Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
David Egnatios
For decades, Europe preached the gospel of open markets while quietly watching its industrial base erode. Factories shuttered, supply chains drifted eastward, and strategic sectors became dependent on external powers. Now, the European Commission is preparing to change the script.
On February 26, Brussels will unveil the “Industrial Accelerator Act,” a law that signals a profound shift in Europe’s economic philosophy. At its core is a simple yet controversial premise: if European taxpayers are footing the bill, European industry should reap the rewards.
From Free Trade Idealism to Strategic Realism
Public procurement in the European Union exceeds €2 trillion annually. For years, much of this vast purchasing power has flowed into global supply chains that frequently favored lower-cost producers abroad—especially in China, where energy is cheaper and regulatory burdens are lighter.
The new proposal aims to reverse that trend. It requires that a defined percentage of products supported by public money be “made in Europe.” In other words, Europe intends to leverage its enormous public spending power as a strategic industrial tool.
This is not an isolated move. Across the Atlantic, the United States Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act, tying subsidies to domestic production. Around the world, industrial policy is back in fashion. Europe is simply catching up.
Strategic Sectors, Strategic Strings Attached
The Industrial Accelerator Act is not a blanket protectionist wall. It is targeted. It focuses on strategic sectors that will define Europe’s economic and geopolitical relevance: batteries, renewable energy, hydrogen, nuclear power, aluminium, and low-carbon construction materials.
Under the proposed rules:
-
Solar panels purchased through public contracts must include specific European-made components within a year, with thresholds rising over time.
-
Electric vehicles acquired with public funds must be assembled within the EU, and 70% of their components—excluding batteries—must originate in Europe.
-
Subsidized aluminium and concrete products must meet minimum European content requirements.
-
Public procurement and manufacturing subsidies will integrate low-carbon standards alongside origin requirements.
This is industrial policy fused with climate policy. It is Europe’s attempt to prevent the green transition from becoming another story of technological dependence.
The Foreign Investment Question
Perhaps more controversial are the investment provisions. Foreign investments exceeding €100 million in strategic sectors—particularly from countries dominating global manufacturing—would face conditions. These could include limiting majority ownership or requiring intellectual property licensing.
This is not merely economic regulation; it is geopolitical signaling. Europe is asserting that strategic autonomy cannot coexist with unchecked foreign control over its industrial backbone.
Critics will call it economic nationalism. Supporters call it resilience.
What Does “Made in Europe” Even Mean?
The definition currently aligns with the European Economic Area. But Brussels has left the door open to “trusted partners” in the future. That ambiguity is deliberate. It offers flexibility while maintaining strategic leverage.
There are also escape clauses. If global supply disruptions make compliance impractical, or if costs become prohibitively high, exceptions can be granted. The Commission is attempting to balance industrial ambition with economic pragmatism.
A Divided Continent
France and much of Europe’s industrial base support the plan. For them, it is long overdue. But not everyone is convinced. Sweden and the Czech Republic worry about deterring investment and driving up costs.
They have a point. Industrial policy is expensive. If not carefully calibrated, it can inflate prices, provoke retaliation, or fragment internal markets.
Yet the alternative may be more costly still: strategic irrelevance.
The Bigger Picture
This law is not just about solar panels or electric vehicles. It reflects a broader European awakening. The era of naïve globalization—where cost efficiency trumped strategic security—is ending.
Energy shocks, pandemic supply chain collapses, and rising geopolitical tensions have exposed vulnerabilities. Europe now understands that industrial capacity is not merely economic infrastructure; it is geopolitical power.
The Industrial Accelerator Act signals that Brussels is willing to use the full weight of public procurement—over €2 trillion annually—to shape markets rather than simply respond to them.
The real question is not whether this is protectionism. The real question is whether Europe can afford not to do it.
In a world where major powers openly weaponize trade, subsidies, and technology, strategic neutrality is no longer an option. Europe must decide whether it wants to remain a market—or become a maker once again.
