Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
The Middle East needs U.S. foreign policy to address two key threats: a weakened but unpredictable Iran and the resurgence of Sunni extremism in Syria.
As President Trump begins his second term, he inherits a Middle East from his predecessor that has undergone unprecedented changes. Today, the region’s landscape is markedly different from its previous state. While there are signs of optimism, there are also substantial reasons for Washington to remain cautious—particularly concerning its primary adversary in the region: the Islamic Republic of Iran.
According to General Frank McKenzie, the former commander of U.S. CENTCOM, Iran is currently at one of its weakest points in decades. Its so-called “Axis of Resistance” is fragile and significantly weakened.
The Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which began in October 2023, has dealt a severe blow to one of the primary components of Iran’s proxy network, Hezbollah. The conflict led to the death of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, along with several other members of its high command. Israeli operations have inflicted heavy losses on Hezbollah, including the deaths of at least 4,000 elite fighters. Additionally, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has destroyed half of Hezbollah’s arsenal, neutralizing a significant portion of the militia’s operational capacity.
Hezbollah, however, is not the only pillar of Iran’s Axis of Resistance that has suffered damage. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has delivered a critical blow to Iran. The Ba’ath regime was one of Iran’s few allies in the Arab world and a crucial link in maintaining its primary land corridor to Hezbollah.
Hamas, another key member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, has also experienced severe setbacks. The deaths of prominent leaders Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Ismail Haniyeh have significantly weakened its military and political capacity.
Iran’s challenges extend beyond battle zones. In Iraq, which has long been a stronghold for Iranian influence, developments are increasingly discouraging for Tehran. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani appears less aligned with Iran than his predecessor and actively seeks closer ties with the U.S. to counterbalanceIranian influence. Together, these developments signify a substantial decline in Iran’s Axis of Resistance.
While this shift may seem advantageous for the United States, it poses new risks. The Axis of Resistance has been a key pillar of Iran’s deterrence strategy, ensuring its survival against external threats. For a regime like the Islamic Republic, where survival takes precedence over anything else, deterrence is essential.
With its regional network weakened, Iran may pursue alternative means to safeguard its regime, like accelerating its nuclear program. Since sanctions have hindered upgrades to its conventional military, Tehran’s incentive to develop its nuclear capabilities has only grown.
Iran’s uranium enrichment has reached a historic level of 60 percent purity, bringing its breakout time to just weeks—or even days in some cases. This escalation heightens the threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, making the risk more immediate and tangible than ever before.
Alongside Iran’s nuclear advances, its Axis of Resistance weakening presents new risks. While one adversary’s decline may seem advantageous, it can create opportunities for another to rise. A clear example is the takeover of power in Syria by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a development with far-reaching implications for the United States.
HTS’s rise reflects a broader pattern, coming just four years after the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. This signals a resurgence of radical Sunni armed groups that position themselves as alternatives to state authority. While HTS’s rapid consolidation of power in Syria is notable, its long-term dominance is uncertain. Potential conflict with rival factions, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or rebel groups in southern Syria, could challenge HTS’s grip on power, adding further instability to an already volatile region.
The power vacuum in Syria risks transforming the country into a training ground and recruitment hub for international jihadists. This poses a direct threat to U.S. security, as HTS, with roots in al-Qaeda and past links to ISIS, could facilitate the resurgence of these groups. While HTS claims to have distanced itself from both, sympathies for al-Qaeda or ISIS may still exist within its ranks, potentially enabling covert collaboration and expanded terrorist activities across the region.
The developments in Syria also raise serious security concerns for Jordan. Historically, Jordan’s stability has depended on foreign support—primarily from the United States—and the disinterest or lack of capability of neighboring states to destabilize it. Among its neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Israel have had no incentive to destabilize Jordan. In Syria’s case, the Alawite regime of Assad lacked the popularity among Sunnis necessary to exert significant influence over them.
However, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) control of Syria changes this dynamic. As a Sunni militant group with ideological appeal, HTS could influence Jordan’s Sunni communities. Its proximity to Jordan’s border increases the risks of infiltration, smuggling, and radicalization within the kingdom, posing a growing challenge to Jordan’s security and stability.
Compounding this threat is Jordan’s sizable Palestinian population. Some of whom are discontent with the government’s perceived alignment with Israel. If unaddressed, these grievances could be exploited by HTS to destabilize Jordan from within, further threatening U.S. and regional security.
