Recent years have seen a noticeable ramp-up of China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea. While China previously held a far more passive stance in regards to its neighbors, it seems that shaky footage of Chinese Coast Guard vessels or fishing boats shadowing and attacking Philippine vessels with water cannons, ramming attacks, or even hatchets is a common occurrence. China’s ongoing campaign to cement itself as the dominant power in the South China Sea risks pulling the United States out of its position of global dominance. The United States must establish a stronger kinetic presence in the Pacific to maintain its edge in the great power competition against the People’s Republic of China.
China possesses three major forces with which it can exert control in the South China Sea: the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), and the People’s Armed Force Maritime Militia (PLAFMM). China has been utilizing the latter two of these forces to encroach on the sovereignty of seagoing nations; Chinese vessels will violate the EEZs of other nations, vessels attempting to exercise freedom of navigation rights will be harassed, resupply vessels to remote island outposts of other countries will be outright attacked, and territory may even be seized. The primary targets of Chinese aggression have been the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan, but no nation in the South China Sea is truly safe.
The world is no stranger to asymmetric tactics being used to intimidate, to control, and to bully. As has been explored in the past, asymmetric tactics such as those used by China emerge when a country believes they have an acute necessity for them. Countries that hope to accomplish diplomatic, informational, military, and economic objectives without using outright military power will resort to asymmetric tactics that do not rise to the level of sparking a conflict, such as using law-enforcement forces and plausibly deniable forces (in this case, the Chinese fishing militia).
China’s desire to avoid an all-out confrontation is the necessity that has bred their use of asymmetric tactics. China’s success in the grey zone has been primarily because they do not have any qualms with undertaking actions below the level of war against fellow Pacific nations. American assets generally keep their distance when standoffs occur, in an attempt to avoid escalation. It seems as if the PRC is emboldened by the lack of an American presence as attacks continue to grow more brazen; an attack this year featured CCG personnel brandishing bladed weapons against Philippine military personnel, and using these weapons to damage Philippine boats. This continual ramping-up of Chinese efforts cannot be permitted to continue unabated.
ANOTHER WAY OF DOING BUSINESS?
Fortunately, all is not lost. While the PRC’s behavior on the high seas is anything but civil when dealing with its Pacific neighbors, they tend to be much more measured when encountering the United States. China does regularly cut off or closely shadow American vessels, but those actions represent the extent of their aggressiveness. China has not dared to venture into the realm of near-kinetic tactics such as ramming against the US Navy or US Coast Guard, and the majority of encounters between the PRC and the United States have been described as “professional.”
China, which uses these asymmetric tactics in order to exert control over smaller nations, is resorting to them out of the fear that use of its navy in an aggressive manner could pull the United States into the arena. This would represent an absolute worst-case scenario for the PRC, as American naval forces are far less susceptible to the bullying-type tactics that China employs. If the USN or USCG were to be engaged in the same way as Philippine and Vietnamese vessels routinely are, China is aware that force protection measures would be taken by the Americans.
Iran, which applies very similar methods in the littoral waters of the Middle East but lacks restraint against American vessels, is a force that the United States routinely deals with. Rather than remaining hands-off and avoiding a confrontation with Chinese asymmetric assets and leaving South China Sea nations to contend for themselves in confrontations with the PLAFMM, CCG, or PLAN, the United States should take a more heavy-handed approach; American assets should place it as a high priority to respond to, and be present for, confrontations caused by the PRC.
Assets do not necessarily need to be surface assets, nor do they need to be manned. The mere presence of an American-flagged aircraft or vessel could be all that is necessary for Chinese asymmetric forces to reconsider their actions. While it is a generally non-confrontational move, the presence of a US military asset on-scene sends a clear message that if China pushes too hard, the United States will respond. Additionally, it sends a clear message to South China Sea nations that the United States stands ready to aid them if necessary.
If the United States fails to change course and more immediately confront Chinese hostility, it is only a matter of time before a situation turns kinetic and sparks a regional conflict. Nations do not have confidence that the United States is willing to intervene, and the PRC does not believe that the United States is a threat to their expanding influence. A more proactive military presence is what the United States needs to prevent the ever-escalating PRC threat from becoming the dominant power in the Pacific.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. PA#: USAFA-DF-2025-3.