Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
The abrupt collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has sent shockwaves across the region, placing Iraq on high alert. As Syria embarks on an uncertain political transition guided by newly appointed caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir and the interim ministers from the former Syrian Salvation Government, regional actors, including Iraq, are acutely aware of the potential ramifications.
For Iraq, the immediate danger lies in a possible resurgence of Islamic State (ISIS, or Daesh) along its shared and porous border with Syria, a concern compounded by its lingering vulnerability to jihadist activity. Heightening these risks is the uncertain political vacuum in Syria, which could invite external powers to exploit the situation, further destabilizing Iraq’s already fragile internal equilibrium.
Baathist Legacies: The Entangled Fates of Iraq and Syria
Syria and Iraq have been profoundly scarred by the authoritarian regimes of the Assad family and Saddam Hussein, both of which left legacies of political repression, economic devastation, and societal fragmentation. Though initially tied together by the founding of the Baath Party in the 1940s and its pan-Arab ideology, their paths diverged sharply, leading to rivalries that exacerbated their respective national struggles.
By the 1970s, the Assad and Hussein regimes had become fierce adversaries. Hafez al-Assad’s alignment with Iran during the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War further deepened the divide, as Damascus sought to counter Saddam Hussein’s regional ambitions. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent collapse of Saddam’s regime marked a new era, ushering in sectarian divisions and the spread of jihadist movements across both nations.
The Syrian civil war that began in 2011 added another chapter to their intertwined histories. The Assad regime relied heavily on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, whose thousands of fighters played a crucial role in securing Assad’s hold on power throughout the 14-year conflict. In a striking reversal of fortune, the head of the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (now using his given name Ahmed al-Sharaa), who overthrew Bashar Assad in December, embodies this interconnected history. Jolani fought as a jihadi in Iraq under al-Qaida and was detained in the U.S. military’s Camp Bucca, an infamous crucible for militant networks.
These ties underscore how the trajectories of Syria and Iraq remain deeply interlaced. From shared authoritarian legacies to the role of transnational militias and rebel leaders shaped by conflicts in both countries, the fates of Syria and Iraq continue to influence one another, even as they struggle with the enduring consequences of their ruinous regimes.
The Collapse of the Assad Regime: Iraq on High Alert
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has heightened fears in Iraq, where officials are keenly aware of the risks posed by regional destabilization. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani highlighted these concerns during a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as rebels advanced on Damascus, emphasizing that “Iraq will not be a mere spectator regarding the grave developments in Syria.” He further pledged that Iraq would “make all efforts to preserve its security and that of Syria,” underscoring the urgency of safeguarding Iraq from the cascading effects of its neighbor’s ongoing crisis.
For Iraq, the stakes are particularly high. The unsettled situation in Syria following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad has created conditions that are conducive to a potential resurgence of ISIS, and Iraq remains highly vulnerable to the spillover effects. Iraq’s 600-kilometer porous border with Syria has historically been exploited by militants as a conduit for infiltration, arms smuggling, and the movement of fighters. The Euphrates River Valley has been a strategic corridor for ISIS, which has repeatedly used regional instability to regroup and launch devastating attacks.
Iraqi leaders have reason to be alarmed. The ISIS offensive during the Syrian civil war resulted in catastrophic consequences, including the genocide of Yazidis and the fall of Mosul. Today, the threat remains palpable. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) cautioned in July that ISIS is actively working to reconstitute its capabilities. Despite fluctuating levels of strength over the past five years, ISIS has maintained a consistent presence in Syria’s central Badia desert, an area that remains a focal point of concern. The post-Assad vacuum in Syria has compounded this threat, providing extremist factions with opportunities to reorganize and exploit weakened security structures.
The fate of Kurdish-administered camps and prisons in northeast Syria, such as al-Hol and Roj, adds another layer of complexity. Housing thousands of ISIS family members and suspected militants, these facilities are time bombs for radicalization and unrest. Iraq’s efforts to repatriate its citizens from these camps are notable, yet they underscore the regional scope of the ISIS threat and the immense challenges of managing the fallout from the toppling of the Assad regime.
