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For the first time since BRICS was established in 2009, Chinese President Xi Jinping will not attend the annual summit. His absence from the July 2025 gathering in Rio de Janeiro—a meeting that features a dramatically expanded bloc and arrives at a moment of geopolitical flux—suggests that it is more than a matter of scheduling. It is a quiet signal, one that underscores China’s growing discomfort with a bloc that has evolved from a provocative counterweight to the West into a stage for symbolic declarations and internal friction. It is an unprecedented no-show that will be sorely felt while at the same time raising questions about China’s diplomatic priorities and possibly blunting Beijing’s ability to advance its agendaat the summit.
Since becoming China’s top leader in late 2012, Xi has attended every BRICS summit without fail. Word that he would give the upcoming two-day summit in Rio de Janeiro a miss was first carried by the South China Morning Post on June 25. Formal confirmation came on July 2, when China’s Foreign Ministry announced at a routine press briefing that Premier Li Qiang would head to Rio instead.
The Kremlin has said Russian President Vladimir Putin will join virtually, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attending in his place. China has not said whether Xi will similarly join the summit via video link. With no-shows by Xi and Putin, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be the only leader attending in person from the original BRIC quartet of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, aside from host President Lula da Silva.
BRICS at a Crossroads: Expansion and Divergence
Originally formed by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with South Africa joining soon after, BRICS has undergone a dramatic transformation in recent years. What began as a compact group of emerging powers with aligned interests has expanded into a sprawling coalition with a wider, but less cohesive, membership. In 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates joined the bloc, followed by Indonesia earlier this year.
In parallel with full membership expansion, BRICS has also created a “partner country” category, offering looser affiliation to a second tier of states. Ten nations—including Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam—have been granted this status. While these partners are invited to participate in BRICS events, they do not possess the same decision-making authority as full members. With these additions, the enlarged grouping now represents nearly half the world’s population, accounts for two-fifths of global trade, and generates around 40 percent of global gross domestic product when measured by purchasing power parity.
This rapid expansion has generated both opportunity and friction. While Beijing likely viewed earlier rounds of enlargement as diplomatic victories, the influx of new voices—with varying regional priorities and geopolitical orientations—has made coordination and collective action increasingly complex. The aspiration to present a unified Global South voice is increasingly challenged by the reality of divergent national agendas.
Even so, longstanding themes remain prominent on the BRICS agenda. Chief among them is the bloc’s ambition to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar in global trade, reserves, and finance—a goal often referred to as de-dollarization. China has led calls for greater use of local currencies and has even supported the idea of a common BRICS currency. Russia, now deeply estranged from Western financial systems, has joined Beijing in championing alternatives to dollar hegemony. At the 2024 summit in Russia, the country’s leader—President Vladimir Putin—accused the United States (U.S.) of “weaponizing” the dollar, while Xi Jinping echoed those concerns by urging reforms to the international financial architecture and reaffirming China’s support for the New Development Bank.
However, translating financial ambition into functional reality has proven far more difficult. Despite rhetorical momentum, actual progress on de-dollarization has been limited. Key BRICS members like India and Brazil have expressed caution, citing both practical hurdles and broader geopolitical risks. Brasília has consistently stressed the importance of not antagonising its Western trade partners, while New Delhi continues to hedge—engaging with BRICS on one hand, and deepening strategic ties with the U.S. and the G7 on the other.
This divergence in approach has undermined BRICS’ capacity to present a united front. Brazil’s cautious diplomacy and India’s strategic balancing act risk diluting the bloc’s transformative potential. Rather than pursuing structural overhaul, several members appear to favour incremental gains—prioritising trade and visibility over systemic change. As BRICS grows in size and ambition, it also grows more unwieldy, raising fundamental questions about whether the bloc can deliver on its promise to reshape global governance.
A Fractured Family: Strategic Rivalries Within BRICS
Despite public affirmations of unity and South-South solidarity, the relationships among BRICS members are riddled with strategic tensions and mutual distrust. As the bloc expands in scope and ambition, internal divisions have become increasingly difficult to ignore—especially between China and some of its most prominent partners.
