The Armed Conflict Survey 2024

As we approach the final quarter of 2024, the global outlook for peace remains bleak. The world is experiencing an unprecedented number of conflicts, which appear increasingly intractable due to the growing involvement of both domestic and external actors, a complex array of underlying drivers, and escalating geopolitical tensions.¹ The conflicts in Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine – arguably the most consequential of 2023–24 due to their geopolitical significance and human impact – are amplified examples of these broader trends. Meanwhile, the intensity and human cost of armed conflicts continue to surge (see Figure 1). Fatalities from violent events rose by 37% year-on-year during the reporting period (1 July 2023–30 June 2024) of The Armed Conflict Survey 2024, reaching nearly 200,000 globally. Although fatalities slightly declined in the Americas (-9%) and Asia (-3%), they skyrocketed by 315% in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This was primarily driven by spiralling violence in the Palestinian Territories, where deaths related to violent events soared to nearly 40,000 compared to 321 in the previous year. Significant year-on-year increases in fatalities were also recorded (in descending order) in Israel, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Sudan and Niger. Additionally, the overall ratio of fatalities per event increased by approximately 17%, underscoring the growing intensity and lethality of armed violence.²

This disheartening state of affairs is unfolding at the same time that the resources available to affected governments and international actors to address the unprecedented reconstruction and humanitarian needs created by ongoing armed violence are becoming increasingly strained. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UNOCHA) latest Global Humanitarian Overview report calculates that over 290 million people are in need of assistance in 2024. Of the US$48.3 billion required to support the 182.2m people targeted for relief, only US$7.3bn in humanitarian funding had been raised by the end of April 2024, reflecting a 36% decrease year-on-year.³ Financial gaps have been compounded by successive external shocks in recent years including the coronavirus pandemic and the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on food and energy security. These factors, combined with the accelerating climate crisis, have also intensified the root causes of conflict. The financial resources needed for the reconstruction of Ukraine and Gaza are stark examples of these challenges. The World Bank estimates that Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery will cost nearly US$486bn over the next decade, while the direct damage to Gaza’s infrastructure exceeds US$18.5bn, amounting to 97% of the Palestinian Territories’ total GDP in 2022.⁴

The above underscores the urgent need to thoroughly understand conflict drivers, actors and external influences, and repercussions in order to develop innovative policies and solutions aimed at reducing armed violence globally. The Armed Conflict Survey series has long contributed to this endeavour by unpacking the complexities of conflicts as well as offering strategic analyses of the factors that must be considered by policymakers and peacebuilding operators to design effective policies and strategies to address armed conflicts.

Figure 1: Human impact and intensity of conflict

The resurgence of inter-state conflicts

The reporting period saw a further acceleration of a crucial trend that The Armed Conflict Survey series has highlighted since its inception in 2015: the growing internationalisation of internal conflicts. Civil wars, which remain the dominant form of conflict globally, are increasingly shaped by the intervention of regional and global powers pursuing their strategic interests. As noted in last year’s report, this trend is driven by heightened great-power competition and the more assertive foreign-policy stances of many emerging powers, set against a backdrop of increasing geopolitical fragmentation.

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had already marked an inflection point in this dynamic, developments in the reporting period have further underscored the growing risk of inter-state wars. Beyond the continuation of the Russia–Ukraine war, now in its third year, the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war has destabilised the Middle East and beyond, threatening the start of various inter-state conflicts, most notably a full-scale war between Iran and Israel, after decades of low-intensity proxy conflict between the two. In Asia, tensions between the United States and China over the Taiwan Strait, between Pakistan and India along the Line of Control (LoC), and between China and India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) retained the potential to turn into major conventional wars, with nuclear implications. In Sub-Saharan Africa, frictions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda and between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the stand-off between Niger (alongside Mali and Burkina Faso) and the Economic Community of West African States, particularly Nigeria, all posed significant risks of escalating into inter-state conflicts. Even in the Americas, a region that has not experienced a major inter-state conflict since the 1930s, bilateral tensions flared up after a referendum in Venezuela in December 2023 reaffirmed its claim over the oil-rich Essequibo region, a long-disputed territory of Guyana. While the crisis was de-escalated through international mediation, it heightened the risk of the first inter-state confrontation occurring in the region in nearly a century.

