Monthly Review

When the intelligence academy of a leading regional power publishes a report called “The Anatomy of Israeli Expansionism”, the message goes beyond scholarship. Turkey’s National Intelligence Academy issued the report on October 23rd, according to Noon Post. Its central claim is that Israeli expansion is not a response to passing threats, nor the work of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government alone, but a structural habit of the state that survives changes of government. One can disagree with that thesis, but not ignore it, because it shows how Ankara reads the moment.

The report rests its case on four pillars. The first is a religious doctrine that moves land from the realm of negotiation into that of sacred right. The second is “securitisation”, which presents every expansion as necessary for the state’s survival, drawing on the withdrawals from southern Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005. The third is the movement of the settler camp from pressuring the state to running it, exemplified by Bezalel Smotrich, the finance minister, who has held wide civil powers over the West Bank since February 2023. The fourth is an army that turns these ideas into facts on the ground, and defines Israel’s security perimeter to include its neighbours’ territory and capabilities.

The institutional argument is the strongest. When the settler project’s proponents sit inside the machinery of government, their policies become harder to reverse. But the picture is not one-sided. Israel has serious domestic opposition to these trends, and defenders of its government’s policy argue that the attack of October 7th 2023 taught its security establishment to judge adversaries by their capabilities, not their stated intentions. Whether one accepts that logic or not, it drives much of Israel’s behaviour, and any serious debate has to reckon with it.

The report’s most persuasive section deals with the limits of Israeli power. Military superiority, it argues, does not turn automatically into political influence, and the ability to strike adversaries is not the ability to govern the realities of Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria. What it calls “negative security”, which means denying neighbours capabilities rather than building mutual security, tends to reproduce the hostility it claims to contain. Israel also depends structurally on American support, strains its reservists in long wars, and risks pushing its adversaries into counter-balancing coalitions. The lesson is not only for Israel: power without legitimacy and acceptance does not create a stable order.

It would be wrong, though, to read the report as neutral analysis. It comes from the security apparatus of a state that is a party to the rivalry. Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, used similar language in April, accusing Israel of using security as an excuse to seize more land. The Israeli mirror image is just as sharp. The Nagel Committee, which is reviewing the defence budget, has warned that Turkish forces or proxies in Syria could deepen the danger of a direct Turkish-Israeli conflict, and Israeli media reported in August an alleged Israeli strike on a Turkish military build-up in the Idlib area. Each side sees the other as the threat. What Ankara calls support for rebuilding the Syrian state, Tel Aviv sees as a military deployment on its doorstep.

That is why the most important part of the recommendations is not what they propose to contain Israel but what they warn against: building a counter-hegemony. The report calls for strengthening neighbouring states and their institutions, diversifying security partnerships, deepening economic ties through transport, energy and trade, and reinforcing social cohesion, all without sliding into rigid blocs, so that one dominance does not replace another.

Here lies the real test for Ankara. A call for a balanced regional order earns credibility only if its author applies it to itself, and if its neighbours, Arabs, Kurds and others, accept its role. Without that, “containment” could become just another contest for influence, and the region would pay the price.

The Middle East needs neither a new hegemon nor a continuation of security built on deprivation. It needs states able to protect their sovereignty, and arrangements in which one side’s safety does not rest on another’s insecurity. That is the question the report puts to everyone, even from the standpoint of a party to the conflict.

In the short term, normalization between Damascus and Jerusalem is not likely. But progress is still possible.

In a major moment somewhat overshadowed by the Middle East’s competing headlines, Syria’s transitional government confirmed that it held a second trilateral meeting with Israeli and US officials on August 19—thefirst public acknowledgement of any such engagement in 25 years. The announcement comes as Syria watchers debate the possibility of a Syria-Israel normalization agreement that would officially end their decades-old state of war. However, while the events culminating in the August trilateral meeting are notable, the states are far from achieving a full diplomatic opening under the Abraham Accords today.

To be sure, there are plenty of reasons for Damascus and Jerusalem to hit the diplomatic channels. Following the collapse of the former Assad regimein December 2024, Israel rapidly advanced on Syrian territory, destroyingmuch of what remained of the Syrian Arab Army’s depots and infrastructure and capturing and occupying significant swaths of southern Syria’s Quneitra Governorate under the guise of preventing threats on its disputed border. That decision has infuriated Syrians, putting the transitionalgovernment of President Ahmed al-Shara in a difficult position.

