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Turkey’s Aspirations and the Future of Kurds in Post-Assad Syria

Asif Haseen and Monalisa Dash

The recent takeover of the Assad regime by an Islamist rebel group—Hay’at-Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—has unleashed a power vacuum in post-Assad Syria wherein competing groups backed by different regional and foreign players are vying for control. Surprisingly, on Friday, comments by Recep Tayyip Erdogan were released from his office cautioning the foreign powers to withdraw their support for the Kurdish militia in Syria. As the evolving situation in the region seems precarious and Russian and Iranian influence is declining, Turkey stands to gain the most in its particularly strategic motives of controlling the Kurdish-dominated north-eastern Syria along the southern border of Turkey. While a plausible power struggle seems imminent between the Turkey-supported Syrian National Army (SNA) and the HTS vis-à-vis the Kudish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), both are bracing for an uncertain future for political leadership concessions and compromises.

Syrian Kurds and Their Aspirations

Kurds constitute the largest stateless ethnic group in the West Asian region, largely residing in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran—and fighting against assimilation and repression for regional autonomy and democratic governance in respective states. In Syria, Kurds constitute 10% of the total population, predominantly residing in northeastern cities such as Aleppo, Kobane, Manbij, Afrin, Jazira, and Damascus. Kurds have been an instrumental tool in fighting against the expanding footprint of the extremist group ISIS in the Levant region in the backdrop of havoc created by the Arab Spring. Since 2015, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have collaborated with the U.S.-led coalition, leading ground operations that demolished the ISIS caliphate in Raqqa. This military achievement established the Kurds as a significant actor in Syria’s disjointed political arena and revived the Kurdish aspirations to achieve a decentralised and autonomous territory in northeastern Syria called the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) or Rojava, replicating the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that enjoys a quasi-state status in Iraq. However, the Kurdish dream faced several obstructions under the Assad regime. Moreover, Turkey’s military operations in Syrian Kurdish areas and the ambiguous posture of the US, the principal foreign ally, have exacerbated the Kurdish predicament. While Washington offered essential assistance against ISIS, its reluctance to challenge Turkey’s interests has rendered the Kurds susceptible to vulnerability.

Turkey’s Ambitions in Post-Assad Syria

Turkey’s strategic objectives in Syria have been evolving since the Arab Spring. One of the central goals of Ankara has been to thwart the Kurdish aspirations of an autonomous Kurdish entity in Syria along its southern border, which it views as an imminent threat to its national security. Turkey associates the SDF and its principal component, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a proscribed entity that has been carrying out insurgency in Turkey since 1984, whom Ankara, the US, and the EU have tagged as a terrorist group. Successive Erdogan government in Ankara pursued to eradicate the YPG-controlled large swathes of northern Syria that he claims to be “a terrorist corridor,”  jeopardizing Turkey’s territorial integrity.

On the other hand, the US political and military support to the SDF against ISIS has always been a source of contention for Turkey, its NATO ally. However, despite US support for the SDF, throughout the Syrian Civil War and following the withdrawal of US troops from Syria in 2019, Turkey has launched several military offensives, such as Operations Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), and Peace Spring (2019), in Kurdish-dominated Syria. Justifying its military operations inside Syria, the Erdogan government has advocated creating a “buffer” or “safe zone” of 30 km along the Syrian border to rehabilitate three million Syrian refugees, which has become a source of socio-political and economic burden for Turkey’s crumbling economy and consistently plummeting Lira.

The Road Ahead for Post-Assad Syria: Competing Visions

In the aftermath of Assad’s rule, conflicts have exacerbated over territorial dominance and governance among competing factions with distinct aspirations for the future. HTS, an Islamist organization that previously had links with Al-Qaeda, is currently presenting itself as a moderate and pragmatic entity and has promised to protect minority rights.  It seeks to centralize authority under its self-proclaimed governance frameworks. The HTScontends with the competing territorial and political aspirations of the Kurdish-led SDF, seeking to establish an autonomous political framework that grants them autonomy, especially in the affluent oil fields of northeastern Syria. Their accomplishments in vanquishing ISIS in conjunction with U.S. forces have strengthened their assertion for self-governance; nevertheless, this ambition directly conflicts with Turkey’s steadfast opposition to SDF’s territorial ambitions.

In an uncertain atmosphere, with the HTS asserting its leadership for Syria and the SDF endeavouring to retain hold in the northeast, their interaction will determine the country’s future. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani has been reiterating that Kurds are “part of the Syrian homeland” while assuring “there will be no injustice” in a positive tone and avoiding offensive remarks at this critical moment. However, attaining a cohesive and stable political system appears to be an elusive aspiration. Turkey’s pivotal influence and resistance to Kurdish autonomy in Rojava complicate this picture and the power struggle. Turkey-backed SNA persists in acquiring territory, thereby diminishing the aspirations of the SDF. Moreover, limited and uncertain U.S. military support to the SDF amid changing political leadership in Washington is becoming increasingly ambiguous.

Driven by its greater geopolitical ambitions to what experts say “Neo-Ottomanism,” Turkey under Erdogan was envisioning the toppling of Assad and ending of the civil war to strengthen its grip over Syria and to limit the influence of Russia and Iran and the withdrawal of the US forces. Moreover, the incoming Trump administration had already signalled in 2019 its lack of interest in the Kurdish cause, thereby positioning Turkey as the sole victor on the strategic map. As the leading rebel group overtly or covertly is aligned with Ankara, the Kurds are left at the mercy of Turkey and Syrian Sunni rebels.

Despite this entangled regional situation, a question persists: whether an inclusive, multi-ethnic, and democratic Syria to arise from the devastation of a brutal civil war is possible? The conflicting visions of HTS and SDF, marked by a geopolitical rivalry among Kurdish, Islamist, and Arab groups, exacerbated by external interventions, suggest an unstable future for the people of Syria. The route to a stable Syria depends on these factions’ ability to harmonise their governing ideals while rectifying the historical injustices that have fragmented the country for decades. Even though HTS has formed an interim government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the SDF is likely to contest its legitimacy because it is unlikely to give up its claim to power without making significant sacrifices. The future of Syria hinges on the capacity and political will of leaders of different factions to transcend historical grudges and establish a framework that reconciles the wishes of its varied populace.