Instability in Jordan could have far-reaching consequences for regional security. As a key U.S. ally and a stabilizing force in a volatile region, unrest in Jordan risks triggering a domino effect that could fuel anti-Israeli sentiment in the West Bank. This would exacerbate the fragile Israeli-Palestinian conflict, threatening U.S. and Israeli strategic interests.
The HTS takeover in Syria further complicates the situation, introducing an unpredictable element into the region. For U.S. policymakers, preserving Jordan’s stability should be a top priority, as its collapse would jeopardize American interests, Israeli-Palestinian stability, and regional security as a whole.
While unrest in Jordan threatens to influence the West Bank, Gaza presents another significant challenge. Although the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas appears to address one of the primary angles of the crisis, the issue of hostages, the other main issue remains uncertain: the future governance of Gaza in the post-war era. The loss of much of Hamas’s senior leadership has made negotiations more difficult, with no clear authority to engage in talks. This leadership vacuum complicates any potential agreement and increases the likelihood of a prolonged and uncertain process.
Beyond the hostage issue, the future governance of Gaza poses another critical challenge. Both the United States and Israel oppose Hamas retaining control, but viable alternatives are limited. One option is to empower Egypt or Jordan to assume control, but both nations are unlikely to accept the risks and political burdens involved. Another option is establishing a governing authority composed of moderate Palestinians from the West Bank or Jordan, but this path is equally fraught.
Any new governing authority to assert control would require significant backing from the U.S. and Israel. However, such overt support risks delegitimizing the authority as it may be seen as a foreign-backed puppet regime. This dilemma could create conditions for the rise of a militant successor to Hamas, prolonging the cycle of instability in Gaza.
President Trump faces multifaceted challenges in the Middle East, extending beyond conflict zones to include seemingly stable allies like Egypt. With a population of over 100 million, Egypt is grappling with severe economic strain marked by inflation, unemployment, and surging prices. This economic hardship has fueled public discontent, raising fears of potential unrest that could destabilize the region. Given Egypt’s strategic importance, such turmoil would have significant regional implications. Additionally, HTS’s takeover may have reignited hope among cells of the Muslim Brotherhood, encouraging them to consider revolt once again.
Other U.S. allies, like Oman, are also facing economic pressures. Once a bastion of stability, Oman has recently seen protests over unemployment and economic grievances, highlighting the broader fragility of U.S. allies in the region.
Compounding these issues is the growing influence of U.S. rivals Russia and China. China has overtaken the United States as the Middle East’s top trading partner and steadily increased its military footprint. Its militarybase in Djibouti, near the Red Sea’s strategic chokepoint, reflects its broader ambitions. More notably, China’s attempts to establish a military base outside of Dubai signal an effort to cement economic and military influence in the region. Such moves highlight Beijing’s growing role as a competitor to U.S. dominance as it seeks to entrench itself in critical trade and security corridors.
Russia, too, has asserted itself, strengthening ties with Iran and cementing its military presence in Syria. Its key outposts at the Tartus naval base and Hmeimim airbase remain critical footholds despite several troopwithdrawals following the HTS takeover. In the meantime, reports suggest that Russia and HTS are reaching an agreement allowing Moscow to maintain a military presence at both bases. This development shows that Russia is adapting to the changing realities on the ground, while the U.S. does not seem to have any strategy for the new developments.
Meanwhile, U.S. allies like Turkey are adopting a “hedging” strategy, balancing relationships with rival powers. Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system strained its ties with the United States, jeopardizing the F-35 program. This trend reflects a broader shift among regional allies toward strategic autonomy as they engage in transactional diplomacy with Washington and its adversaries.
The Middle East requires a proactive and nuanced U.S. foreign policy to address two key threats: a weakened but unpredictable Iran and the resurgence of Sunni extremism, notably HTS. Iran’s vulnerability could prompt negotiations or push it to accelerate its nuclear program, requiring U.S. preparedness for both scenarios. Meanwhile, HTS’s growing influence in Syria poses a transnational threat, with potential spillover into Jordan, Iraq, and Europe.
Beyond countering adversaries, the United States must manage shifting dynamics among allies like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, who have shown signs of alignment with U.S. rivals. Establishing clear red lines and consequences is crucial to maintaining leverage over these partners and preserving U.S. influence.
While President Trump may seek to reduce U.S. involvement in the region, complete disengagement is not viable. Past events, like 9/11, underscore the dangers of ignoring Middle East instability. To prevent the region from becoming a hub for extremism, nuclear proliferation, and great power rivalry with Russia and China, the United States must adopt a comprehensive strategy that addresses threats, stabilizes allies, and reasserts its influence.