Largely unable to respond to the Israeli assault given its weakness, Damascus opted for talks under US auspices. Reportedly starting in Paris and Baku, Azerbaijan, over the summer, diplomatic engagements have advanced equally as rapidly as Israel’s invasion, leading to the recent trilateral talks in Paris. Negotiations have largely focused on security, with Israeli media reporting that talks over a security agreement are “advanced.”

Given the file’s sensitivity, officials in Damascus quickly denied that any such agreement was close, although al-Shara did admit the talks were advanced. He also pumped the brakes on a broader deal or so-called “peace” under the Abraham Accords, highlighting Damascus’s interest in a more pragmatic deal under today’s conditions. Al-Shara has previouslystated that he prefers a return to the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement regarding the Golan Heights, indicating his preference for a return to the status quo as it was before December 1974.

Realistically, the truth in the talks lies somewhere in between the reporting and public stances of either the state of Israel or Syria. Each actor has an interest in the talks, albeit for different reasons.

For Jerusalem, its new security doctrine centralizes external security in the form of buffer zones along its border, reflecting the post-October 7 geopolitical landscape. Just as in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Lebanon, Israel refuses to let real or perceived threats build up on its border after the worst terror attack in the country’s history. It is willing to create facts on the ground—including and particularly the occupation of a sovereign state’s territory—to bolster its security or garner the leverage necessary in talks to achieve a preferential deal.

That approach heavily informs Syria’s thinking. Damascus needs economic support and political legitimacy to rebuild itself after roughly 14 years of brutal conflict, which it cannot achieve with ongoing Israeli strikes and occupation or without sustained easing of US sanctions. Whether Syrian officials traded steps towards normalization with Israel in exchange forsanctions relief is unclear, but not unlikely.

If so, it is now following through with talks with its southwestern neighbor, likely with the hope of retaining that relief and ending the occupation. Whether Syria still hopes to regain the Golan Heights, which Israel illegally occupied and annexed decades ago and which the first Trump administration unilaterally recognized as Israeli territory in 2019, remains to be seen as well. Israel has said that it will not cede the territory under any circumstances and is unlikely to do so, barring serious pressure that is simply not coming.

Still, Israel’s ongoing brutality in Gaza, which continues to whip upwidespread anger in the Arab street, is critical to understand in this context. Al-Shara appreciates the importance of discretion and caution in this regard, especially following over a decade of Syrian non-state insurgencies.

For Washington, expanding the Abraham Accords is the stated goal. President Donald Trump still considers his first-term accomplishments as central to his Middle East strategy. For Trump, the Accords are about cementing his legacy, especially in ways his predecessors could not. He wants a Nobel Peace Prize and will continue to press leaders in Damascus for a deal that can further bolster his case.

Typically, the convergence of interests in such a manner is enough to produce full diplomatic normalization or a lesser deal, even one of such historic magnitude. Furthermore, Trump’s willingness to make any issue existential and to utilize every arm of the US government to achieve the goal surrounding that existential issue only bolsters the idea that normalization is forthcoming. Syria’s relative weakness to not only both countries, but also globally, could further indicate that an Israel-Syria thaw is close.

At the same time, however, Syria’s general weakness also inhibits advances in the talks. Damascus is beholden to its people and cannot sustain clear control over its sovereign territory, whether it be against Israel, local militias, or the Islamic State. It is likely keen to avoid giving its domestic rivals more reasons to fight it, even amid a war-weary climate in Syria. That is particularly true with respect to the Sunni armed factions that supposedly constitute its base today, which would be loath to see or support any Syrian opening with Israel and could come to view such a move as opening the door for a coup.

Thus, the question of normalization between Damascus and Jerusalem is not one of certainty, but rather one of scale in public and private, not unlike that of other Arab states. Security topics sit atop the reporting agenda because they are arguably the most pressing to address today, and somewhat ironically, the most practical. Syrians will applaud al-Shara should he end the latest Israeli occupation of Syrian land, just as Israelis will applaud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for securing the borderlands and sticking it to Salafist Arabs to the north that originally applauded the October 7 massacres. Meanwhile, Trump will relish the spotlight—per usual.

But any deal normalizing diplomatic relations feels like a hill too steep for Damascus. To be sure, that conclusion does not suggest that a future Israel-Syria normalization will not happen. Rather, it is to argue that conditions are not ripe for an agreement of that scale under present conditions.

Still, Trump’s willingness to use massive pressure to achieve his goals is a wild card in this context. That should be notable for Syria watchers today as they aim to make predictions in a notoriously unpredictable region. Even with historic recent shifts on issues like US sanctions on Syria, more time is ultimately needed for any Abraham Accords expansion today.

