Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Shehab Al-Makahleh
Jordan has entered another period in which the question of the West Bank is no longer being discussed simply as part of the unresolved Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but increasingly as a direct question of Jordanian national security. For decades, Amman has warned that any fundamental change to the political, territorial or legal status of the West Bank would inevitably have consequences for the Kingdom. King Abdullah II has repeatedly drawn attention to what he has described as the danger of the collapse of the legal and political framework governing the West Bank, particularly if settlement expansion, annexationist policies, territorial fragmentation and displacement become irreversible realities. What is different today is the growing sense among Jordanian political circles that these are no longer hypothetical scenarios to be discussed only in diplomatic forums. They are becoming contingency questions that the Jordanian state must prepare for. The question being asked with increasing urgency is therefore a simple but profoundly consequential one: What will Jordan do if the existing legal and political order in the West Bank effectively collapses?
First, the West Bank must be understood in Amman as a Jordanian national-security issue rather than exclusively a Palestinian issue. Geography makes this unavoidable. Jordan shares its western frontier with the Palestinian territories and Israel, and the Jordan Valley represents a strategic space whose future directly affects the Kingdom’s military calculations, border security and political stability. Any fundamental transformation of the West Bank—whether through formal annexation, permanent territorial fragmentation, the establishment of new security zones, large-scale settlement expansion or the gradual dismantling of the possibility of a viable Palestinian state—would alter the strategic environment on Jordan’s doorstep. The concern in Amman is therefore not simply that Palestinians could lose additional territory. It is that the cumulative erosion of Palestinian political and economic viability could eventually create conditions in which Jordan is expected to absorb the consequences. This is the strategic logic behind Jordan’s longstanding rejection of displacement and its insistence that the Palestinian issue must be resolved on Palestinian territory rather than through the transfer of its demographic, economic and political burdens to neighboring states.
Second, the growing anxiety inside Jordan should not be dismissed as political rhetoric. The increasing number of warnings coming from Jordanian commentators, political organizations and public figures reflects a broader concern that developments in the West Bank are moving beyond the traditional parameters of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Jordanian writer Ramadan Al-Rawashdeh, for example, has emphasized that the West Bank remains an essential component of Jordan’s national and national-security calculations. Such arguments are important because they reflect an understanding that the Jordanian state cannot separate developments west of the Jordan River from its own domestic security environment. Reports and political statements suggesting that Jordanian institutions are closely monitoring developments in the West Bank should therefore be understood within this wider context. The absence of detailed public statements from the government does not necessarily mean that the issue is being ignored. On the contrary, governments facing sensitive security contingencies frequently avoid disclosing the full extent of their preparations. Strategic planning can take place quietly through the institutions responsible for national security, foreign policy, border management and economic planning while political leaders maintain diplomatic flexibility in public.
Third, the most serious concern for Jordan remains the possibility of displacement. Amman has consistently rejected any attempt to resolve the Palestinian question through the transfer of Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan. This position is not simply a matter of political solidarity with the Palestinian people, although that dimension is unquestionably important. It is also rooted in a calculation of Jordan’s own national interests. A large-scale movement of Palestinians across the Jordan River would create enormous pressure on an economy that already operates under substantial fiscal, water, employment and infrastructure constraints. It would place additional demands on housing, education, healthcare and public services, while potentially generating political tensions that could persist for decades. More importantly, Jordan fears that displacement described initially as temporary or humanitarian could gradually become permanent. Once populations are transferred and political circumstances change, returning them may become practically impossible. This is why the distinction between humanitarian assistance and demographic transfer is so important in Jordanian thinking. Amman can provide assistance to Palestinians facing hardship, but it cannot accept a political arrangement in which the consequences of the Palestinian conflict are permanently externalized onto Jordanian territory.
