Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
By Dr. Shehab Al-Makahleh
In a private meeting with geopolitical analyst George Friedman in 2022, and during an earlier conversation with the late Henry Kissinger in 2021, both thinkers alluded to the strategic inevitabilities of conflict in the Middle East. Strategist Friedman warned that the region was heading into a transformative decade—one where old borders and alliances would no longer suffice. Kissinger, whose realist doctrine shaped American foreign policy for decades, spoke in more ominous terms, suggesting that “the architecture of the post-World War II Middle East is reaching its terminal phase.” These insights, in retrospect, seem to anticipate what may become a broader and more unilateral Iranian military engagement in the region in late 2025.
Recent intelligence signals point toward a likely return to open confrontation between Iran and Israel in the final quarter of 2025. Unlike previous tit-for-tat operations or shadow wars, this new phase is anticipated to take a different character: a unilateral Iranian offensive against Israel and its regional allies. The scale of the upcoming conflict, according to several strategic assessments, could significantly redraw the map of the Middle East.
This confrontation, expected to erupt after a period of strategic recalibration, will not just be a continuation of the covert and proxy battles that have typified the Iran-Israel conflict for years. Instead, it signals a fundamental shift in the rules of engagement and in Tehran’s readiness to act overtly, without necessarily relying on Hezbollah or the militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen as intermediaries.
August is a historically significant month. Tisha B’Av, which fell on August 3 in 2025, is a solemn Jewish day of mourning for the destruction of the First and Second Temples. In Persian history, this month includes events related to the reigns and deaths of major Achaemenid rulers such as Darius and Xerxes—kings remembered both for their imperial might and strategic miscalculations.
American history, too, bears August milestones—the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, and the Iraq invasion preparations in early 1990s all began or escalated during this month. Thus, August remains a symbolic stage for escalation, and Q4 of 2025 appears to be no exception.
For decades, Iran’s military strategy has relied heavily on the doctrine of asymmetrical warfare. Tehran’s axis of resistance—Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, and various militias in Syria—was designed to encircle Israel and create constant pressure on American assets in the region. But this model, though tactically effective, has also proven increasingly fragile under new regional and global alignments.
In recent years, Iran has begun shifting toward greater military centralization and autonomy. Its drone technology, missile programs, and growing naval presence in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea suggest a move away from indirect engagement. Iran’s leadership now appears willing to confront Israel more directly—not just through a calibrated escalation, but through preemptive strikes and open strategic declarations.
This marks a break from the older strategy of plausible deniability, and is partly driven by domestic political imperatives and a sense of encirclement following the Abraham Accords and normalization deals between Israel and several Arab states.
Henry Kissinger once warned that “America has no permanent friends or enemies—only interests.” In the current context, U.S. interests in the Middle East are becoming harder to define, and its commitments less predictable. American influence has been steadily eroding—not because of any singular failure, but due to the global recalibration of its priorities toward Asia and away from the Middle East.
The Trump administration may find itself caught between supporting Israel militarily and avoiding an all-out regional war that could ignite global economic repercussions. This creates a vacuum in which regional actors are recalibrating their strategies and forging their own independent security doctrines.
Friedman noted in the meeting: “We’re seeing the emergence of a post-American Middle East. Countries are no longer asking what Washington thinks. They’re asking what the others fear.”
There is growing speculation that a coalition of ten countries may align themselves—formally or informally—in support of Israel or in opposition to Iranian expansionism. This coalition may not manifest in a conventional alliance, but through coordinated airspace denial, intelligence sharing, cyber operations, or maritime pressure in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.
These nations could include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, Morocco, France, the United States, the UK, and possibly Turkey and Azerbaijan. Each has its own reasons to oppose Iranian ambitions, ranging from sectarian fears to geopolitical competition over shipping lanes, energy corridors, and regional influence.
However, Iran appears undeterred. Its leadership may calculate that a direct confrontation, even if met with force, could galvanize nationalist sentiment and solidify its revolutionary credentials at home and abroad.
If the confrontation escalates into a full-scale war, the region may witness unprecedented territorial, political, and economic shifts. Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—already weakened by years of instability—could become battlegrounds or bargaining chips. The Gulf states could be targeted by missile barrages. Israel might respond with overwhelming force, reshaping borders and displacing populations.
In the best-case scenario, a limited conflict could lead to a rebalancing of regional security frameworks. In the worst case, it could accelerate the fragmentation of the Arab state system and trigger a global crisis involving oil prices, mass displacement, and the reactivation of dormant alliances like NATO in new theatres.
Whether late 2025 becomes the breaking point or simply another turning of the screw remains to be seen. But all signs indicate that the balance of power in the Middle East is approaching an inflection point. As Kissinger once remarked, “Order must be restored before peace can be negotiated.” In this case, the restoration of order may come only after a phase of violent recalibration—one that Iran appears increasingly willing to initiate, and one that Israel and its allies may no longer be able to defer.
