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Electronic War Against Iran: How the Five Schools of Warfare Have Entered the Battlespace

Dr. Shehab Al-Makahleh

What is unfolding today in the Middle East is not a prelude to war. It is war — conducted in the electromagnetic spectrum rather than the airspace. The forward deployment of Eurofighter Typhoon EK/IK electronic-warfare variants from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom into some Arab states and Cyprus marks a decisive escalation. This is not symbolic reassurance. It is the activation of a coalition-level electronic attack architecture designed explicitly to confront Iran’s air-defense, missile, and command-and-control systems.

Following the failure of limited electronic measures during the so-called “Black Wednesday,” U.S. planners concluded that American and Israeli systems alone — including modified F-18 electronic-attack platforms, UAV-based EW, and satellite-dependent enablers — were insufficient against the Iranian challenge. Iran has demonstrated resilience in radar redundancy, guidance hardening, and electronic counter-countermeasures. The response has been to escalate horizontally, not vertically: to bring in Europe’s full electronic warfare doctrine.

The Eurofighter EK is not a fighter aircraft in the conventional sense. It is a dedicated electronic attack platform, optimized for wide-area radar suppression, electromagnetic dominance, and offensive EW. Equipped with German ARSIS and ICE systems, derived from the Tornado ECR lineage, these aircraft specialize in SEAD/DEAD missions at scale. Integrated AESA sensors, IR/CRM Mk1 electronic-warfare suites, and real-time AI-driven signal processing allow continuous classification, targeting, and neutralization of hostile emitters.

Germany provides the structural backbone of the operation: spectrum management, emitter libraries, radar taxonomy, and electronic battle management. This is systematic warfare, designed to dismantle Iranian air-defense architecture node by node. France contributes a distinct EW school through Dassault Systems, emphasizing deep sensor-shooter fusion, adaptive deception, and cross-platform electronic integration. British systems add a third layer: adaptive, waveform-agnostic jamming, refined through decades of NATO interoperability but enhanced by sovereign modifications.

The United States remains the operational commander, but no longer the sole executor. Its role is now to orchestrate a compound jamming environment: American-Israeli electronic attack reinforced by European electronic penetration. Israel, meanwhile, functions as the operational laboratory. Its experience in missile trajectory manipulation, seeker confusion, and re-vectoring threats toward maritime or low-density areas transforms air defense into an offensive electronic maneuver. This is not interception. It is denial of functionality.

Geography completes the design. Some Arab states operate as the forward electronic shield, enabling early-phase disruption — targeting Iranian missiles and drones from the moment of launch. Cyprus provides rear-area electronic depth, sealing the battlespace from the west and completing a dual-wall electromagnetic barrier around Israel. The result is an electronic envelope that shifts the engagement zone from Israeli airspace into the Iranian launch-and-control ecosystem itself.

This marks a fundamental break from the Twelve-Day War. Then, electronic warfare was supplementary. Now, it is decisive. Firepower is no longer the primary instrument; electronic paralysis is. The coalition is executing five distinct jamming doctrines simultaneously — American, Israeli, German, French, and British — overwhelming Iranian defenses with multi-vector, multi-logic interference. No air-defense system is designed to absorb five electronic grammars at once.

What we are witnessing is likely the first sustained, alliance-wide electronic war in modern military history. Just as earlier conflicts introduced space warfare as an operational domain, this phase institutionalizes continuous electronic conflict below the threshold of declared war. Signals are attacked, command chains are stressed, and defenses are degraded in real time, without a single missile crossing a border.

Equally revealing is what this war is not. Against Russia, NATO continues to exercise electronic restraint, preserving escalation control. Against Iran, those restraints are absent. Every available card is being played. This alone signals how the West defines the Iranian challenge: not a peer to be balanced carefully, but a system to be technologically overwhelmed.

Wars are no longer announced. They are activated. And this one is being fought in frequencies, algorithms, and electromagnetic dominance — where victory is achieved long before the first explosion is heard.