Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Hadi Elis
In January 2026, Kurdish diasporas across the world launched coordinated solidarity demonstrations in response to escalating violence against Kurds in Syria (Rojava) and Iran (Rojhelat). These mobilizations were triggered by what Kurdish organizations and human rights advocates describe as war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by state authorities in both countries.
From the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to Turkey and Iran—where Kurdistan remains divided and under state control—millions of Kurds and supporters took to the streets to protest long-standing anti-Kurdish policies that have increasingly turned into armed confrontations. In Iran, this conflict is not new; it stretches back decades to 1979, following the rise of the Ayatollahs to power—a political transition shaped, in part, by strategic miscalculations made collectively by the United States, Britain, and France.
At the same time, Western policies toward Kurds in Syria have exposed a striking contradiction. The implicit message conveyed by policy choices has often appeared to be: “Al-Qaeda is on our side.” This perception stems from the political recognition and indirect legitimization of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an organization that Western governments themselves previously identified as an Al-Qaeda affiliate, formally designated as a terrorist group, and for whose leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (al-Shaara), they once offered a multi-million-dollar bounty.
By contrast, the alternative—“Kurds are on our side”—is demonstrably more accurate. Kurdish political movements in Syria and Iraq have consistently positioned themselves as pro-Western, supportive of federal governance, and committed to gender equality, pluralism, and local democracy. Kurdish forces have also been the most militarily organized and effective actors in the fight against Islamist extremist groups, including those affiliated with Al-Qaeda.
Despite this record, the United States, Britain, and France chose, at critical moments, to cooperate with or tolerate Islamist actors in Syria while exerting political and military pressure on Kurdish forces. This approach has alienated the very groups that bore the greatest cost in the struggle against jihadist organizations.
The ideological hostility of pan-Arabist and pan-Islamist movements toward Kurdish self-rule further compounds the problem. Leaders of groups such as HTS argue that Kurds inhabit “Arab lands” and therefore have no right to territorial autonomy—despite the historical reality that Kurdish presence in the region predates the arrival of Arab nomadic tribes by millennia.
Why the United States, Britain, and France have repeatedly deprioritized Kurdish interests is a broader strategic question. However, a more immediate issue is how Kurds can develop an effective counter-strategy—one that draws on the precedent of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which these same Western states formally recognize and support.
Kurds already maintain channels of communication, dialogue, and negotiation with Washington, London, and Paris. Crucially, public opinion within these countries tends to be sympathetic to Kurdish causes and deeply skeptical of Islamist extremist groups. This creates a natural political alliance between Kurdish movements and Western civil societies, even when government policies lag behind.
Peaceful, sustained, and globally coordinated demonstrations—open to engagement with the public, media, journalists, and academic communities—remain one of the most effective tools for influencing foreign policy. Visibility, clarity of messaging, and moral consistency are essential.
Recent developments in the United States illustrate this dynamic. Senator Lindsey Graham and Representative Don Bacon have publicly condemned actions taken against Kurds in Syria. If pressure continues to build, more lawmakers are likely to follow, increasing the cost of maintaining current policies. Over time, the U.S. administration—as well as governments in Britain and France—will face mounting pressure to reassess their strategic choices.
These arguments must be communicated clearly and widely within the international community.
Key questions the public must be encouraged to ask:
What does HTS stand for—and what is its ideological and organizational history?
What do SDF and YPG stand for—and what values and alliances do they represent?
Let the people decide
About the Author:
Hadi Elis is a sociologist and writer specializing in Kurdish and Middle Eastern politics. I am the author of “Turkey’s Military Occupation of Syria and Responsibility for Regime Change” (2025) and “Kurdish Demand for Statehood and the Future of Iraq” (2004). I served as spokesperson for the Canadian Kurdish Federation (2002–2016) and have appeared on BBC World News Service. He publishes on Academia.edu and have supported academic research on Kurdish studies for over 35 years.