Fourth, the possibility of an Israeli security zone along the Jordan Valley is becoming another source of concern.Jordanian political figures have publicly warned about the possibility that Israel could seek to establish or expand a security buffer along the eastern side of the West Bank, drawing comparisons with Israeli security arrangements in other parts of the region. Whether such a development ultimately occurs remains uncertain, but the strategic implications would be serious. A permanent or expanded Israeli military presence close to the Jordanian border would alter the security environment along one of the Kingdom’s most sensitive frontiers and would require Amman to reassess its own military and intelligence posture. Jordan would have to consider the consequences for surveillance, border patrols, weapons trafficking, smuggling networks and possible infiltration by armed groups. At the same time, the Kingdom would have to avoid allowing its western frontier to become another theater in the broader regional confrontation involving Israel, Iran and non-state armed actors. This is precisely why Jordanian policymakers are likely to view developments in the Jordan Valley through a different lens from Israeli policymakers. What Israel may describe as a defensive requirement could be interpreted in Amman as a fundamental change in the regional security balance.
Fifth, the emerging Israeli narrative about threats from the eastern front deserves careful attention in Jordan.Israeli political and media discourse has increasingly focused on the possibility of security threats reaching Israel from the east, including concerns about weapons transfers, Iranian networks and armed groups operating through the broader regional environment. Jordan finds itself in an exceptionally sensitive position because it does not want its territory to become a corridor for such activity, but it also does not want Israeli security calculations to determine the future of Jordanian territory or dictate the country’s regional policy. This creates a difficult balance for Amman. Jordan has a clear interest in preventing weapons smuggling and militant infiltration across its borders, and it has strong reasons to maintain effective security coordination with international and regional partners. At the same time, it must ensure that cooperation against specific security threats does not gradually transform the Kingdom into an extension of another state’s strategic doctrine. Jordanian national security has to remain defined by Jordanian interests, even when those interests overlap with those of Israel, the United States or other regional powers.
Sixth, the economic condition of the West Bank is becoming inseparable from Jordanian security calculations. The deterioration of Palestinian economic conditions cannot be viewed solely as a humanitarian problem. When people lose employment, access to markets, freedom of movement and the ability to maintain viable livelihoods, the political consequences eventually become regional. Jordan therefore has a direct interest in strengthening the economic resilience of Palestinians in the West Bank and in preventing economic collapse from becoming another mechanism of displacement. Supporting Palestinian businesses, trade, employment and basic services can serve two purposes at the same time: it provides humanitarian and economic assistance while strengthening the ability of Palestinians to remain rooted in their communities. This is why any Jordanian strategy toward the West Bank will inevitably have an economic component. The objective is not simply to alleviate suffering but to reduce the structural pressures that could make people conclude that leaving is their only viable option.
Seventh, Jordan has another instrument available to it: international law. The Kingdom is party to the 1994 peace treaty with Israel, while the wider Palestinian-Israeli relationship has historically been governed by a series of political and legal arrangements, including the Oslo framework. If developments in the West Bank were to produce fundamental changes to territorial arrangements, population status or existing obligations, Amman could increasingly turn to international legal mechanisms as a means of contesting unilateral changes. This could include preparing legal assessments concerning treaty obligations, territorial status, forced displacement, international humanitarian law, occupation law, water resources and the consequences of unilateral annexation. Such preparation would not necessarily mean that Jordan intends to pursue immediate legal confrontation. Rather, it would give the Kingdom additional diplomatic leverage and ensure that it is not forced to improvise its legal position after a major crisis has already occurred. In an increasingly contested international environment, the ability to frame a crisis through international law can itself become a strategic instrument.
Eighth, the apparent gap between Jordan’s public statements and its possible internal preparations should not be mistaken for passivity. Amman has historically preferred a cautious diplomatic style, particularly when dealing with issues involving Israel, the United States and the Palestinian territories. Jordan has little interest in announcing every contingency it is considering because doing so could reduce diplomatic flexibility and potentially provoke escalation. At the same time, silence can generate its own political costs. When Jordanian society sees settlement expansion, displacement concerns and changes in the West Bank while hearing relatively measured official language from the government, questions naturally arise about what the state is actually preparing to do. The most reasonable interpretation is that Jordan needs to maintain a distinction between public diplomacy and private contingency planning. The government can continue to advocate restraint and a political solution publicly while simultaneously preparing economic, humanitarian, legal, intelligence and border-security responses to more serious scenarios. The challenge is to maintain strategic ambiguity without allowing ambiguity to become uncertainty about the Kingdom’s fundamental red lines.
