Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Eng. Saleem Al-Batayneh
The Arab world today appears increasingly fragmented, with individual states carrying their own crises while struggling to exercise collective influence. From Gaza to Doha, the region is experiencing a profound strategic vacuum in which traditional alliances are being tested and new alignments are emerging. The signing of the Mecca defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan therefore deserves attention not simply as another military arrangement, but as a possible indication that the regional security architecture is beginning to change. For Jordan, which remains outside the agreement, the development raises an uncomfortable but unavoidable question: how can Amman protect its national interests when the geopolitical environment surrounding it is being reorganized at remarkable speed?
First, there are two competing ways to interpret the emerging regional order after the end of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. The first assumes that the United States and Israel remain the principal actors capable of redrawing regional maps, determining spheres of influence and defining the boundaries of acceptable political behavior. From this perspective, new regional alliances remain ultimately subordinate to the American security architecture. The second interpretation is considerably more consequential: regional powers have finally begun to accept that the era of automatic American protection may be approaching its limits and are therefore attempting to construct new balances of power that cannot be entirely controlled by Washington or dominated by Israel. The Mecca Pact should be examined against this second possibility.
Second, it would be premature to determine the ultimate consequences of the Mecca agreement, but it would be equally premature to dismiss its importance. The agreement should not be viewed merely as a conventional military alliance. Its larger significance may lie in the strategic thinking behind it. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan are three countries with substantial political, military and economic weight, and their decision to deepen security cooperation could represent the beginning of a different approach to regional security. The central issue is not necessarily whether these states are preparing for an immediate war, but whether they are attempting to develop greater strategic autonomy in a region where confidence in the traditional U.S.-led security system has increasingly been questioned.
Third, however, every defense alliance raises the fundamental question of the threat against which it is directed. If Iran is the principal target, the strategic logic becomes complicated. Turkey and Pakistan possess significant military capabilities, but neither has an obvious interest in entering a direct war with Iran. Both countries have also maintained diplomatic channels with Tehran and have at various times positioned themselves as intermediaries between Washington and Iran. It would therefore be difficult to interpret the agreement simply as an anti-Iranian military coalition.
If Yemen is the intended theater, the question becomes equally complicated. Pakistan itself declined to participate in the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen in 2015. The agreement may therefore be less about preparing for a specific war and more about creating a framework for strategic deterrence, political coordination and contingency planning.
Fourth, Jordan’s absence from the Mecca Pact is strategically significant precisely because Jordan is not a direct party to the current conflict. Amman may not be participating in the war, but geography places Jordan directly inside the region’s strategic equation. Jordan borders Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and sits at the intersection of several emerging security and trade corridors. Any major transformation in the regional balance will therefore have consequences for the kingdom whether or not Jordan formally participates in the alliances that are being created around it. This creates a particularly difficult strategic position: Jordan may be exposed to the consequences of regional escalation without possessing an equivalent ability to influence the decisions that generate it.
Fifth, Jordan should therefore resist the temptation to reduce its strategic choices to the old question of “Who is with us and who is against us?” The more important question is whether Amman can preserve sufficient strategic flexibility to avoid being drawn into conflicts or alliances that were not designed around Jordanian interests. A state with multiple diplomatic, economic and security options has greater room to maneuver than one that depends excessively on a single external patron or security architecture. Strategic autonomy does not mean isolation. Nor does it mean abandoning traditional alliances. It means ensuring that no external power possesses sufficient leverage to dictate Jordan’s choices when those choices conflict with the kingdom’s national interests.
Sixth, the emergence of competing regional alignments makes this challenge even more complicated. Shortly after the announcement of the Mecca agreement, Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla wrote on X that a new geopolitical and geoeconomic alignment was emerging in West Asia involving India, Israel and the United Arab Emirates, ostensibly to address regional instability, Iranian threats, Turkish activism and the possibility of a reduced American presence. Whether or not such an alignment ultimately materializes in formal institutional form, the argument illustrates the broader strategic competition underway. Different regional powers are already imagining different post-American configurations, and Jordan will inevitably be affected by whichever configuration becomes dominant.
Seventh, the absence of Egypt from the Mecca arrangement deserves particular attention. Egypt’s exclusion—or simply its decision not to participate—is strategically important because Cairo remains one of the principal centers of gravity in the Arab security system. Egypt controls the Suez Canal and possesses major strategic influence over the Red Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, Gaza and the wider Arab security environment. Its military weight and geographic position make it difficult to construct a comprehensive Arab security architecture without taking Egyptian interests into account.