In the wake of Assad’s ouster, the U.S. military has carried out multiple airstrikes against ISIS positions in Syria, signaling the persistent threat posed by the group in the Levant. Yet, it remains uncertain what military strategy the Trump administration might adopt and whether the interim Syrian government would consent to a continued American military presence aimed at countering ISIS.
Further complicating matters is Iraq’s internal vulnerability. While the country has made strides in curbing ISIS activity, longstanding safe havens in Anbar’s remote deserts persist as areas of concern. Moreover, the broader regional instability, including U.S.-Iran tensions manifesting in tit-for-tat strikes on Iraqi and Syrian soil, highlights the inseparability of Iraq’s security from the tumultuous Middle East landscape.
In this precarious environment, Iraq’s leadership must navigate a multi-front battle: preventing the resurgence of ISIS, addressing domestic vulnerabilities, and mitigating the cascading effects of regional crises.
Shielding Iraq from the Fallout
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s response to the evolving crisis in Syria following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad reveals a deliberate effort to insulate Iraq from the repercussions of the Syrian conflict. Amid regional instability, Sudani’s government has sought to balance internal security concerns, foreign pressures, and the delicate political landscape in Iraq.
1. Adopting a Military Non-Intervention Stance
Sudani’s strategy has been marked by calculated restraint. Despite facing external and internal pressures, he has maintained Iraq’s policy of non-intervention in Syria.
However, his public statements reveal the nuanced balancing act he faces. For instance, during a Dec. 3 call with Turkish President Erdogan, as Syrian rebels gained ground against government forces, Sudani cautioned against the ethnic cleansing of minorities in Syria, signaling concern — but without committing to military intervention.
This cautious approach aligns with figures like Muqtada al-Sadr, who has called for Iraq to distance itself from Syria’s turmoil. In a Dec. 5 post on Twitter/X, Sadr, a political rival to the Shiite factions supporting Sudani, warned against “conspiracies” by Western powers while urging the Iraqi government and people, including militias and security forces, to refrain from interfering in Syrian affairs.
Since Assad’s fall, Sudani’s government has consistently reaffirmed this stance, as evidenced by Iraq’s decision to repatriate Syrian soldiers without their weapons following an amnesty offer. Sudani’s meeting with General Michael Kurilla, Commander of U.S. CENTCOM, emphasized the importance of preserving Syria’s security, territorial integrity, and diverse social fabric.
While reiterating Iraq’s non-interventionist policy, Sudani has also acknowledged the significant risks posed by instability in Syria. He made it clear that any action taken by Iraq would not be unilateral, stressing Iraq’s “commitment to close cooperation” with the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition to address emerging threats. Since Dec. 7, when Assad was ousted, Sudani has repeatedly voiced concerns that the renewed instability in Syria could further endanger the country’s religious and ethnic minorities.
2. Engaging Regional and International Stakeholders
Prime Minister Sudani has been proactive in engaging regional leaders to shield Iraq from the spillover effects of Syria’s turmoil. On Dec. 11, he traveled to Amman to meet Jordan’s King Abdullah II, discussing mutual concerns about Syria’s destabilizing influence. A week later, Sudani met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in AlUla, emphasizing the importance of regional collaboration to address the challenges emanating from Syria.
Amid these regional engagements, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken made an unannounced visit to Iraq on Dec. 13, underscoring the country’s central role in international security efforts. Blinken praised the U.S.-Iraq partnership in dismantling ISIS’s territorial caliphate and stressed the need to secure Iraq’s border with Syria to prevent a resurgence of ISIS and to halt the flow of Iranian arms to Lebanon. Together, these exchanges highlight Iraq’s critical position in both regional and global security strategies.
3. Fortifying Border Security
Iraq has taken significant steps to prioritize border security in the wake of the Syrian crisis. Iraqi officials announced the closure of all border crossings with Syria on November 30, with the main crossing remaining sealed to prevent potential spillovers of instability.
Reinforcing this effort, thousands of Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitaries, border guards, and soldiers have been deployed along Iraq’s 600-kilometer western frontier. These forces, supported by armored reinforcements, have worked to tighten control and prevent infiltration into Iraqi territory.
Prime Minister Sudani has emphasized the importance of cross-border collaboration, pledging Iraq’s commitment to coordinate with Syria on border management. In late December, Hamid al-Shatri, head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, led a delegation to Damascus to discuss the evolving security dynamics, underscoring Iraq’s intent to maintain stability along its western frontier.
