The Architecture of Washington’s Peace Diplomacy

Washington’s diplomatic and policy stakeholders have been in full motion in Africa this quarter—from Senate hearings shaping ambassadorial leadership to high-level visits in Benin, Cameroon, and Mali. The rhythm of these engagements suggests an evolving U.S. foreign policy, one that fuses civilian and military instruments of statecraft to sustain partnerships in Africa. Congressional oversight, ambassadorial nominations, and defence cooperation worked as the United States reassesses how best to remain a relevant and reliable partner across Africa’s complex security and economic landscape.

Congressional Foundations: Diplomacy Begins at Home

On July 29, 2025, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened a nominees hearing to vet several ambassadorial nominees, including Richard Buchan III (Morocco) and John Giordano (Namibia). Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho), the Committee’s chairman, set the tone; diplomatic leadership.

That assertion underscores Congress’s central role in shaping U.S. foreign engagement. Ambassadors are not mere envoys; they are extensions of American strategy in regions where security, trade, and governance are intertwined. As both nominees faced bipartisan scrutiny, the hearing reflected an enduring consensus that U.S. influence abroad requires not only capable diplomats but also sustained legislative support—especially at a moment when global competition is redefining how partnerships are measured.

Sub-Saharan Priorities from New York to Nairobi

Two months later, at the September 2025 United Nations General Assembly in New York, the State Department’s Africa team sought to refine Washington’s message. In a briefing titled “Advancing Trump Administration Priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Senior Adviser for Africa Massad Boulos and Senior Bureau Official Jonathan Pratt outlined the administration’s renewed emphasis on what Boulos termed the “Three Ps: Peace, Partnerships, and Prosperity.”

“We’ve shifted the paradigm from aid dependence to trade-driven relationships,” Boulos said. “Our goal is to move from transactional to transformational engagement — rooted in mutual benefit, not charity.”

Pratt, acknowledging the skepticism surrounding continuity in U.S.-Africa policy, added, “We will measure success not by the number of aid projects but by the scale of sustainable private investment. Peacekeeping remains critical, but without prosperity, it cannot last.”

Caption: U.S. Department of State Senior Bureau Official Jonathan Pratt (left and Senior Adviser for Africa Massad Boulos (right), September 2025. Photo Source: U.S. Department of State.

Boulos highlighted what he considers are concrete investment outcomes as evidence of a “new commercial momentum.” He cited U.S. energy and infrastructure companies expanding footprints across the continent—from ExxonMobil’s downstream projects in Angola and Bechtel’s logistics corridors in Kenya, to General Electric’s renewable energy initiatives in Zambia and Cisco’s digital connectivity partnerships in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. “These are not abstract commitments,” Boulos said. “They are proof that American enterprise, when matched with African ingenuity, drives lasting prosperity.”

He emphasized that the administration’s policy goal is to leverage the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)—to be led by now Senate confirmed Ben Black—and Export-Import Bank (EXIM).

The September briefing followed Boulos’s April 17 session, where he recapped his 2-9 April regional visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda. That trip focused on advancing a durable peace in eastern DRC and encouraging U.S. private-sector involvement in infrastructure and energy. These engagements were not rhetorical exercises—they served to communicate a policy realignment emphasizing economic statecraft as an instrument of diplomacy and peace diplomacy. The new trade-driven vision reflects strategic intent.

Tomaszewski’s West Africa Engagement

In late August, diplomacy left the hearing rooms and briefing halls for the field. Between 23 and 26 August, John “JT” Tomaszewski, Senior Professional Staff Member for Africa Policy at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited Bamako, Mali, representing Chairman Jim Risch. His mission: to reinforce U.S.–Mali cooperation at a time of regional instability and recalibrated alliances.

Tomaszewski is no stranger to the continent. With over two decades of Africa policy experience spanning election observation, governance support, and legislative diplomacy, his trip symbolized high-level congressional engagement. In Bamako, he met with Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop, Defence Minister Colonel-General Célestin Traoré, representatives of the Malian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and U.S. Ambassador Rachna Korhonen and American embassy staff.

Caption: John “JT” Tomaszewski, Senior Professional Staff Member for Africa, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting key officials in Benin, August 2025. Photo Source: U.S. Embassy Benin.