Ninth, if the situation in the West Bank deteriorates further, Jordan has several possible courses of action, and they would probably be implemented gradually rather than simultaneously. The first would be diplomatic escalation, including intensified coordination with Arab states, Washington, European governments and international organizations. The second would be greater reliance on international law to challenge measures that Amman considers inconsistent with existing legal obligations. The third would be humanitarian and economic preparedness designed to strengthen Palestinian resilience while explicitly rejecting permanent displacement. The fourth would be enhanced border security, including greater surveillance, intelligence collection and counter-smuggling measures along the Jordan Valley. The fifth would be closer coordination with Arab partners whose interests overlap with Jordan’s objective of preventing forced displacement and preserving the possibility of a Palestinian state. The important point is that Jordan does not have to choose immediately between military confrontation and complete passivity. Its strategic tradition favors graduated responses, allowing the Kingdom to increase pressure while preserving channels for diplomacy.
Tenth, the future of the Jordan-Israel relationship would become increasingly difficult if the West Bank’s legal and political status were fundamentally altered. Jordan has strong reasons to preserve regional stability and maintain mechanisms of security coordination with Israel, but the peace treaty cannot be viewed independently from the Palestinian question. If Israeli policies were perceived in Amman as moving toward permanent annexation, large-scale displacement or the creation of conditions that make Palestinian statehood impossible, domestic pressure on the Jordanian government would almost certainly increase. That does not automatically mean that Jordan would immediately cancel the peace treaty. Such a step would carry significant security and economic consequences for the Kingdom itself. A more plausible sequence would involve intensified diplomatic pressure, internationalization of the issue, possible reductions in certain forms of cooperation and stronger coordination with Arab and international partners. The ultimate response would depend on the scale of Israeli actions and, most importantly, whether those actions directly threatened Jordan’s territorial security or created a mass displacement crisis.
Eleventh, Washington will remain central to Jordan’s calculations. Jordan has a longstanding strategic relationship with the United States and understands that Washington possesses substantial political influence over Israel. Amman therefore has an interest in convincing the Trump administration that developments in the West Bank cannot be treated as an isolated Palestinian issue. From Jordan’s perspective, any policy that generates permanent displacement or destroys the possibility of a viable Palestinian political entity would not produce regional stability; it would simply transfer the crisis to Jordan and other neighboring states. This is an argument that Jordan can make to Washington even when the two governments disagree on broader Middle Eastern policy. The Kingdom’s strategic value to the United States derives partly from its geographic position and partly from its role as a stabilizing state in an exceptionally volatile region. A destabilized Jordan would not serve American interests, Israeli interests or the interests of Jordan’s Arab partners.
Twelfth, the central problem facing Jordan is the question of thresholds. At what point would Amman move from warnings to concrete action? Would formal Israeli annexation constitute such a threshold? Would a permanent Israeli security zone along the Jordan Valley? Would large-scale displacement from the West Bank? Would the collapse of Palestinian governing institutions? Or would the Kingdom require several of these developments to occur simultaneously before fundamentally changing its policy? These questions are unlikely to receive clear public answers because revealing precise red lines can sometimes encourage adversaries to operate just below them. Nevertheless, the fact that such scenarios are increasingly discussed by Jordanian political and strategic circles indicates that the Kingdom is moving from general concern toward more systematic contingency planning. That transition is important. A state does not need to announce a crisis plan publicly for its security institutions to be preparing for one.
Ultimately, Jordan’s concern is not simply what happens to the West Bank but what happens to Jordan if the West Bank’s existing political and legal order disappears. The Kingdom is confronted with a strategic problem in which geography, demography, economics, diplomacy and national security are inseparable. Jordan cannot determine Israeli policy, cannot independently resolve the Palestinian conflict and cannot control the calculations of the major powers. What it can do is prepare for the consequences. That means strengthening the resilience of the Palestinian population, developing a credible legal and diplomatic strategy, protecting the western border, coordinating closely with Arab and international partners and making clear that Jordan will not accept the transformation of its territory into a substitute homeland. The Palestinian question has always had a Jordanian dimension, but the present moment is forcing Amman to consider whether that dimension could become existential if the current trajectory continues. Jordan’s red line is therefore not simply a particular border, settlement or political declaration. It is the transformation of a Palestinian crisis into a Jordanian crisis. Preventing that transformation will be one of the most consequential strategic challenges facing the Kingdom in the years ahead.