About the Author: Alexander Langlois

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst and Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities. He is focused on the geopolitics of the Levant and the broader dynamics of West Asia. Langlois holds a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from American University. He has written for various outlets such as The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Sada, Atlantic Council’s MENASource, the Lowy Institute, Gulf International Forum, the New Arab, the Nation, and Inkstick.

Donald Trump’s tariffs on India signal that Washington, far from abandoning New Delhi, wants to see more effort and less hedging.

When the State Department finally placed the “Foreign Terrorist Organization” label on the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its suicide outfit, the Majeed Brigade, on August 11, most observers filed it under routine counterterrorism. BLA militants have spent years in violent struggle with the Pakistani state. Their actions have included the murder of Chinese teachers in Karachi, hijacking Pakistan’s Jaffar Express, and turning Gwadar—the centerpiece of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—into a terror zone. The US move thus can be seen as a long-overdue legal housekeeping.

However, the terror tag was rolled out the same week the White Housedoubled tariffs on Indian exports and tied any relief to New Delhi’s procurement of cheap Russian oil. This is hardly a coincidence, especially because Pakistani Authorities have long been claiming India’s backing of BLA terrorist activities in Pakistan.

The FTO designation, therefore, marks the opening chord of a new American play in South Asia. The United States is no longer treating India as a privileged partner exempt from cost, nor Pakistan as a mere appendage to Afghan policy. Instead, it is introducing conditionality as the organizing principle of its regional strategy.

Pakistan’s Narrow Window of Opportunity

The FTO designation establishes a more transparent, pragmatic channel for US-Pakistan cooperation, including force protection near foreign projects and intelligence sharing on insurgent financing. It also comes as US officials and businesses eye Balochistan’s buried riches—copper, lithium, and the rare-earth elements that power green tech and precision missiles.

Western firms will hardly invest billions in Reko Diq if BLA gunmen kidnap their engineers on the road. A practical, policeable counterterrorism compact could limit that risk without dragging Washington back into a 2000s-style security sinkhole. However, there is also a message meant for New Delhi.

The Price of Indian Strategic Hedging

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions in 2022, India’s Russian crude imports rose precipitously, with refineries flipping barrels into lucrative export fuel. Russian oil accounted for more than one-third of India’s daily supply last year. In parallel, Indian companies shipped dual-use chemicals like HMX/octogen to Russian buyers, politely labelled “civilian.” New Delhi refers to this as “strategic autonomy.” Washington now sees it as sanctions sabotage and has decided to charge a fee.

The new tariff wall can be seen from that perspective. Roughly two-thirds of India’s $86 billion exports to the US market, from textiles to steel to jewelry, now sit behind an up to 50 percent gate. Every extra Russian barrel imported will cost New Delhi hard dollars and US market share.

Ending India’s Blank Check

For two decades, successive US administrations have granted India numerous privileges—nuclear waivers, technology transfers, prime seats in every Indo-Pacific forum—on the expectation that New Delhi would one day reciprocate and fully align with Washington against Beijing. That day keeps drifting into the future. India hasn’t started to toe the line, neither on Russianor on export-control regimes. It still denies any hint of third-party mediation when a crisis erupts with Pakistan. In effect, Washington continued to extend credit while Delhi kept pocketing the balance.

The BLA designation rearranges the ledger. By carving out a Pakistan-only counterterrorism lane, the United States creates an option it can open or close without Indian endorsement. It won’t transform the region overnight, but it punctures Delhi’s subcontinental gatekeeper role and that alone rebalances the field.

The China Subtext

This is not a comfortable scenario for Beijing either. Chinese workers have been steady BLA targets; a US-Pakistan program that shields them—and, by extension, protects foreign capital—chips away at China’s claim to be the indispensable security provider in Balochistan. It also sends a message to smaller South Asian states that Washington still has a say in the regional game, even as it pressures the biggest player on the board.

Reciprocity, Not Rupture with India

Critics warn that squeezing India just pushes it deeper into Russia’s embrace. However, the partnership was already lopsided. India reaped advantages from the United States while disregarding US priorities. Conditional incentives are not a rupture; they are an attempt at receiving long-deferred reciprocity. New Delhi could still achieve what it values—advanced jet-engine co-production, supply-chain re-routing, and a vote of confidence in the Indo-Pacific, as long as it demonstrates its commitment.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is confronting a tricky situation. Diversifying away from Russian crude will raise fuel prices at home, but ignoring Washington could stumble the very export industries underpinning his “Viksit Bharat 2047” growth plan. Filing a WTO case can buy time, but it will not necessarily provide relief.

