US–Iran War, Mecca Agreement and Strait of Hormuz Crisis

An Interview with Hadi Elis by AsiaOne News — August 13, 2026

AsiaOne News: The Middle East is experiencing a profound transformation in its security environment, with the U.S.–Iran conflict, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye, and the continuing crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz all raising questions about the future regional order. To examine these developments in greater depth, we are joined by Canadian sociologist and geopolitical analyst Hadi Elis. Mr. Elis, thank you for joining us.

Hadi Elis: Thank you for having me. It is a pleasure to be here.

Q1. Mr. Elis, how could Pakistan’s Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye reshape the regional security balance amid rising tensions in the Middle East?

Hadi Elis: At first glance, the Mecca Agreement can certainly be presented as a positive development. Any serious attempt by regional powers to establish mechanisms for collective security, consultation and deterrence has the potential to make the Middle East more secure. The more difficult question, however, is not whether collective defence is desirable, but how this particular architecture can coexist with the existing international security system.

Türkiye presents the most complicated case. It is a member of NATO and has deep institutional, military and strategic relationships with the United States, Britain and other Western powers. Pakistan, although not a NATO member, has also maintained extensive security relations with Washington and has historically been designated a major non-NATO ally of the United States. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has its own longstanding security relationship with Washington. The Mecca Agreement therefore brings together countries that are simultaneously embedded in different, and sometimes competing, strategic networks.

This raises a fundamental question about Türkiye’s future strategic positioning. If the Mecca framework eventually develops into a genuinely integrated collective-defence structure—what some commentators have already begun calling a kind of “Muslim NATO”—Ankara could eventually find itself having to reconcile obligations arising from two different security architectures. I am not suggesting that Türkiye will immediately have to choose between NATO and the Mecca Agreement. That would be premature. But if the Mecca framework develops an independent military doctrine, command structure and collective-defence obligation, the strategic tension between the two memberships could become increasingly difficult to manage.

There is also the question of Iran. The geographic and strategic environment surrounding the agreement makes Tehran an unavoidable consideration. Saudi Arabia has serious security concerns regarding Iran, while Pakistan shares a long border with Iran and has historically maintained important bilateral channels with Tehran. Türkiye also has its own complex relationship with Iran, combining competition, economic interaction and diplomatic engagement. Consequently, whether the agreement is explicitly directed against Iran or not, Tehran is likely to interpret the emergence of such an arrangement through a security-dilemma lens.

Israel is another complication. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye each have different relationships with Israel, but there are significant political disagreements with Israeli policies, particularly regarding Palestine. If the Mecca Agreement evolves from a narrowly defined defence mechanism into a broader political-security bloc, the Palestinian question could become an increasingly important component of its collective identity.

That is where Washington, London and other major NATO capitals would become concerned. A regional defence organization that begins with one strategic purpose but gradually develops a broader political identity could eventually acquire an agenda that does not necessarily coincide with Western priorities.

For that reason, I am cautious about predicting a long-term future for the agreement in its present form. It may survive, but its durability will depend on whether it can remain a flexible regional security mechanism rather than becoming an explicitly anti-Iranian or anti-Israeli military bloc. If it becomes the latter, it could encounter significant internal contradictions and external pressure. My concern is therefore less about the agreement’s immediate survival and more about whether its members can maintain strategic coherence over the next several years.

Q2. Turning to the Strait of Hormuz, how do you assess Iran’s decision to keep the waterway restricted, and can Tehran realistically maintain control over such a vital international route?

Hadi Elis: The first thing we need to do is separate Iran’s military ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz from its ability to exercise internationally recognized sovereignty over the waterway. Those are two very different things.

The legal framework is complicated. The Strait of Hormuz is governed in significant part by the international law of the sea, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. Iran has signed but not ratified UNCLOS, while the United States has signed but also has not ratified it. Oman, on the other hand, is a party to the convention. Therefore, there is a complicated intersection between treaty obligations, customary international law, navigational rights and the competing security claims of the states bordering the Gulf.

I would therefore be very cautious about describing the Strait as something that Iran can simply “own” or control politically. Iran has enormous geographical and military leverage over Hormuz, but leverage is not the same thing as legal sovereignty.

Iran is unquestionably capable of making navigation extremely difficult and extremely dangerous. Its geographic position along the northern shore of the Strait, its missile capabilities, naval forces and asymmetric warfare capabilities give Tehran considerable capacity to threaten commercial shipping. But Iran cannot realistically dictate the long-term international regime governing Hormuz by itself.

There are too many stakeholders.

The Gulf states depend on the waterway. Major Asian economies depend upon energy transported through it. Europe depends on global energy markets. The United States has enormous strategic interests in the Gulf, while China has become one of the largest consumers of energy originating from the region. Even countries that are not physically dependent upon Middle Eastern oil are affected by the price shock that a prolonged closure would generate.

This is why Hormuz should be understood as a global strategic chokepoint rather than an exclusively Iranian security issue.

If Iran attempted to transform temporary military leverage into permanent political control, it would confront not merely the United States but a much broader international coalition of economic interests.

There is another problem for Tehran. Iran itself needs functioning energy markets. It needs to sell its hydrocarbons and maintain economic relationships with countries that purchase them. Prolonged disruption could therefore become economically self-defeating.