In Africa, between 26-28 August, Tomaszewski continued to Cotonou, Benin, where he assessed bilateral programs, met key officials, engaged civil society, and—as the U.S. Embassy in Benin noted in an X postand “visited American security initiatives.” His travel coincided with a wider Congressional Staff Delegation’s 22 August visit to U.S. Africa Command headquarters in Stuttgart, where House Foreign Affairs staffers Joe Foltz and Christina Tsafoulias held consultations with AFRICOM Commander General Dagvin Anderson.

Military Diplomacy: AFRICOM’s West Africa Tour

From 16 to 20 September, General Anderson embarked on a five-day visit to Benin and Cameroon, reinforcing U.S. military cooperation and underscoring Washington’s message of partnership.

Caption: Christopher John Lamora, U.S. Ambassador to Cameroon (left), U.S. Air Force General Dagvin Anderson, 7th Commander U.S. Africa Command, with President of Cameroon, Paul Biya during a key leader engagement in Yaoundé, Cameroon, on 19 September 2025. Photo Source: The Presidency of Cameroon; U.S. Africa Command.

In Cotonou, Anderson met with President Patrice Talon, Defence Minister Alain Fortunet Nouatin, and Chief of Defence Staff Major General Fructueux Gbaguidi, joined by U.S. Ambassador Brian Shukan. Discussions focused on expanding maritime domain awareness and addressing the growing threat of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) moving south from the Sahel.

“The terrorist threat has evolved,” Anderson said in remarks published by AFRICOM public affairs office. “Partnerships and coordination in West Africa remain key to countering the escalating threat. Without working together, Africa becomes the next generation’s 9/11.”

In Yaoundé, Anderson met with President Paul Biya, Defence Minister Joseph Beti Assomo, Brigadier General Donatien Melingui Nouma, and U.S. Ambassador Christopher Lamora. Conversations centered on joint counter-insurgency efforts against Boko Haram and cooperative maritime patrols in the Gulf of Guinea.

Caption: Major General Fructueux Gbaguidi, Benin Chief of Defence Staff, meeting with U.S. Air Force General Dagvin Anderson, Commander, U.S. Africa Command, during a military honors formation in Cotonou, Benin, on 16 September 2025. Photo Source: U.S. Africa Command.

“Our goal is not to replace African forces,” Anderson told journalists. “Security partnerships only succeed when they enhance sovereignty, not dependency.”

The visit reassured partners unsettled by perceived U.S. retrenchment elsewhere and reinforced the notion that the Pentagon views West Africa as central to global counterterrorism and maritime security.

A Coherent Diplomatic Architecture

Taken together, the Senate hearings, State Department briefings, and congressional field visits reflect more than bureaucratic momentum. They suggest a synchronization of America’s diplomatic instruments.

• Strategic Continuity appears present.Despite political turnover, domestically, the underlying approach endures—advancing stability through engagement and capacity building. The common thread linking Boulos, Tomaszewski, and Anderson is clear; Africa’s security, trade and investment resilience are inseparable.
• Tomaszewski’s and Anderson’s official trips exemplify improved cross-government alignment between civilian policymakers and military leadership. For Washington, that coherence is not merely administrative; it is strategic.
• Economic diplomacy as security policy was reemphasized on private-sector engagement, as championed by Boulos and Pratt. This positions trade and investment as pillars of long-term security. Prosperity, in this formulation, becomes both a diplomatic objective and a deterrent against instability.

Pragmatic Diplomacy Reasserted

By the start of fourth quarter 2025, U.S. engagement in Africa has revealed a pattern. Diplomacy and defence intersecting lanes of policy execution. From Bamako to Yaoundé, from Cotonou to Washington, the message is consistent—America’s engagement relies appears to be relying on coordination between policymakers, diplomats, and its defence leaders.

Much of this diplomacy unfolds away from cameras—in closed meetings, legislative briefings, or security roundtables—yet its imprint is unmistakable. The interplay of congressional oversight, ambassadorial appointments, and regional engagements shows aspects of civilian and military arms of government in the conduct of foreign affairs to achieve national security aims.

If these efforts hold, 2026 may see elements of pragmatic diplomacy—one where U.S. envoys, commanders, and lawmakers operate in unison, not in isolation. It is a model rooted not in grand declarations but in consistent engagement—proving that, even in an era of uncertainty, the architecture of diplomacy still stands strongest when built together.