Engaging in retaliatory tariffs risks a trade spiral India cannot win. A wiser approach should involve gradual, face-saving curbs on Russian barrels, a tougher line on dual-use exports, and renewed engagement for sector-specific deals that showcase US-Indian “friend-shoring.” The era of free hedging for India is over.

Toward a New, Sharper US-Partnership?

The United States is not pivoting to Pakistan, nor abandoning India. It is enforcing terms: secure the mine shafts, curb the Russian tap, and police the dual-use pipeline. Once these terms are met, the tariff gates may swing back open. Keep hedging, and the cost will rise. This is a far cry from betrayal. Rather, it is the maturation of a partnership that has outgrown its courtship phase and entered geopolitical crunch time.

In Washington’s new South Asia playbook, indulgence is out, reciprocity is in—and India, finally, must decide how much its strategic hedging is really worth.

About the Authors: Muhib Rahman and Nazmus Sakib

Dr. Muhib Rahman is a Perry World House Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania. 

Dr. Nazmus Sakib is a Lewis Lecturer at the University of Kentucky.

Global capitalism is in a state of stagnation, increasing pressure on the political and military actors of transnational capital to find new ways to generate profit. William I. Robinson, a professor at the University of California, has written highly relevant texts on this subject.

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza, as well as the new Cold War between the United States and China, “accelerate the violent collapse of the post-World War II international order and increase the risk of a world war.” Civilization as we know it “is disintegrating under the impact of the relentless accumulation of global capital,” Robinson states in the introduction to his thesis.

At the core of the crisis of this era is “the fundamental conflict within capitalism, the overproduction of capital.” In recent decades, overproduction has reached exceptionally high levels. Large international corporations and financial conglomerates have recorded record profits, even as profit rates have declined and corporate investments have decreased.

“It is precisely this decline in profit rates alongside the increase in the cash hoard that signals the collapse of capitalism. Since 1980, corporate cash reserves have only increased, but idle money is not capital because its value does not increase. Stagnant capitalism is in a state of crisis,” asserts the academic.

The international capitalist class has “accumulated more wealth than it can consume or reinvest.” Global inequalities have continued to rise.

“In 2018, 1% of humanity controlled 52% of global wealth, and 20% of humanity controlled 95%, while the remaining 80% had to make do with barely 5% of that wealth,” Robinson notes, citing research data, some of which is outdated.

“Financial speculation, debt-fueled growth, and plundering taxpayer money” have reached the end of their usefulness as temporary solutions to chronic stagnation. The capitalist class is increasingly desperate to find new ways to dispose of the capital it has accumulated. The result is that “the system becomes more violent, more predatory, and more reckless.”

After the boom of capitalist globalization at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the elite had to admit that the crisis had become uncontrollable. In its 2023 risk report, the Davos Economic Forum warned that the world is facing a “multi-crisis” with “growing economic, political, social, and climate consequences” and a “unique, uncertain, and turbulent decade.”

The insatiable desire to indefinitely prolong capital accumulation prevents the ruling class from finding viable solutions to this crisis. Thus, experiments are underway to transform the current political chaos and economic instability into a new, more deadly phase of global capitalism: ruling groups are turning, according to Robinson, “towards authoritarianism, dictatorship, and fascism.”

In the coming years, new technologies based on automation, machine learning, and artificial intelligence, combined with the marginalization caused by conflicts, economic collapse, and climate change, will exponentially increase the number of “surplus people” living in proletarian misery, plagued by unemployment and poverty.

The ruling classes face an insoluble problem: how to suppress the potential uprising of this enormous mass of people worldwide? The “madmen” must be held in check by a technocratic control society, a global police state, whose instruments are pandemics, wars, and genocides, with the ultimate goal of destroying humanity.

According to Robinson, this is also the broader context of events in Gaza. “The Palestinian proletariat of Gaza ceased to provide cheap labor to the Israeli economy when Gaza’s rebels were encircled in 2007 and the entire region was turned into a concentration camp. Useless to Israel and international capital, the Gazans are an obstacle to capitalist expansion in the Middle East and are entirely disposable.”

The ongoing genocide makes major contributions to the dynamics of the capitalist crisis. “Gaza is a microcosm and the ultimate manifestation of the fate that awaits the working class and the rest of humanity as the forms of domination in the world order become increasingly brutal and violent,” Robinson warns.