The most visible fault line remains the strained relationship between China and India. Tensions have persisted since the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in 2020 and continue to simmer amid lingering bilateral tensions. Strategic competition is intensifying, with India deepening its security and economic alignment with the U.S. and its Quad partners—moves that Beijing views with suspicion. Further aggravating matters are reports that China has transferred military-grade technology to Pakistan, India’s archrival, during recent episodes of regional tension. Despite their parallel aspirations for regional leadership and stronger multilateral influence, China and India are locked in a complex rivalry where mistrust outweighs cooperation.
China’s relationship with Brazil is more stable on the surface, but caution runs deep. Under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil has called for a more multipolar world and strengthened economic ties with China. Yet it continues to hedge strategically, seeking also to maintain close ties with Washington. This quiet resistance may limit Beijing’s ability to project consensus within BRICS and reveals underlying doubts about the group’s balance of power.
Taken together, these bilateral frictions indicate a tough, hard reality: BRICS is no longer a compact coalition of like-minded emerging powers. It is a fragmented and unwieldy grouping, burdened by divergent ambitions and deep-seated distrust. The expansion of the bloc has widened the tent—but it has not necessarily strengthened the foundation. Consensus is elusive, and strategic rivalry increasingly defines what was once billed as a unified front.
Understanding Xi’s no-show
Xi Jinping’s decision to skip the 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro cannot be viewed in isolation. It reflects a convergence of domestic imperatives and strategic recalibration in China’s approach to multilateral diplomacy. On the home front, Xi faces a growing list of challenges: persistent economic headwinds, sluggish consumer demand, a protracted property crisis, and rising youth unemployment. These concerns have been compounded by renewed tariff threats from the U.S., further straining an already uncertain economic outlook.
Equally pressing is the strategic task of steering China through its next development phase. According to state media outlet Xinhua, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently drafting proposals for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), with a month-long public consultation launched in May. Given the importance of this planning cycle to Xi’s long-term vision for national rejuvenation, his direct involvement is likely both necessary and intensive.
In this context, Xi’s absence from the BRICS summit can be seen as a tactical retreat to focus on consolidating domestic stability. But the decision also carries significant foreign policy implications. By delegating representation to Premier Li Qiang, Xi ensures continuity in China’s formal engagement while avoiding the political risks of appearing at a summit marked by internal divisions and growing rivalries—especially with India. His absence removes the possibility of a direct confrontation with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and reduces the likelihood of contentious interactions that could expose fractures within the bloc.
More broadly, Xi’s no-show aligns with Beijing’s growing preference for selective multilateralism—favoring platforms where China can exert greater control, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or advancing its interests through bilateral channels shaped by economic leverage. On the one hand, BRICS, once a cornerstone of China’s South-South diplomacy, now appears less central to its strategic calculus. The bloc’s recent expansion has made decision-making more cumbersome and diluted the cohesion that once gave it momentum. For China, BRICS is increasingly an unpredictable stage—less a vehicle for coordinated resistance to Western dominance than a forum of competing agendas.
China’s foreign policy strategy has also shifted towards maximizing control over international discourse. While BRICS historically offered a platform to challenge U.S.-led global institutions, its expanded membership has made consensus elusive. For Beijing, the costs of steering such a diverse and fractious group may now outweigh the benefits.
One the other hand, this does not necessarily signal a downgrading of BRICS. China has consistently supported the bloc’s enlargement and remains its economic anchor, accounting for around two-thirds of the economic bloc’s nominal GDP. Beijing is also the largest trading partner for most BRICS members. This structural dominance provides it with continued leverage to shape the bloc’s evolution—albeit more cautiously.
In this light, Xi’s absence encapsulates both a strategic withdrawal and a domestic preoccupation. It reflects an effort to manage internal challenges without abandoning China’s long-term ambition to reshape the international order—just not through a BRICS platform that no longer functions as a cohesive or reliable instrument of influence.
Conclusion
Xi Jinping’s decision to skip the BRICS summit is a quiet but potent signal. It reflects both internal constraint and external recalibration. BRICS, once imagined as a transformative counterweight to the West, is now a fragmented bloc struggling to manage its contradictions. For China, the costs of managing this pluralistic and increasingly incoherent group may now outweigh the benefits.
