The Strategic Risks of an Israel-Iran War

Tereza Felix 

As the world watches the simmering tensions between Israel and Iran, Tehran continues to hurl threats of annihilation at the Jewish state. But despite their venomous rhetoric, these threats lack any substantive strategic foundation. They are built on nothing more than empty bravado and hollow provocations.

A logical analysis of the situation reveals that in any conceivable military confrontation between Israel and Iran, Israel would likely achieve “escalation dominance.” With its nuclear arsenal already in place, Israel possesses a significant strategic advantage over a non-nuclear Iran. How, then, could Iran realistically expect to emerge victorious in a high-stakes game of brinkmanship with a nuclear-armed Israel? Why would Tehran, the clearly disadvantaged party, pretend to have war-fighting capabilities that it simply does not possess? Is this merely a case of “pretended irrationality,” or is the Iranian leadership genuinely irrational? If the latter is true, then does Israel have any rational choice but to consider preemptive action, either before or during a conflict?

There is a deep irony in Iran’s bluster. If a war were to break out between the two nations, it could provide Israel with the opportunity to prevent Iran from ever becoming a nuclear power. In fact, Tehran’s incoherent threats might inadvertently serve Israel’s strategic interests, while leading Iran down a path toward genuine existential peril.

What should the world expect? The most plausible scenario for an Israel-Iran war, with Iran still lacking nuclear weapons, would likely stem from escalating conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah or other Iranian proxies. In such a war, even a non-nuclear Iran could provoke “limited” Israeli nuclear responses. While such actions could be legally justified under international law, their impact on both allies and adversaries could be profoundly destabilizing.

One of the most alarming possibilities would be Iran using radiation dispersal devices or launching a conventional rocket attack on Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. In the worst-case scenario, North Korea—a known ally of Iran—could become directly involved in the conflict, acting as a military surrogate for Tehran. It’s worth recalling that North Korea has engaged in military actions against Israel before, most notably during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Israel must remain vigilant, constantly analyzing and interpreting these evolving threats. Each potential scenario is unprecedented, meaning that any predictions can only be “quasi-scientific” at best.

Historically, accurate predictions of war are based on the frequency of similar past events. However, since there has never been a nuclear war (Hiroshima and Nagasaki notwithstanding), it is impossible to predict with certainty how a nuclear conflict between Israel and Iran might unfold. Nonetheless, even if Iran remains non-nuclear, Israel might find itself compelled to “cross the nuclear threshold” in a crisis to maintain its strategic advantage. In such extreme circumstances, Israel could employ nuclear weapons—albeit in a limited or tactical capacity—to ensure “escalation dominance.”

These are not matters that can be understood through common sense alone. They require a deep, strategic reasoning that transcends the grasp of most politicians and pundits.

For Israel, a nation smaller than Lake Michigan, nuclear weapons and deterrence are essential to its survival. Israel’s longstanding policy of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” dates back to its early days as a state, when David Ben-Gurion recognized the need for a powerful equalizer against larger, more populous regional enemies. Initially, these enemies were Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Ironically, some of these same Sunni states now share Israel’s concerns about Iran and could even covertly align themselves with Israel.

What should Israel do next? Facing an increasingly intransigent and potentially nuclear Iran, Israel must reconsider and refine its traditional posture of nuclear ambiguity. The goal should be to achieve a credible nuclear deterrent, which may require shifting toward “selective nuclear disclosure.” Counterintuitive as it may seem, Iran must be convinced that Israel’s nuclear weapons are not too destructive to be used if necessary.

This approach is fraught with complexities. For Israel to develop rational nuclear policies, it must assume that Iran’s leaders are rational actors. However, it is possible that Iran could act irrationally, perhaps in collaboration with other states like North Korea or with terrorist groups such as Hezbollah. In the case of North Korea, any actual military engagement with Israel would present challenges far beyond Tehran’s bellicose posturing.

Absent North Korea, Israel currently has no nuclear enemies, unless one considers Pakistan. However, Pakistan, an unstable Islamic state with close ties to Saudi Arabia and Iran, could be vulnerable to a coup by jihadist elements. At some point, the Sunni kingdom of Saudi Arabia could decide to pursue its own nuclear program—not because of Israel, but out of fear of a nuclear-armed Iran. This decision could be echoed by Egypt or Turkey, further complicating the regional security landscape.

Israel must rely less on “common sense” and more on disciplined, strategic reasoning. Such reasoning must be both literate and dialectical, considering every possible angle and outcome.

For Israel’s nuclear deterrence to be effective in the long term, Iran must be made aware—selectively—of Israel’s nuclear targeting doctrine and the invulnerability of its nuclear forces. Simultaneously, Jerusalem must clarify its “Samson Option.” The aim here is not to “die with the Philistines,” as the biblical story suggests, but to enhance the credibility of Israel’s deterrence posture.

While Israel’s nuclear weapons are intended solely for deterrence, there are scenarios in which deterrence could fail. Such scenarios could emerge from an escalating conflict with Hezbollah or other Iranian proxies, or from a direct confrontation with Iran.

Four Scenarios of Escalation:

1. Nuclear Retaliation:
   • If Iran were to launch a massive conventional attack on Israel, Jerusalem might escalate to a limited nuclear retaliation. This would be especially likely if the attack involved chemical, biological, electromagnetic, or radiological weapons.
2. Nuclear Counter-Retaliation:
   • If Israel preemptively strikes Iran with conventional weapons, and Iran responds with any form of nuclear or mass destruction weapon, Israel might retaliate with nuclear weapons.
3. Nuclear Preemption:
   • Though unlikely, Israel could launch a preemptive nuclear strike if it believes Iran is on the brink of launching its own weapons of mass destruction.
4. Nuclear Warfighting:
   • If nuclear weapons are introduced into the conflict by either side, some form of nuclear warfighting could occur. This could happen if Iranian strikes do not destroy Israel’s nuclear capabilities, or if Israeli strikes do not completely neutralize Iran’s retaliatory potential.

Israel is at a critical juncture in its nuclear preparedness. The primary focus in Jerusalem must remain on Iran’s capabilities and intentions, as well as on the actions of its proxies. The threat from Iran and its allies is not just another terror threat—it is a unique danger that could trigger nuclear warfare.

Tehran’s threats of annihilation are more dangerous to Iran itself than to Israel. As Iran’s leadership is likely aware of this, Israel holds the upper hand in any potential escalation. To maintain this advantage, Jerusalem should immediately shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure,” while also clarifying its “Samson Option.” These measures are not about preparing for nuclear war—they are about preventing it.