These measures have yielded tangible results. Since the closure of the border, officials have reported a noticeable decline in drug trafficking, highlighting the effectiveness of Iraq’s reinforced security posture. This approach reflects a broader strategy to insulate Iraq from the turmoil in Syria while maintaining cooperative ties to address shared challenges.
Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein announced Iraq’s intention to reinstate its diplomatic mission in Damascus to foster cooperation on security and other matters during talks with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani. This pragmatic stance reflects Iraq’s measured approach toward HTS, the de facto authority in Damascus — an approach that garnered the endorsement of Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Administration, who affirmed, “Iraq does not help divide Syria and does not interfere in its affairs.”
While Iraq’s efforts to secure its western border and reestablish diplomatic ties with Syria underscore its focus on managing external pressures, the shifting dynamics in Syria also pose significant internal challenges for Prime Minister Sudani. Maintaining border stability is only part of the equation; ensuring domestic political cohesion within Iraq’s fragmented Shiite establishment is equally critical as the regional balance of power shifts in the wake of Assad’s downfall.
4. Crafting a unified political response
Internally, Sudani faces the challenge of maintaining unity within Iraq’s politically divided Shiite establishment, especially as the regional balance of power shifts in the wake of Assad’s downfall. The fallout of this shift has strained relations between various factions within Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework, particularly regarding Iraq’s response to Syria’s changing political dynamics. This fragmentation is compounded by the growing divide between the Iranian-backed militias, which seek to maintain influence in Syria, and those factions within Iraq that prefer a more neutral stance.
Sudani has worked to foster domestic consensus through political dialogue, meeting with key leaders from across Iraq’s political spectrum. His strategy here is to maintain a unified position on Syria while navigating the competing demands of various factions, particularly those that are influenced by Tehran, as he seeks to bolster his own political position ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections.
While Sudani’s efforts to unify Iraq’s political landscape have made incremental progress, challenges surrounding the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) remain central to the broader discourse on balancing internal stability and external pressures. The fate of the PMUs encapsulates Iraq’s effort to reconcile the competing demands of regional powers, domestic factions, and the imperative of sustaining a cohesive security strategy.
5. Resisting pressure to dismantle the PMUs
In a rare show of unity, Iraq’s PMUs, including major Iranian-affiliated armed factions, unanimously decided not to intervene in Syria to defend President Bashar al-Assad’s regime against the rebel advance. This choice, while highlighting a shift toward prioritizing Iraq’s internal stability, left unresolved the contentious debate over their future role and activities.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani faces mounting cross-pressures as the PMUs’ fate becomes increasingly contested. Established in response to Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s 2014 fatwa to combat ISIS, the PMUs served as the Iraqi military backbone in the fight against ISIS. These forces are seen as a key pillar of Iraq’s security architecture and a counterweight to Iranian influence in the region, despite the support some of the factions within the PMU umbrella receive from Tehran.
Prime Minister Sudani has resisted calls from the US and its allies to dismantle them. He has publicly reaffirmed his commitment to his allies in the Iran-backed Shiite Coordination Framework. During a December 19 interview on Al-Iraqiya, Sudani defended his approach to Syria and rejected claims that outside powers had imposed “conditions” that would compel Iraq to demobilize the PMUs. He also disavowed statements by several of his advisors potentially signaling the forces’ dissolution.
However, Iraq’s Iran-backed factions, which had withdrawn from Syria ahead of the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad, have since been repositioned at a “sufficient distance” from Syrian territory. This adjustment is in line with regional and international expectations that Iraq should show its support for Syria’s ongoing transitional phase and the changing dynamics in the region.
Conclusion
Iraq stands at a critical juncture as the collapse of the Assad regime reshapes the regional landscape. Prime Minister Sudani’s cautious and calculated responses — from fortifying borders to engaging regional partners — reflect a deliberate effort to insulate Iraq from Syria’s unraveling. Yet, as he seeks to consolidate his political authority and navigate a fragmented domestic political environment, Sudani’s fortunes are inextricably tied to his ability to address these dual threats. Successfully managing Iraq’s precarious position will not only shape his political future but also influence broader regional dynamics in a profoundly unsettled Middle East.
