Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dimitra Staikou
Since 2022, the energy relationship between India and Russia has quietly become one of the most consequential adaptations to the West’s sanctions on Moscow. What began as an opportunistic trade in discounted crude has evolved into a durable restructuring of global energy flows—one that exposes a central contradiction in Europe’s post-Ukraine energy posture.
When Europe moved rapidly to curtail direct imports of Russian oil, Moscow did not lose access to global markets; it merely changed the route. India, confronting surging energy demand and inflationary pressure, emerged as the ideal absorber. Russian crude arrived at steep discounts, cushioning India’s economy without forcing New Delhi to adopt a political position on the Ukraine war. This was not defiance. It was strategic pragmatism.
Over time, the arrangement hardened into infrastructure, contracts, logistics and finance. Indian refiners—state-owned and private—integrated Russian crude into long-term supply chains. Russia reengineered shipping, insurance and payment systems to survive under sanctions. By early 2025, this was no longer a workaround but a structural pillar of India’s energy strategy and Russia’s economic survival. The result: a stable channel that keeps Russian oil moving, Indian refineries running, and global markets supplied.
This is where Europe enters the picture—quietly, indirectly, and uncomfortably.
Through India’s refining capacity, Russian crude is transformed into diesel, jet fuel and petroleum products that flow back into global markets, including Europe itself. The letter of sanctions is upheld; their spirit is diluted by market reality. Europe has not eliminated its dependence on Russian energy—it has outsourced the political discomfort to India’s refineries. The global energy market, indifferent to moral posturing, has simply re-optimized.
What makes this indirect bridge effective is not ideology but structure. India offers scale, technical capacity and strategic autonomy. Unlike unstable transit corridors or overtly revisionist powers, it provides reliability without alignment. For Europe, this means energy access without political exposure. For India, it cements status as a serious global energy actor. For Russia, it preserves revenue and relevance. This is how power operates in interconnected markets: not through declarations, but through logistics.
A critical stabiliser in this geometry is the United Arab Emirates. In an era where energy flows depend less on alliances and more on resilient hubs, the UAE stands apart. Since 2022, it has become indispensable—not merely as a transit point, but as a financial, regulatory and logistical anchor. Ports, shipping services, insurance, financing and trading platforms converge in the Emirates, allowing energy flows to continue where others would stall.
The UAE’s role is fundamentally systemic. It lowers risk across the supply chain by offering predictability in a volatile world. For Europe, it reduces exposure to weaponised corridors. For India, it strengthens credibility as an intermediary processor and exporter. For Russia, it offers commercial oxygen without open confrontation with the West. The Emirates are not exploiting disorder; they are arbitraging stability.
This stabilising triangle—India, Russia and the UAE—stands in stark contrast to a far riskier alternative emerging across Eurasia: the China–Pakistan–Turkey axis. Beijing’s push to secure energy through controlled corridors, particularly via the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, is designed to reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints—but it concentrates risk instead. Pakistan’s chronic instability and security vulnerabilities threaten infrastructure. China’s model prioritises dependency over transparency. Turkey, meanwhile, has repeatedly shown its willingness to weaponise transit for political leverage.
Unlike the Indian-UAE pathway, this axis amplifies coercion rather than resilience. It is not a neutral bridge but a geopolitical instrument—less reliable, more volatile, and ultimately destabilising for Europe.
There is also an unspoken American dimension. India remains central to Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The UAE is one of the United States’ most institutionalised security partners. An energy configuration that keeps markets supplied, limits price shocks and avoids empowering a unified revisionist bloc serves American interests—even if it includes Russia at arm’s length. Quiet tolerance, rather than loud objection, is the rational response.
At the economic level, this stabilised energy order reshapes trade politics. India’s role as a major refining and redistribution hub strengthens its leverage with Washington. The UAE’s position as a commercial bridge lowers friction between American and Asian capital. Under these conditions, tariff reductions and trade recalibration are not concessions—they are consequences.
The lesson is uncomfortable but clear. Sanctions did not isolate Russia; markets rerouted it. Energy did not become moral; it became modular. And the future of global power will belong not to those who declare red lines, but to those who control the hubs that quietly render them irrelevant.
Dimitra Staikou is a Greek lawyer, human rights advocate . She works as a journalist writing about human right's violations in South Asia and ctravels to India to get informed about the political situation there and the geopolitcs between India,China ,Pakistan and Bangladesh. She works for Greece's biggest newspaper Skai.gr and Huffpost.Gr as well as international distinguised news sites as Modern Diplomacy and Global Research.
