Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim
As Moscow and Beijing intensify their cooperation through institutions including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the probability of a dual contingency—Russia embarking on a full-fledged military offensive in Europe, while China conducts an assault against Taiwan—is no longer a long-term hypothesis. Although US policymakers tend to search for historical analogies from the Cold War period or crises in East Asia, one of the most instructive lessons can be drawn from the Middle East—more specifically from the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988).
This eight-year war was not a mere brutal regional struggle. It was a complex testing ground for how continuity, alliance, logistics, and economic recovery could be preserved amidst a divided world. For the US, Japan, South Korea, and other NATO member states, it offers some valuable lessons on how multi-front attrition looks when major powers hesitate to intervene directly yet indirectly shape the outcome.
Endurance and the Myth of Blitzkrieg
When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980, he expected a swift victory that could collapse the revolutionary regime in chaos. However, both sides were engulfed in eight years of attrition. The initial imbalance in capability soon turned into a stalemate; a warning to any country that assumes a quick victory in a large-scale campaign.
If China believes that it could overwhelm Taiwan before US intervention in the region occurs, the experience from the Iran-Iraq War indicates that even a technologically asymmetric war could easily degenerate into a drawn-out war of endurance. Similar lessons could be applied to the US. Once embroiled in a regional conflict, limited objectives could be expanded to an unlimited commitment that necessitates sustained logistics, industrial capacity, and political will.
This war also demonstrates how Iran and Iraq adapted under pressure; enlarging their domestic weapons production, restructuring their supply chain in an abrupt manner, and securing new external sponsors. Therefore, deterrence is an issue of continuity rather than firepower alone. A future conflict involving Russia and China can also develop into a long-term attrition that tests the economic resilience of both democracies and authoritarian systems.
External Balancing, Proxy Pressure, and Maritime Parallel
The dynamics of the Iran-Iraq War prefigure today’s gray-zone coordination among Moscow, Beijing, and their partners. Each belligerent heavily relied on external support. Iraq received weapons and materials from the Soviet Union, France, and other Gulf monarchies, while Iran maintained its secret supply route despite being under diplomatic isolation. Although the great powers avoided a direct collision, they set the course of the war through weapons supply, diplomatic influence, and intelligence sharing.
Such a pattern has some degree of similarity with how Russia and China align and operate in the 2020s; loosely coordinated, opportunistic, yet mutually reinforcing. Under Europe’s crisis, Beijing could harden its coercion in the Indo-Pacific through disinformation, energy manipulation, and limited maritime escalation. Meanwhile, Moscow could fixate NATO’s focus on the Baltic Sea or the Arctic. It is not necessary for these two countries to act simultaneously. It would be sufficient to create an overlapping crisis that could distract the Western alliance’s finite decision-making capacity.
Meanwhile, the maritime domain of the Iran-Iraq War—the so-called Tanker War (1984–1988)—clearly shows how a regional conflict could cause a global repercussion. While both sides attacked oil tankers, the US was compelled to reflag Kuwaiti vessels and dispatch its naval forces to the region. This clearly symbolized how energy choke points could invite even faraway countries to war.
In the current context, similar vulnerability exists. The South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and Northern Europe’s maritime routes share the same traits. Future tanker wars could erupt in sea lines of communication (SLOC)s near Taiwan or the Arctic energy corridors—triggered by Russia or China—eventually endangering the maritime flow in both Asia and Europe. Therefore, building resilience in such choke points—through securing various maritime routes, pre-positioning maritime assets, and joint energy security planning—should be the key task of the allies.
Strategic Focus and the Risk of Overexpansion
The most enduring lesson of the Iran-Iraq War is how easily the world’s focus can be diverted. During the 1980s, US policymakers had to manage crises in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Latin America while keeping an eye on the protracted war in the Gulf. Such diffusion of strategic focus constrained Washington’s ability to handle escalation in a consistent manner. In that context, a future dual contingency might overwhelm the US’s ability to react between Europe and East Asia.
The Russia-China pincer strategy does not necessarily need to rely on an official alliance mechanism. If Russia’s invasion aligns with China’s blockade or massive military exercise in an unofficial manner, it could sufficiently weaken the West’s capability for coordination. To reduce such risk, the Western allies should establish an autonomous regional command system and flexible logistics networks that do not depend on real-time US control.
For NATO, it implies an institutionalization of emergency planning that factors in the possibility that the US’s attention could be diverted to the Indo-Pacific. For Japan and South Korea, it means preserving deterrence—by readjusting joint operations and stockpiling supplies—even when US reinforcement lags. The ultimate goal is synchronization rather than separation; it aims to ensure that the two fronts could be met with a coherent response under pressure.
Preparation for a Prolonged War
The Iran-Iraq War teaches a paradoxical truth: long wars emerge not from irrational attacks, but from rational expectations of a brief war. If a Russia-China dual contingency were to occur, perhaps it could be triggered by a similar illusion of speed, surprise attack, and decisive victory.
In order to prevent such a crisis from happening, the US and its allies should internalize endurance planning, reinforce their industrial capability, and decentralize command authority. In the next tanker war—either in the Baltic Sea or in the Taiwan Strait—democratic allies should be well prepared, coordinated, and resilient.
The forgotten war that happened 40 years ago in the Middle East could be a mirror that effectively reflects the two-front challenges in the 21st century. It reminds us that victory in a globalized world depends on who can endure longer, and not necessarily who fires the first shot.
About the Author:
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim currently serves as a President at the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly. He has been involved in numerous defense projects and has provided consultation to several key organizations, including the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, the Ministry of National Defense, the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, the Agency for Defense Development, and the Korea Research Institute for Defense Technology Planning and Advancement. He holds a doctoral degree in international relations from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan, a master’s degree in conflict management from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a degree in public policy from Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Public Administration (GSPA).