The turmoil in the Middle East following Hamas’s unprecedented attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 has likely been the most visible and concerning development in this trend. Hamas’s close ties with the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’ – which includes various non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen – prompted retaliatory attacks on Israel and its allies in response to Israel’s offensive in Gaza. In Lebanon, Hizbullah re-engaged in conflict with Israel, with violence escalating throughout the reporting period and Israel decapitating the group’s leadership and invading southern Lebanon in September–October 2024.

In Iraq and Syria, Iran’s proxies launched repeated assaults on US and Western military forces, while in Yemen, Ansarullah (the Houthis) repeatedly targeted Western commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden using missiles, uninhabited aerial vehicles and uninhabited surface vessels. More alarmingly, the events in Gaza inflamed the Iran–Israel low-intensity conflict, culminating in Iran’s first direct attack on Israel since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 in April 2024 – in response to a deadly Israeli strike on an Iranian embassy complex in Syria. Given the United States’ and Western Europe’s unwavering support for Israel, this regional crisis has escalated into an international one.

The repercussions of growing geopolitical fragmentation

The foreign-policy assertiveness of non-Western powers intensified during the reporting period, with Russia serving as a prime example. Beyond its ongoing war in Ukraine in violation of international law, Russia has remained active in crucial theatres in the MENA region. More notably, following the collapse of the Wagner Group after the death of its chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, Russia has increased its direct involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa through the Africa Corps, controlled by Russia’s Ministry of Defence. This move has solidified Moscow’s security and diplomatic influence in the region and reinforced its anti-Western agenda, especially in the Sahel. Russia has deepened ties with the military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, formalising security partnerships with these countries.

Russia’s efforts to secure allies, coupled with the rise of other emerging powers and growing resentment from many countries in the Global South towards the West’s perceived disengagement and double standards (particularly regarding Israel’s actions in Gaza), have continued to fuel geopolitical fragmentation. This has notably undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of established conflict-resolution mechanisms and international law more broadly.

The UN Security Council has continued to struggle to fulfil its primary role of maintaining global peace and security due to internal divisions fuelled by geopolitical fragmentation. The inability of the international system and Western powers (such as the US) to broker ceasefires in conflicts like those in Gaza and Sudan, or mediate domestic and international conflicts, including those between Russia and Ukraine, Ethiopia and Somalia, and the DRC and Rwanda, and in Venezuela after its contested elections in July 2024, has been a constant feature of the reporting period. Meanwhile, emerging geopolitical powers, such as the Gulf countries, Brazil, China and Turkiye, have also failed to demonstrate greater effectiveness in their mediation efforts.

In addition, international humanitarian law has come under increasing attack. The conflicts in Sudan and Gaza have been marred by widespread violations and alleged war crimes perpetrated by all parties involved. Both state actors and NSAGs have shown a blatant disregard for civilian lives, resulting in alarming levels of displacement, including 90% of Gazans and 7.7m internally displaced Sudanese.5 These violations have included the use of lethal violence in proximity to or against civilians, the obstruction of humanitarian-aid deliveries, the reported use of food insecurity as a weapon of war, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, particularly in Gaza’s urban areas.

NSAGs as political and geopolitical actors

The Armed Conflict Survey series has consistently highlighted the central role of NSAGs as a driving force behind the increasing complexity and intractability of most contemporary wars. It has also documented their growing importance as political actors and providers of governance to the population under their control, often filling the void left by the state’s inability to meet basic socio-economic, political and security needs. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 455 armed groups of humanitarian concern were active globally as of July 2024, with approximately 210m people living under their full or contested control. Of these groups, 80% provide some form of public service (including security, healthcare, education and social support) and/or extract taxes from the population under their control.6 This phenomenon is of notable concern for Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region, where a total of 284 groups operate, but it is also an issue in the rest of the world, with 84, 76 and 11 such groups active in the Americas, Asia, and Europe and Eurasia respectively.

The rise of NSAGs as domestic political actors has often coincided with their increasing internationalisation, as many have been developing transnational networks and receiving support from third-party states. Their geopolitical significance was particularly evident during the reporting period in the MENA region, where groups like Hamas, Hizbullah and the Houthis played pivotal roles in shaping the conflict landscape. These groups illustrate the growing international and geopolitical influence of NSAGs, as they engage with or challenge state actors to further their strategic aims. The ICRC notes that at least 15% of armed groups globally provide support to states, while 25% receive backing from states. Moreover, around 50% of these actors give and receive support from other armed groups, pointing to their extensive networks of alliances and strategic interests.

