The Revolutionary Guards and the Making of Iran’s Iraq Policy

Iran’s policy toward Iraq since the 2003 US invasion has been shaped far more by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than by Iran’s civilian diplomats. Under Khamenei’s rule the IRGC became the regime’s powerhouse. Mohsen Sazegara, an exiled Iranian dissident who helped found the IRGC, describes the Guard as “a very strange and unique organization, like a huge investment company… also being a de facto foreign ministry” through its Quds Force. In Iraq’s case this has proved true. Indeed, even Iranian media note that every ambassador Tehran has sent to Baghdad since 2003 was a Quds Force veteran, “reinforcing the notion that the I.R.G.C.… is in charge” of Iran’s regional policies. Ahmad Majidyar, an Iran-focused policy analyst and researcher, stated that Iran’s engagement in Iraq has often been run by the Guards, not by the regular Foreign Ministry.

The IRGC’s aims in Iraq are fundamentally twofold: economic benefit and centralized power. On the economic front, the Guard is a business-oriented approach to the reconstruction of Iraq. Most of the investment in Baghdad is going through IRGC connections. The Rouhani government has been requested by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (I.R.G.C.) to “prepare the ground,” allowing Iranian companies to contribute a bigger part in the reconstruction process of the Iraqi city. According to Fars News Agency, affiliated with I.R.G.C., “Iran should also strive to be actively involved in the reconstruction of Mosul and other cities in Iraq that have been devastated by the war and export Iranian technological and engineering services and other products that are required in Iraq. It is a win-win scenario between Iran and Iraq.”

As Ahmad Majidyar noted in 2017, “IRGC companies such as Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters are already active in Iraq and are now seeking a role in Mosul’s rebuilding.” IRGC-affiliated media even warned Tehran to “actively participate in the rebuilding of Mosul” or risk ceding the opportunity to U.S. and Gulf firms. The Guards have even leveraged barter: the IRGC’s giant contractor Khatam al-Anbiya admits supplying Iranian gas and electricity to Iraq in exchange for Iraqi oil and fuel, funneling hard currency to Tehran. Each such deal enriches IRGC-controlled firms, which in turn bankroll the Guard’s wider ambitions.

At the same time, the IRGC has cemented its centralized power by dominating Iran’s diplomatic and proxy channels in Iraq. The clearest sign is at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad, such as Brigadier General Iraj Masjedi and Hassan Danaeifar. In January 2017 President Rouhani finally named Brig. Gen. Iraj Masjedi, a longtime Quds advisor to General Qassem Suleimani, as Iran’s ambassador in Baghdad.  This fits a pattern: every Iranian envoy in Baghdad has in effect been a former Quds officer, meaning the IRGC has taken charge of Iran’s diplomatic outreach to Iraq. In practice, Tehran’s official missions there have come to echo the IRGC’s priorities.

The IRGC’s influence in Iraq extends also through its proxy militias. Western analysts note that especially during the campaign against ISIS, the Quds Force “granted vast military and financial support to Shiite, Iraqi state, and Kurdish forces” and even deployed “thousands of IRGC and Basij soldiers” into the country. Beyond direct support, the Guards helped found or fund most of Iraq’s leading Shiite armed groups. Veterans of the Iran–Iraq War formed the nucleus of the Badr Organization, and in the 2000s, IRGC backing spawned Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and dozens of other brigades now active in Iraq. In effect, many Iraqi militia brigades are extensions of the Guards. As Behbod Negahban highlighted, this “leadership of and support for Iraqi Shiite militias” is how the Quds Force “anchors Iran’s influence in Iraq.” But this has been double-edged. On one hand the militias extend Tehran’s power; on the other they have provoked Iraqi backlash. By 2020, survey data showed Iraqis overwhelmingly negative about Tehran, with many blaming militia abuses and corruption. Even Iranian strategists warn that these proxies’ excesses have “damaged the Islamic Republic’s image” in Iraq and could weaken Iran’s sway. Nonetheless, the IRGC clearly retains the militia system as its own security guarantor and network in Iraq.

In sum, Iran’s strategy in Iraq under Khamenei has often been a Guard Corps operation. The IRGC network drives reconstruction and trade deals, staffs the embassy with its own men, and mobilizes the most feared militias on the ground—all of which further its interests. In effect, Tehran’s Iraq policy is a hybrid of official diplomacy and IRGC self-interest. As observers note, in practice Iran’s foreign policy has become the Guards’ domain. To understand Tehran’s role in Baghdad, therefore, one must see how the IRGC’s twin agenda of profit and proxy power dictates policy as much as any formal state strategy.

Even critics of the regime recognize that Iraq has become a prize for the Guards. Tehran’s leaders explicitly frame their Iraq involvement as defending Shia communities and resisting ISIS or U.S. encroachment—narratives that dovetail neatly with IRGC ideology. This mix of ideology and interest helps explain why Iranian governments of all stripes have tolerated or even encouraged the IRGC’s stranglehold on Iraq. Iranian analysts admit, however, that it comes at a cost: the very militias that serve Iran’s interests can also smear its image when they abuse power. For the Guards, every economic foothold in Iraq doubles as a strategic gain; for many Iraqis, it feels like a takeover. In short, Iran’s Iraq policy today is a blend of statecraft and “guardcraft,” driven as much by ideology as by enterprise.

For foreign and Iraqi observers alike, any Iranian promise or threat often comes with a Guard Corps signature behind it. Major deals, from oil contracts to security pacts, are frequently brokered by IRGC channels, ensuring outcomes favor Guard-linked actors. For example, in negotiations over oil pipelines or security cooperation, IRGC figures often sit at the table—a sign of who truly controls the agenda. In other words, under Khamenei’s leadership, Iran’s policy toward Iraq has become a Guards-led project, driven by the IRGC’s pursuit of profit and centralized power. In short, Tehran’s Iraq policy has become as much an IRGC enterprise as official diplomacy.