The transnational corporatocracy is preparing for a new radical phase of its control over the human population and the planet. It is no coincidence that new mega-prisons are being built worldwide, along with “block cities” designed to restrict citizens’ movement. The rise of authoritarian political systems is also “part of a broader movement toward a global police state,” Robinson adds.

“Gaza, the Congo, and other countries in hell are sounding the alarm in real-time: genocide could become a powerful means of resolving the conflict between excess capital and surplus humanity in the coming decades.”

Political chaos and chronic instability can create extremely favorable conditions for capital. In the past, wars have been a major economic stimulus, pulling the capitalist system out of its accumulation crisis while diverting attention from political tensions and legitimacy issues.

Each new conflict in the world opens up new opportunities for victory in the fight against stagnation. The endless destructions that follow reconstruction have ripple effects. They not only fuel the profits of the arms industry but also revitalize urban planning, construction, high-tech, energy, and many other sectors.

Geopolitical competition, even genocide, thus becomes a perverse lifeline for crisis-ridden capitalism, offering opportunities for new wealth through violence. From this perspective, the Russian military operation in Ukraine and Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza “have paved the way for increased militarization of an already global war economy.”

It took a second world war for capitalism to finally emerge from the Great Depression. The Cold War justified half a century of increased military budgets, followed by the so-called war on terror, which also helped prevent the economy from imploding due to chronic stagnation.

While the militarization of the global economy may help alleviate the overpopulation crisis in the future, it is also risky because it increases tensions and dangerously pushes the world toward a major conflagration.

“We are in the midst of a global civil war,” asserts Robinson. Instead of two armies, citizens around the world face ruling groups with sinister designs. Can popular resistance intensify to the point that the transnational elite must accept major structural reforms in favor of the people?

“The future is uncertain because the outcome will depend on the struggle between opposing social forces, the policies that will emerge from this struggle, and factors that are often difficult to predict. But it is clear that major upheavals are coming,” states the American sociologist.

Lisa Smith Al-Makahleh  

The decisions made in the coming weeks of the French general election will not only determine the direction of France’s governance but also resonate deeply within the broader European and global contexts.
The 2024 French legislative elections have become a pivotal moment for the future of the country. President Emmanuel Macron’s unexpected call for snap parliamentary elections, made without wide consultation, has inadvertently boosted the political influence of the far-right.
The far-right National Rally led by Marine Le Pen is on track to score an unprecedented number of parliamentary seats in the July 7 runoff, after securing 29.24% of the vote in the first round. This comes as a blow to Macron’s centrist alliance, which finished a distant third with only 20% of the vote.
The decline of traditional centrist parties has long been underway in France, with a noticeable shift in voter preferences away from the political establishment. Macron’s own administration has been criticized for normalizing far-right rhetoric and policies, from his participation in interviews with far-right media to the appointment of controversial figures like Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin.
Internationally, the primary beneficiaries of the far-right’s triumph appear to be Russia and Israel. Marine Le Pen has long been associated with the Kremlin, having received generous campaign loans from Moscow-linked banks. Meanwhile, the National Rally has undergone a notable transformation, shifting from its historical antisemitism to a more pro-Israel stance in a bid to rebrand and broaden its appeal.
However, the French far-right’s rise has also spurred unexpected pushback. The newly formed left-wing coalition, known as the New Popular Front, brings together socialists, greens, and communists in a last-ditch effort to prevent governance by a far-right administration. Should the National Rally secure a majority in the National Assembly, Macron could potentially face power-sharing with the first far-right government in France since the Vichy regime.
As France braces for the runoff elections, the nation stands at a pivotal moment in its political history. The convergence of shifting voter preferences, strategic alliances, and ideological transformations underscores the high stakes facing French democracy. Whether the rise of the far-right will reshape the political landscape or galvanize opposition into a formidable force remains to be seen. The decisions made in the coming weeks will not only determine the direction of France’s governance but also resonate deeply within the broader European and global contexts.

The SPD and the Greens, the two left-of-center parties in Olaf Scholz’s traffic light coalition, along with their supporters in the media and academia, are continuing to make a lot of public noise about the need to relax Germany’s debt brake.   

That is very evident in the current hard-fought negotiations over next year’s German budget.

The SPD and the Greens perform this political dance even though they know full well that, for the next two years, it is virtually impossible to bring that goal about. 

Stating that is simply a matter of political realism and power politics. Why then is this fact not addressed more openly? Because it is not in the interest of either political camp to be honest with the public at large, never mind the world outside Germany. 