To enhance understanding of the varying types and characteristics of NSAGs, The Armed Conflict Survey series provides detailed, standardised information on these groups in each country it covers. This includes data on their strength, areas of operation, organisational structure, leadership, resources, and domestic and international allies and adversaries. The Regional Analysis chapters in The Armed Conflict Survey 2024 also focus on the most important NSAGs per region, shedding light on their main characteristics, dynamics, and regional and global interlinkages.

The increasingly pressing need to unpack the climate–conflict nexus

The Armed Conflict Survey 2024 continues to reflect the disproportionate impact of the accelerating climate crisis on fragile countries, which are especially vulnerable to its manifestations. This aggravates underlying causes of conflict, leading to forced displacement and instability across borders while amplifying humanitarian needs globally.

Moreover, the growing competition for scarce natural resources, such as water and land, has increasingly become a significant driver of both internal and inter-state conflicts, with NSAGs notably leveraging control over these resources as a weapon of war and a means of gaining political power. In turn, armed violence and conflict weaken states’ capacities to adapt to climate change and build resilience. Additionally, conflicts often hinder climate-mitigation efforts, as seen in narco-deforestation in Latin America and the pollution from illegal mining in many regions of the world.

Visualising conflict dynamics

The data-rich analysis of The Armed Conflict Survey 2024 is enhanced by multiple visual elements, including regional and conflict-specific maps, charts and tables. These visual aids help illustrate key conflict trends from the reporting period, covering data on violent events, fatalities, military interventions, humanitarian impacts and forced displacement, among others. They also highlight regional and global connections and spillovers, offering a comprehensive understanding of the conflict landscape. An exhaustive categorisation and analysis of conflict parties, together with regional timelines of key military/ violent and political events for the reporting period, provide essential context for the conflicts analysed.

Additionally, the accompanying Chart of Armed Conflict presents a visual overview of the global conflict environment, with a particular focus on the economics of conflict. It highlights the key economic factors driving, enabling or exacerbating conflicts, as well as selected economic aspects of governance structures established by NSAGs over populations under their control, categorised by region.

Regional interlinkages and trends

The Armed Conflict Survey 2024 adopts a regional approach to analysing active conflicts, aiming to better capture their growing regional and international interlinkages as well as the broader geopolitical influences at play. Each regional section includes an extended Regional Analysis chapter, offering an overview of conflict trends, drivers and main actors such as NSAGs and third-party involvements. These analyses explore the regional and international dimensions of conflicts, assessing their potential future trajectories, prospects for peace or escalation, political risks, and possible flashpoints to monitor. This ‘horizon-scanning’ exercise provides forward-looking insights for policymakers, practitioners and corporate actors operating in or near conflict-affected areas.

Complementing the Regional Analyses are Regional Spotlight chapters, which focus on trends of strategic importance for the regional or global conflict landscape. Trends highlighted and discussed include the expansion and diversification of Mexican drug-trafficking organisations in the Americas section; instability trends in the Western Balkans in the Europe and Eurasia section; Iran and its network of NSAGs in the MENA section; the impact of the Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding on regional stability in the Sub-Saharan Africa section; and paths towards the reintegration of Afghanistan into the international community in the Asia section.

Americas

Armed violence tied to illicit economies in the Americas remains widespread, with homicide rates at nearly three times the global average. Organised crime is heavily involved in diverse criminal activities, including human trafficking, environmental crimes and synthetic-drugs trafficking. Read more about the region >

Europe and Eurasia

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the resulting political upheavals are key factors driving conflicts in Europe and Eurasia, alongside Russia’s revanchist policies under President Vladimir Putin. Read more about the region >

Middle East and North Africa

The reporting period was marked by a significant escalation in armed conflict in the MENA region, with the Hamas-led 7 October attacks against Israel and consequent Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip serving as the most consequential events in the reporting period. Read more about the region >

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa remained the most conflict-affected region globally during the reporting period, with 14 out of 49 countries engulfed in war. In 2023, the region recorded 28 internal conflicts (either with or without external intervention) – its highest number since 1991. Read more about the region >

Asia

The intensity of two of the three most consequential conflicts in Asia, namely the dispute over Kashmir and especially the war in Afghanistan, has significantly reduced in terms of violence over the reporting period.