Iran may have the capacity to close or severely restrict the Strait for a period of time. But maintaining a permanent closure is an entirely different proposition. It would require Tehran to sustain enormous military, economic and diplomatic pressure while absorbing the consequences of international retaliation.

That is why I believe the more realistic Iranian objective is not necessarily permanent closure. It is to use Hormuz as strategic leverage—to demonstrate that any military pressure on Iran has consequences extending far beyond Iranian territory.

Q3. If the United States tries to forcefully reopen the Strait, what could be the consequences for regional security and global energy supplies?

Hadi Elis: A forceful reopening would represent a very serious escalation because Washington would effectively be challenging Iran’s ability to impose restrictions on one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

In military terms, this could quickly become much larger than a dispute over commercial navigation. Iran has demonstrated that it is prepared to use asymmetric capabilities, including missiles, naval assets and potentially mines, to raise the cost of maritime operations. Even a limited American attempt to clear the waterway could therefore produce a chain reaction involving Iranian missile attacks, attacks on commercial shipping, disruption of regional military bases and potentially attacks on energy infrastructure across the Gulf.

The danger is not simply the first exchange of fire. It is escalation dynamics.

Once American forces begin military operations to reopen the Strait, Iran would have a powerful incentive to demonstrate that American coercion carries a price. Tehran could respond asymmetrically rather than attempting to defeat the United States conventionally. That could mean targeting shipping, military installations or critical infrastructure rather than engaging American forces directly.

The consequences for global energy markets could be immediate. Even the perception that the Strait is unsafe can increase insurance premiums, shipping costs and oil prices. If tankers begin avoiding the waterway, the disruption could affect economies far beyond the Middle East.

This is why I would regard a military reopening operation as a last resort rather than a sustainable strategy.

Washington may have overwhelming conventional military superiority, but that does not automatically translate into an inexpensive or politically manageable solution. The United States could potentially reopen the waterway militarily while simultaneously creating a much broader regional war.

The irony is that the Strait of Hormuz is strategically valuable precisely because neither side can afford to ignore it.

Iran cannot indefinitely close it.

The United States cannot indefinitely fight over it.

The Gulf states cannot tolerate prolonged disruption.

And the international economy cannot absorb an extended energy shock without consequences.

That creates an uncomfortable but important incentive for diplomacy.

Q4. Pakistan is attempting to facilitate dialogue between Iran and the United States. What can Islamabad realistically achieve through mediation at this critical stage?

Hadi Elis: Pakistan occupies a fascinating but difficult position because Washington and Tehran appear to perceive its role differently.

The United States may regard Islamabad as a potential mediator. Iran may initially regard Pakistan more as a message carrier—a channel through which positions can be communicated without establishing direct negotiations.

That distinction matters.

Pakistan has significant advantages. It has geographical proximity to Iran, longstanding bilateral relations with Tehran, extensive relations with the United States and a substantial security relationship with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. It can therefore communicate with several sides simultaneously.

But mediation requires more than access.

For Pakistan to become a credible mediator, Tehran must believe that Islamabad has sufficient independence and diplomatic weight to protect Iranian interests during negotiations. At the same time, Washington must believe that Pakistan can communicate Iranian positions without simply becoming an advocate for Tehran.

A successful mediator needs credibility in both rooms.

Pakistan therefore has an opportunity, but it also faces a credibility problem. Its relationships with Washington, Riyadh and Ankara could be an advantage, but Tehran could also interpret those relationships as evidence that Islamabad is not entirely neutral.

The most realistic Pakistani objective at this stage is therefore not to produce an immediate grand bargain. It is to achieve tactical de-escalation.

That could include extending a ceasefire, establishing reliable communication channels, negotiating maritime arrangements, preventing attacks on commercial shipping, creating humanitarian mechanisms and preparing the ground for more substantive negotiations.

Sometimes diplomacy succeeds not by solving the conflict but by preventing the next missile from being launched.

The June framework is particularly relevant because the understanding reached at that time reportedly envisaged a 60-day period for negotiations toward a broader settlement. But the strategic environment changed considerably during that period. The NATO summit in Türkiye and the subsequent emergence of the Mecca security arrangement added another layer of uncertainty from Tehran’s perspective.

Iran is therefore looking at the next stage with considerable suspicion.

At the same time, Tehran’s demands reportedly extend beyond simply stopping military operations. Iran has sought restrictions on further nuclear-related developments while also raising the issue of compensation for the damage caused by the war.

These are extremely difficult negotiating positions because they involve fundamentally different interpretations of responsibility.

Washington is likely to argue that Iran must make concessions to guarantee regional security. Tehran is likely to argue that it should not be expected to make strategic concessions while simultaneously absorbing the economic and physical costs of the conflict.

That is precisely why Pakistan’s most useful role may be to keep the diplomatic door open long enough for both sides to discover that compromise is less expensive than another round of war.

Closing

AsiaOne News: Mr. Elis, thank you for joining us and for providing your analysis of the U.S.–Iran conflict, the Mecca Agreement and the Strait of Hormuz crisis.

Hadi Elis: Thank you. It was a pleasure to join you.

AsiaOne News: We appreciate your time and insights.

Interview conducted by AsiaOne News, August 13, 2026.

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