Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
President Donald Trump’s first overseas trip of his second term included visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—notably excluding Israel. The trip was framed as an opportunity to secure economic deals, strengthen U.S.-Gulf partnerships, and advance Trump’s signature foreign policy achievement from his first term: the Abraham Accords. The question now is whether Trump, in his effort to reshape the world order, will also manage to convince both the Saudis and Syrians to normalize relations with Israel and sign onto the Abraham Accords.
These accords, signed in 2020, normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan) and were hailed as a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations. The Abraham Accords, brokered during Trump’s first term, marked a paradigm shift in Middle East diplomacy by prioritizing bilateral normalization between Israel and Arab states over resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which had historically been a prerequisite for Arab-Israeli ties. The accords were driven by shared strategic interests, particularly countering Iran’s regional influence, fostering economic cooperation, and leveraging U.S. security guarantees. The accords were a double-edged sword: while they reduced regional tensions and opened economic opportunities, they sidelined the Palestinian question, weakening leverage for a two-state solution.
During his Riyadh visit, Trump publicly urged Saudi Arabia to join the accords, praising Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and framing normalization as a “tremendous tribute” to Saudi leadership. He acknowledged, however, that Saudi Arabia would move “in its own time,” reflecting awareness of Riyadh’s cautious stance.
Saudi Arabia, as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites and a leading Sunni power, holds immense symbolic and strategic weight in the Arab and Muslim world. Its potential inclusion in the Abraham Accords would be a diplomatic coup for Trump, potentially paving the way for other Muslim-majority states to follow.
Trump’s new push to expand the accords reflects his desire to cement a legacy as a dealmaker and to counterbalance Iran’s influence while aligning with Gulf states’ economic and security priorities. However, the regional landscape in 2025 is markedly different from 2020, with the Gaza war, heightened anti-Israeli sentiment in American and European public opinion, and shifting geopolitical alignments complicating normalization efforts.
Saudi Arabia’s insistence on Palestinian statehood aligns with the Democratic Party’s emphasis on a two-state solution as a cornerstone of Middle East peace. However, the Trump administration’s apparent willingness to sideline this issue risks perpetuating the accords’ original flaw: prioritizing short-term diplomatic wins over long-term stability. The Gaza war’s devastation and Israel’s war against Hamas underscore the urgency of addressing Palestinian rights to prevent further radicalization and regional unrest.
The Biden administration’s efforts to link normalization to a U.S.-Saudi defense treaty and Palestinian progress were incomplete but reflected a more balanced approach. Trump’s reluctance to pressure Israel, coupled with his hands-off stance on Gaza, risks alienating Arab partners.
Trump also announced a significant policy shift: the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. Trump asked Syria’s interim leader, Ahmed al-Shara’a, to join the Accords in exchange. Syria’s potential inclusion in the Abraham Accords is a newer and more speculative prospect. Al-Shara’a may explore normalization with Israel to secure international legitimacy and reconstruction aid.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under al-Shara’a, marked a seismic shift in Syrian politics. Trump’s announcement during the Riyadh visit to lift U.S. sanctions on Syria, imposed since 1979 due to its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, was a bold move aimed at engaging the new HTS-led government and integrating Syria into a U.S.-aligned regional order. Trump’s decision, influenced by Saudi and Turkish pressure, reflects a pragmatic approach to capitalize on the post-Assad vacuum and counter Iranian and Russian influence.
Syria, devastated by 14 years of civil war, faces immense rebuilding costs. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar have pledged to settle Syria’s World Bank debts, and normalization with Israel could unlock further U.S. and Western support.
But Israel’s deepening occupation of Syrian territory and strikes on Syrian targets complicate normalization. Jerusalem’s preference for a decentralized Syria with a demilitarized south clashes with Sharaa’s goal of unifying the country under HTS control.
It is important to exercise caution against rushing to normalize relations with a nascent Syrian regime led by a former al-Qaeda affiliate. The lifting of sanctions, while potentially enabling reconstruction, risks empowering HTS without guarantees of human rights protections or democratic transition. Democrats would advocate for a multilateral approach, involving the UN and Arab League, to ensure Syria’s reintegration aligns with regional stability and counters Iranian influence without destabilizing the country further.
Trump’s Middle East trip highlights a continuity with his first-term strategy: prioritizing deal-making and economic incentives over comprehensive conflict resolution. The $600 billion Saudi investment pledge and arms deals underscore the Gulf’s role as an economic partner, but the delinking of normalization from Palestinian progress reflects a transactional approach that Democrats would criticize as shortsighted.
As it stands today, the prospects of Saudi Arabia and Syria joining the Abraham Accords in 2025 are slim due to the Gaza war, Israel’s hardline stance, and domestic constraints in both countries. Saudi Arabia’s insistence on Palestinian statehood and Syria’s uncertain transition under HTS leadership present formidable barriers.
A more effective U.S. strategy needs to prioritize a Gaza ceasefire, link normalization to Palestinian progress, engage Syria with caution, and strengthen multilateral diplomacy.
While economic and security partnerships with the Gulf are promising, sustainable peace requires addressing the Palestinian question and engaging Syria with caution. The Trump administration should pursue a principled, multilateral approach that balances strategic interests with long-term stability.