For the time being, the CDU/CSU, Germany’s main opposition, has no interest to change its current stance of rejecting any relaxation of the debt brake. It will only do so once it again leads the German government. The next federal elections are to be held in the fall of 2025. 

Why help Scholz?

The center-right opposition is understandably disinclined to give the wobbling government led by Olaf Scholz any shot in the arm.   

The CDU also anticipates having complex negotiations in the future, likely with the SPD as its junior coalition partner then, over any relaxation of the debt brake when it comes to negotiations over forming a government. With the SPD in power for now, it is a matter of political expediency not to give any negotiating advantage by doing a deal now.

This applies all the more so as it is also evident that the Greens and SPD —no matter how hard they currently try to present themselves as serious managers of public investments — are both very attached to the continued expansion of the already richly endowed German welfare state.   

Any relaxation of the debt brake negotiated now, under the aegis of the SPD and Greens, could hardly be drawn narrowly enough to counteract a further expansion of the consumptive — not investment — parts of the German federal budget. 

No debt brake reform now without (early) elections

Given those circumstances, the only conceivable way for the SPD and the Greens to bring about the desired easing of the debt brake as soon as possible would be to open up the path for new elections.  

That is unlikely to happen for a host of reasons. One of them is that Mr. Scholz is highly unlikely to ever agree to that procedure. Another is that, for many members of the governing coalition, a premature election would run counter to their own material self-interest. 

A significant share of the current members of the German Bundestag from the ranks of the SPD and the Greens have to fear not getting re-elected. There also is the matter of any retirement credits as an MP being contingent upon at least completing a four-year term in full.  

Another reality is that a large swath of the junior members of the government parties currently serving in the Bundestag would probably have to accept a considerable loss of income. Indeed, in many cases, they are unlikely to earn similarly high incomes in the labor market, at least for the foreseeable future, as they now receive as MPs. 

Disadvantage: Germany

The loser in all these political stratagems is the Federal Republic of Germany. The country is already way behind where it needs to be with executing long-overdue structural reforms and has a long list of investments that need to be made.  

In general, the case for allowing long-term investments designed to improve the growth potential of the German economy via the federal budget is quite compelling, given the country’s comparatively low level of public debt. 

However, the evidence to date is that significant parts of any special budgetary measures (such as the special €100 billion defense budget) are then not used for investments but consumed by rapidly rising personnel costs. 

The most insincere political players in this game of head fakes are the leaders of Olaf Scholz’s SPD. They leave no opportunity unused to claim that Germany’s crumbling infrastructure is solely the fault of the austerity policies pursued by the CDU/CSU under Mrs. Merkel.  

Conveniently ignored 

The fact that the SPD was Merkel’s coalition partner for much of her 16 years in office is always conveniently ignored. So is the fact that the SPD shunned investments in the Merkel years in favor of pushing through a steady increase in social spending. 

The final part of injecting the correct dose of political realism into the future German debate over the debt brake concerns the political stance of the CDU/CSU.   

A significant portion of its voters are currently hoping that a future Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz would act with a firm hand on the matter.   

Perhaps so. However, traditionally, the key priority of the CDU/CSU — rather than acting consistently in terms of policy— has always been on maximizing its claims to power and ministerial posts. 

Conclusion

Enabling a constructive, but also sufficiently restrictive easing of the debt brake by implementing an enforceable limitation to public investment activity, is definitely a goal worth pursuing.   

Whether a future CDU government, even one led by Friedrich Merz, would stay the course of budgetary strictness is an open question.  

That would also apply if the CDU would select the Greens to form a coalition government. Like the SPD, it has a strong left wing and, whatever else it may claim, is very much focused on expanding welfare spending. 

Samuel Moyn

Most accounts of the human rights movement begin with the crystallization of ideas about “the rights of man” during the Enlightenment, ideas that were ushered onto the world stage during the American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century, pushed forward by antislavery and anticolonial movements in the nineteenth century, and made universal in the 1940s with the establishment of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this provocatively revisionist history, Moyn argues that the decisive move occurred more recently. Until the 1970s, Moyn claims, human rights were still primarily secured by sovereign states. What was new and revolutionary in that decade was the notion that rights were entitlements that existed “above and outside” the sovereign state, a concept that served as a rallying call for human rights movements across Europe, Latin America, and the United States. But what Moyn fails to fully appreciate is that the deep subversiveness of ideas about “the rights of man” had existed since the Enlightenment, poised to unsettle more traditional notions of citizens and the state.

Published by Foreign Affairs