Is Houthi Disruption in the Red Sea Being Launched out of Sudan with SAF Backing?

It was thought that after the US declared a ceasefire, halting their bombing of Houthi rebels in return for a halt to attacks on US ships, this would see a curtailment of the Houthi threat and disruption in the Red Sea. Yet civilian commercial ships in the Red Sea continue to come under attack, and it would appear that the explanation might lie in Sudan and in the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) collaboration with the Houthis and their Iranian backers.

Despite the US-initiated ceasefire five months ago, Houthi rebels continue to strike at vessels in the Red Sea, including close to Yanbu. This not only demonstrates that they continue to be active but also that they are retaining or even building capacity beyond their shores to disrupt shipping. There are increasing fears that this capacity is being built and consolidated in Sudan, a country deep in a conflict of its own but with a strategically advantageous position on the Red Sea.

How would the involvement of Sudan help the Houthis to expand their range?  Recent attacks on the vessels Scarlet Ray and MSC Aby last month saw the Houthis achieving their most northerly strikes. It is feared that this increase in range for the Houthis comes either from the use of drones or from launching from small boats on Sudan’s coastlines. That Sudan’s Red Sea coast could be used in this way is causing particular concern, particularly because such action would likely involve Iran.

For many Sudan watchers, it seems entirely plausible that Iran would open the door for the Houthi expansion into Sudan. Iran itself has been building its relationship with the general, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the SAF. When Iran facilitates the Houthi relationship with Burhan and the SAF, it opens the way for the Houthis to use the strategically important port and warehouses of Port Sudan, and of course its airport, as a weapons hub.  The fact that the attacks on Scarlet Ray and MSC Aby were just 160 miles from Sudan is fueling fears that the SAF is indeed welcoming in or at least tolerating Iran-backed Houthi operations.

This interlocking triangular relationship between the SAF, Iran, and the Houthis goes beyond strikes on shipping. Iran’s supply of Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones and missile systems to the SAF over the past two years adds another dimension. So does the consistent evidence of the SAF’s relationship and dependency upon Islamist allies within Sudan. It should not be forgotten that the US has recently imposed sanctions on both Burhan and his Islamist allies, not least for the use of chemical weapons. The United States sanctioned Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion, an Islamist militia with a strong grip on Port Sudan’s operations, which is the route through which Iran’s drones and missile systems enter Sudan. The question causing the most alarm is: how close are the Houthis getting to the SAF’s chemical weapons? And how long before we see their use outside of Sudan?

The collaboration between Iran, the Houthis, and the SAF and their Islamist allies is yet another example of why the war in Sudan cannot be simply viewed as a Sudanese problem “over there.” Sudan’s resources, its seven neighbors, and its position on the Red Sea—these geopolitical realities make it impossible to regard this conflict as somehow contained by borders. As one East Africa analyst observed, “There is an entirely justified anxiety that we are all just one attack on a ship, one Iranian drone, or one chemical weapon away from this 30-month-old conflict bursting out of any boundaries and borders and firmly onto the regional stage.”