Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
From the end of the Cold War to the most recent past, liberal democracy had appeared as an untouchable institution. For almost twenty-five years, the establishment of open economies, economic and social integration, and technocratic governance defined the political consensus in Europe. Nevertheless, today this consensus is disintegrating; the entire ideological structure is falling apart. Nationalist and populist political actors, who in the past were on the fringe, are now advancing in Warsaw, Amsterdam, Bucharest, Berlin, and many more.
The victory of Karol Nawrocki in the race for the President of Poland, which took place at the beginning of this year, has been a notable event of these changes. Nawrocki, a historian and the former leader of the Institute of National Remembrance, was the candidate to voice the voice of his country, to proclaim the power of his national history, and to make a requirement to be the owner of his own destiny. No one should be surprised by this election outcome or think of it as merely the outcome of a clever campaign — it was an expression of the public’s manifest disapproval of the EU politics and the liberal elite. Poland’s pivot and political resilience have become evident. Besides, Poland is not the only one.
In the Netherlands, where a liberal attitude has always been a tradition, there was a kind of shock of surprise when the still often inflammatory Geert Wilders made it to the top with the ballots of the citizens. Wilders, whose uncompromising positions regarding migration and Islam had rendered him politically irrelevant, was able to effectively address the citizens’ concerns and take advantage of this topic of rising living costs, asylum policies, and identity politics. His victory took apart the well-established myths of social behavior and proved that the nationalist movement has even found a place in the most liberal European societies.
Germany is facing a similar situation. The right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), so far considered as a party to be left alone in view of the country’s 20th-century history, is currently showing record highs in polls, chiefly at the expense of the ex-GDR territories. Particularly in Saxony and Thuringia, the AfD is constantly outstripping more traditional parties since it has capitalized on the anger of the people with the issue of migration, inflation, energy policy, and cultural tumult. Despite the domestic intelligence’s ongoing watch on them, the AfD has managed to become the opposition and a force to be reckoned with and become an omen that the consensus of the center is nonetheless being undermined in the biggest European nation.
In France, Marine Le Pen single-handedly transformed the National Rally, which was once taboo, into a very strong political force. She is on the way to the Élysée every cycle. The economic protectionism, the national identity, and the appeals to the law and order of Le Pen are the aspects that resonate particularly with the younger and working-class voters who are disappointed with the globalist orthodoxy and urban elitism. Southern Europe is going through a makeover too.
In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of the post-fascist party, which is now driven through with pragmatism, had a surprising ascendancy to power. Her strategy has caused the European institutions to show signs of cautious respect, which proves that nationalist leadership can straddle economic stability — only if it does not directly confront the market consensus.
While Călin Georgescu was an inexperienced nationalist figure and Romanian intellectual, his run for president was impressively close. The shock of the establishment was of no less magnitude. His intertwining of the green language with traditionalist nationalism not only lent moral weight but also identical ideological coverage to his message. The campaign he led signified considerate populism — the kind that is no longer based entirely on anger but is still accompanied by a consistent alternative worldview. They may not be completely similar, but they have very strong links through a major similarity: their popularity is based on the rejection of liberalism in its current state of perceived failures. The hopeful predictions about globalization and multiculturalism have not been realized for all the members of society. Today, for most people not living in cosmopolitan cities, liberalism equates to a loss of safety, cultural coherence, and democratic governance.
Liberalism is not only being attacked from the outside but from the inside too. Original liberalism, which provided individual freedom, limited government, and open debate, is gradually being replaced with a more managerial and ideologically strict version. In the place of promoting pluralism, modern liberal elites consistently argue for a narrow moral consensus, and branded dissent will be called dangerous or regressive. Instead of being a philosophy of an open society, liberalism is turning into a politics of technocratic control and cultural gatekeeping. This change has led to a decrease in public trust. Many people now no longer consider liberalism as a guarantor of freedom and fairness but as an elite ideology that excludes, moralizes, and governs without consent. In the absence of this, nationalism not only emerges as opposition but also as a reclaiming of political agency.
On the other hand, nationalism is a straightforward concept. It talks about limits, the sense of being at home, order, and being a part of something. The reason it attracts people is its simplicity—this is particularly the case in a time of disorder and fickleness.
Yet this is not merely a story of reactionary backlash. Today’s nationalist movements are not necessarily anti-democratic. Instead, they propose a different kind of democracy — one that prioritizes the nation-state, cultural identity, and direct accountability over transnational governance and progressive abstraction. Their leaders do not speak like technocrats; they speak like neighbors.
With no shadow of a doubt, there are still risks. If nationalism is left to its own course, then it starts to make exclusion, majoritarianism, and illiberalism look like very attractive things. However, refusing to pay attention to these developments — whether considering them the relics of the past or a challenge to future development — does not get us any closer to the solution. They are a reaction against actual weaknesses, not the reason for them.
If liberal democracy is to remain credible, it must stop retreating into moral superiority and institutional inertia. It must listen — truly listen — to the grievances that are drawing millions toward candidates once deemed unelectable.
Karol Nawrocki’s rise in Warsaw, Geert Wilders’ triumph in The Hague, Marine Le Pen’s persistence in Paris, and Călin Georgescu’s ascent in Bucharest all reflect the same signal: European politics is being rewritten. Nationalism is no longer a warning from the edge — it is the message from the center.
The challenge now is not to suppress it but to understand why it resonates. The future of Europe depends on whether it chooses condescension or correction.