The question for Jordan is therefore not simply why Turkey and Pakistan are part of the emerging arrangement, but why Egypt is not—and what that absence tells us about the future configuration of regional power.
Eighth, the Red Sea could become the first practical test of the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani security relationship. The security of the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Horn of Africa has become increasingly interconnected with the wider Middle Eastern conflict system. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that geography remains a powerful strategic instrument. A relatively small actor capable of threatening a maritime chokepoint can impose enormous economic costs on much larger powers. The lesson is clear: military power is no longer measured simply by the number of aircraft, ships or missiles a country possesses. Control—or the ability to disrupt—critical geographical corridors can provide disproportionate strategic leverage.
Ninth, Jordan also needs to pay close attention to the emerging competition over regional trade corridors. One proposed route connects Saudi Arabia through Jordan and Syria to Turkey and ultimately Europe. Another strategic vision places greater emphasis on an India-Gulf-Israel-Europe corridor. These competing projects are not simply transportation schemes. Infrastructure has become an instrument of geopolitical power. Whoever controls the principal trade routes connecting Asia, the Gulf and Europe can influence investment patterns, logistics, ports, energy flows and political relationships.
Jordan’s geographical position gives it enormous potential value, but geography alone does not guarantee that Jordan will benefit. Amman must ensure that its infrastructure, logistics capabilities and diplomatic relationships allow the kingdom to become a beneficiary rather than merely a transit territory in someone else’s strategic project.
Tenth, Israel’s interests must also be incorporated into Jordan’s calculations. If competing trade corridors develop across the region, Israel will inevitably seek to promote routes that strengthen its own economic and strategic position. That does not automatically mean that every project involving Israel represents a threat to Jordan, but it does mean that Amman must carefully distinguish between arrangements that serve Jordanian interests and those that make Jordan strategically dependent on decisions taken elsewhere.
The same principle applies to American, Saudi, Turkish, Emirati and Iranian initiatives. Jordan’s objective should not be to choose a permanent camp, but to preserve the ability to engage with multiple centers of power without surrendering its strategic autonomy.
Eleventh, Jordan therefore does not need to join one regional bloc merely because another bloc has emerged. Nor does it need to isolate itself from the transformations taking place around it. What it needs is a coherent national strategy capable of operating in an increasingly multipolar Middle East. Jordan must define its own red lines, its own economic priorities and its own security requirements. It must analyze developments through a Jordanian strategic lens rather than simply adopting the interpretations of larger regional powers.
Most importantly, the country needs a national project around which its political institutions, economic interests and security establishment can converge. Such a strategy would allow Jordan to absorb regional shocks without becoming a battlefield for other states’ rivalries.
Twelfth, the Mecca Pact may ultimately prove to be less about the end of one war than the beginning of a new geopolitical era. The Middle East is moving away from a system in which security arrangements were overwhelmingly defined by Washington toward a more complicated environment in which Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, the UAE, Egypt and other regional powers are attempting to shape their own spheres of influence.
The United States will remain an enormously important actor, but regional states increasingly appear determined to build additional options rather than rely exclusively on one external security guarantor.
For Jordan, the central lesson is not that it must join the Mecca Pact or align itself against it. The lesson is that strategic ambiguity without a national strategy can quickly become strategic vulnerability. Jordan’s geography remains one of its greatest assets, but geography can also become a liability when neighboring powers redesign their alliances and trade corridors without Jordan being an active participant in the process.
The coming years may therefore require Amman to redefine its role from that of a state reacting to regional developments into that of a state actively shaping them. Jordan cannot control the emergence of new alliances, the competition between regional powers or the future of U.S. involvement in the Middle East. It can, however, determine how it positions itself within that changing environment.
The real question for Jordan is no longer simply who belongs to which alliance. It is whether Jordan can maintain enough strategic flexibility to work with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United States, Europe, Egypt and other regional actors simultaneously while protecting its own national interests.
The Middle East is entering a period in which military alliances, trade corridors, energy routes and economic partnerships will increasingly overlap. The states that understand this transformation early will have greater influence over the emerging order. Those that simply wait for others to define the new rules may discover that their strategic choices have already been made for them.
Jordan’s challenge, therefore, is not to stand outside the new regional order. It is to ensure that when the new order takes shape, Jordan has a seat at the table—and not merely a place on the map.
Author’s Bio:
Eng. Al-Batayneh was a member of the Jordanian Parliament.
