Al-Makahleh: West Bank Administrative Reconfiguration and the Deconstruction of the Palestinian State Paradigm

Dr. Shehab Al-Makahleh

There are moments in protracted conflicts when the vocabulary changes before the maps do, when administrative adjustments quietly outrun diplomacy, and when legal instruments become more decisive than armored brigades; February 13, 2026 may prove to be such a moment, as the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a package of measures that—while not formally declaring annexation—systematically expands Israeli state authority across the West Bank in ways that reengineer the territorial, legal, and economic foundations upon which the concept of a future Palestinian state has long precariously rested.

What was decided is not theatrical; it is procedural, technical, bureaucratic—and precisely for that reason, strategically consequential. The Security Cabinet authorized the publication of West Bank land registries, the removal of restrictions on land sales to non-Palestinians, the reactivation of state mechanisms for land acquisition, the expanded application of Israeli law, and the transfer of administrative authorities in Hebron and Bethlehem to Israeli civil structures. The significance lies in the structural context: the West Bank is not formally annexed territory but remains under military administration, meaning these decisions require no parliamentary vote in the Knesset and can be implemented as executive-military directives—swiftly, efficiently, and with minimal legislative friction. In security terms, this is governance acceleration under military jurisdiction.

Officials were unusually explicit. Finance Minister and de facto settlement portfolio holder Bezalel Smotrich described the moment as the burial of the Palestinian state idea, calling it a historic day for Judea and Samaria settlements. Energy Minister Eli Cohen and the Yesha Council echoed the framing of these measures as preparatory steps toward full sovereignty. This was not coded diplomatic language; it was ideological affirmation translated into administrative architecture. The declaratory layer and the bureaucratic layer are now aligned.

The most strategically sensitive instrument in this package is the publication of land records. Previously restricted to prevent fraud and to shield absentee Palestinian owners, these registries will now become accessible, enabling settlers and affiliated entities to identify landowners, initiate direct purchase offers, challenge ownership claims, and potentially litigate disputes in forums increasingly shaped by Israeli statutory extensions. Simultaneously, the repeal of a Jordanian-era restriction prohibiting land transfers to non-Palestinians dismantles a longstanding legal firewall. Critics warn of forged claims, aggressive acquisition campaigns inside Palestinian urban envelopes, and a Hebron Old City–style demographic encroachment model replicated across additional municipalities. In intelligence terms, this is a shift from territorial control by perimeter expansion to territorial control by legal penetration.

The implications extend beyond Area C. Under the 1995 Oslo II framework, Area C—approximately 60 percent of the West Bank—remains under full Israeli control, while Areas A and B were designated for Palestinian administration and shared security arrangements. The new measures reportedly expand the Israeli military’s authority to enforce demolition and construction restrictions beyond Area C into Areas A and B under justifications tied to archaeology, environmental protection, water management, and heritage preservation. Moreover, legislation to establish a “Judea and Samaria Heritage Authority” centralizes Israeli oversight of archaeological sites, including emblematic Palestinian locations such as Sebastia. Cultural governance thus becomes a vector of territorial normalization.

In Hebron and Bethlehem, administrative powers concerning the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs and Rachel’s Tomb have been transferred from Palestinian jurisdiction to Israeli civil administration. These sites are not merely religious landmarks; they are flashpoints embedded in demographic fault lines. Administrative transfer signals more than bureaucratic reshuffling—it recalibrates security control, zoning authority, and potential settlement expansion patterns in their immediate perimeters.

All of this unfolds amid acute Palestinian economic fragility. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Palestinian economy by the end of 2024 had regressed to roughly 2014 levels. Tax revenue withholdings, suspension of work permits, mobility restrictions, and accelerated settlement approvals since the return of Benjamin Netanyahu in early 2023 have compounded structural contraction. In 2025 alone, tens of thousands of additional settlement units advanced through planning pipelines. Economic compression and territorial reconfiguration are proceeding in parallel—a dual-track pressure model.

Security data further contextualize the escalation. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that more than one thousand Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank since the outbreak of the Gaza war, while casualties in Gaza have exceeded 72,000 amid widespread destruction and accusations of restricted humanitarian access. The operational theaters are no longer compartmentalized; West Bank dynamics are entangled with Gaza’s trajectory, and strategic signaling in one arena reverberates in the other.

International responses have been rhetorically critical yet operationally restrained. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas condemned the measures and appealed to the Security Council. The European Union characterized the steps as moving in the wrong direction; the United Kingdom cited incompatibility with international law. U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated formal opposition to outright annexation while emphasizing stability in the West Bank as a pillar of Israeli security. Notably absent, however, are coercive instruments—sanctions, conditionality, or enforcement mechanisms—that would materially alter Israeli cost-benefit calculations. Declaratory diplomacy has not translated into deterrent leverage.

The strategic question is therefore not whether a formal annexation declaration is imminent; it is whether annexation by administrative absorption is already underway. De jure sovereignty may remain undeclared, but de facto integration is advancing through land policy, statutory extension, heritage governance, and economic leverage. The two-state paradigm is not being repudiated in a single dramatic gesture; it is being hollowed out through cumulative regulatory sediment.

For Jordan, whose demographic equilibrium and custodial role in Jerusalem’s holy sites intersect directly with West Bank stability, the implications are acute. For Palestinian political leadership, the erosion of territorial coherence challenges both governance viability and international negotiating posture. For regional actors, particularly those invested in normalization frameworks, the recalibration of West Bank realities may complicate diplomatic architectures predicated on eventual Palestinian statehood.

History often records wars; it less frequently records administrative memos. Yet in this case, the memos may prove more transformative than the missiles. If these measures continue to consolidate without external constraint, the conflict will not merely intensify—it will be redefined. Borders may remain officially undrawn, but the operational map is shifting in real time.

The critical assessment for policymakers and security planners is blunt: Are we witnessing the early stages of formal annexation, or the consummation of a creeping sovereignty model that renders formal declaration unnecessary? Either path converges on the same structural outcome—a profound reconfiguration of the Israeli-Palestinian equation.

What is unfolding in the West Bank may represent not just another escalation cycle, but a pivot point in the historical arc of the Palestinian question—one in which territorial absorption, economic compression, and diplomatic ambiguity intersect, and where any emerging regional “deal” risks being underwritten disproportionately by Palestinians and Jordanians alike.

The maps are not yet redrawn on paper. But on the ground, the geometry of the conflict is being recalculated.