Will Hezbollah Disarm?

Alexander Langlois

Disarming Hezbollah would be much easier if Israel withdrew its troops from Lebanese territory.

In the first week of August, the Lebanese government’s cabinet voted to disarm all armed groups in the country, marking a significant milestone for the country. But will the decision be implemented? Not long ago, Hezbollah was considered the strongest non-state armed actor in the world. Lebanon’s shifting dynamics—part of a broader regional realignment underway since at least the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023—suggest the group’s days as a serious military force may finally be numbered.

The cabinet decision marks the latest major event in a saga of negotiations and war that stretches back to the fall of 2024. After nearly a year of back-and-forth attacks between Hezbollah and Israel that uprooted tens of thousands on both sides of the border, Israel’s invasion of its northern neighbor produced a nightmare scenario for the group. Rather than hold the line, Hezbollah’s senior leadership—including the revered Hassan Nasrallah—perished in a series of highly sophisticated Israeli assassinations and strikes, with widespread destruction across the country’s Shia-dominated south and an Israeli occupation of five key points within Lebanese territory.

A new, indefinite Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory has begun, ironically due to the actions of a group whose raison d’être is resistance to any such occupation. To be sure, Israel’s illegal invasion of its neighbor was hardly justified relative to the real solution—ending the conflict in Gaza and the broader occupation. But in a region where international law leaves the barest of imprints, Hezbollah was the clear loser, alongside the Lebanese people whom it dragged into the fight against their will.

Under US mediation, a November ceasefire proved to be anything but a cessation of violence, with Israel launching near-daily strikes on Hezbollah positions as the group supposedly worked to recover any standing it could after the invasion. The strikes on Lebanon marked another violation of basic international law—hardly a worry on the part of Israel and its patron.

The formation of a new Lebanese government, headed by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, in January and February2025, was the first major step towards a deal much bigger than a ceasefire. With a reformist government in power and American-Israeli pressure further mounting, talks ramped up to address the Hezbollah issue for good. Months of diplomacy spanning two US special envoys amid continued Israeli strikes culminated in the early-August announcement to disarm all armed groups within Lebanese territory.

While Hezbollah argues that the decision is not a Lebanese one, but rather an international imposition, the details hardly matter within this context. The group’s decisions have fostered widespread internal resentment after garnering some cross-sectoral support early in the war. The international community smells blood in the water, having had its sights set on disarmament and reform long before 2023.

Reconstruction funding for the South and other areas considered to be pro-Hezbollah remains in limbo. Most of the country continues to suffer from severe impoverishment amid a government that largely fails to provide adequate services. Hezbollah hardly retains realistic strike capabilities to turn any tide.

Still, it continues to buy time—a classic tactic utilized in the past to avoid serious talk of disarmament and reform. That approach puts the Lebanese government in a bind, as US officials continue to press Aoun and Salam to move on the Hezbollah issue. That pressure produced the cabinet decision, even as both leaders were advocating for a slower, phased approach.

Lebanese government concerns should not be discounted, especially given the arbitrary deadlines largely built around the attention span and frustrations of a notoriously unpredictable US president. Aoun and Salam understand, having lived through their country’s brutal civil war (1975–1990), that many of the underlying reasons for that conflict still exist today. Sectarianism remains a divisive issue—something Hezbollah uses to retain its Shia base and prevent any serious discussion on its arms.

To be sure, the Trump administration likely views increased pressure as the best approach to achieve disarmament. But the easiest path is not always the right one. Increasing pressure on the group feeds the very arguments that underpin its support—namely, resistance to foreign aggression and occupation. That support cannot be wished away and should not be ignored.

Policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals should understand the importance of Lebanon’s stability first and foremost. Risking a new civil conflict or accepting that scenario as a potential outcome if Hezbollah refuses to disarm should be unacceptable. Betting on the group as too weak to seriously commit to such a war presents unnecessary risks when alternative approaches exist to resolve the issue.

That means undermining Hezbollah’s raison d’être, as Aoun and Salam understand. It means forcing Israel to acknowledge its illegal occupation of sovereign Lebanese territory. It means forcing Israel to take a step of good faith, like leaving one of the occupied southern villages in exchange for Hezbollah starting a disarmament process. It means giving Aoun and Salam the political capital to establish disarmament as a united Lebanese national necessity, rather than a perceived sectarian or imperialist slight.

Attempting to force disarmament through the end of a barrel, without considering the domestic Lebanese political situation, risks producing an unsustainable outcome that destabilizes Lebanon by denigrating a Shia community that already and correctly feels historically maligned. Such an effort empowers Hezbollah, possibly increasing its intransigence in disarmament talks. That fosters a setting for no solution and more conflict.

The debate around Hezbollah’s arms should centralize integration and national unity—two core components of Aoun and Salam’s approach. If Washington is serious about supporting the region’s leaders in building a future that works, it should adopt that thinking in Lebanon. The alternative is a potential missed opportunity to help Lebanon finally close the door on its brutal past, at the expense of the broader effort to reshape the Middle East and end an era of US overextension in the region.

About the Author: 

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst and Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities. He is focused on the geopolitics of the Levant and the broader dynamics of West Asia. Langlois holds a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from American University. He has written for various outlets such as The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Sada, Atlantic Council’s MENASource, the Lowy Institute, Gulf International Forum, the New Arab, the Nation, and Inkstick.