an expected generation capacity of 1,200–1,300 MW. On a parallel level, Jordan supplies gas daily to Syria, in cooperation with Qatar, through the Arab Gas Pipeline for the generation of electricity at the Deir Ali station, with distribution extending to the provinces of Damascus.
Gas supply to Syria from Egypt is also expected via Jordan in accordance with two memoranda of understanding (MoU) that were signed in early January 2026 between Cairo and Damascus. The supply of Egyptian gas is foreseen through the existing Arab Gas Pipeline that links Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, which is a commercially viable route. A critical issue, however, that must be addressed so that the MoUs can turn into actual agreements pertains to guaranteeing that gas originating from the East Mediterranean will be paid to energy companies that produce it.
The settlement of this issue can entail a third-party payment guarantee, replicating the case of Jordan’s contract for the supply of Israeli gas that was signed between companies. Specifically, the contract for the purchase of Israeli gas contains a guarantee from the US government that, in the event of Jordan’s inability to pay, the debt would be paid out at the expense of American aid money to Jordan. The reason for a third-party payment guarantee is connected to the fact that energy majors demand political certainty before signing export agreements or committing large sums to infrastructure and energy exploration.
In the case of Syria, years of conflict have eroded confidence in its regulatory and security environment, and even with partial sanctions waivers, investors require stable frameworks and enforceable contracts. Thus, if the transitional government in Syria cannot guarantee uninterrupted operations, banks and oil companies will continue to avoid the Syrian energy market.
The resource-rich northeast and international investments
Northeast Syria is the most lucrative part of the country in terms of production, as it incorporates significant oil and gas fields in the Deir ez-Zor region, such as the Omar and al-Tanak oil fields and the Koniko gas field that have come under the control of the Syrian government. As known, oil and gas fields in northeast Syria were previously held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The eight-point plan agreed upon in March 2025 between the SDF and the interim government in Damascus aimed to eliminate costly middlemen between the SDF and the Syrian authorities and integrate SDF-controlled oil and gas fields into the Syrian state. The eight-point plan has been largely replaced by the fourteen-point plan of 18th January 2026, an outcome of American mediation, that foresees control of oil and gas fields in northeast Syria by the Syrian state. A durable settlement between Damascus and the SDF is evidently a prerequisite for any effort to either revive increased production or attract foreign investment. The centralization of the energy sector aims at a return to pre-2011 production levels. But production recovery is technically complex, particularly for oil fields that suffered from unregulated extraction, while extensive rehabilitation is also required for pipeline infrastructure and processing facilities.
International energy majors reportedly plan a return of operations across Syria, such as the UK’s Gulfsands Petroleum at Block 26 in northeast Syria. It is noteworthy that Royal Dutch Shell and French Total operated in Syria despite Western sanctions, including the Syria Accountability Act, and exited only after the declaration of force majeure.
The partnership of American companies Baker Hughes, Hunt Energy, and Argent LNG to develop a roadmap for Syria’s oil, gas, and power sectors that will be connected to the newly established Syrian Sovereign Wealth Fund marks the first major American business move since the Trump administration lifted sanctions against Syria. A factor driving the involvement of US energy companies in Syria is that President Trump wants Syria to shine by tapping into Syrian energy, marking a convergence of US-Syrian interests. However, the lack of bureaucratic capacity and transparency in Syria can erode American efforts to reconstruct the Syrian energy sector. The rehabilitation of the oil and gas sector can prove to be slow-moving and highly dependent on economic, political, and security circumstances across Syria.
Overall, despite challenges, Syria’s energy sector seems to undergo a transformative shift from breakdown toward recovery in a calculated effort to explore a promising potential.
About the Author:
Antonia Dimou is Head of the Middle East Unit at the Institute for Security and Defense Analyses, Greece; and, an Associate at the Center for Middle East Development, University of California, Los Angeles
