Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Dr. Nessrine Mesto-Assaad
With the emergence of the importance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the efforts of global capital and recently major countries to build hyperscale data centers around the world, natural gas has become a key fuel for powering data centers and enabling AI servers to process huge amounts of data very quickly and around the clock. Giant AI servers require reliable, uninterrupted power so that they can save and archive collected data and train and develop massive language models. Despite the development of renewable energy capable of operating large data centers, this energy has not proven its efficiency in terms of operational interconnection and continuity. Therefore, natural gas has emerged as a very important energy source for generating electricity for data centers.
At the beginning of 2026, the International Gas Union IGU issued a detailed report on the role of gas in meeting the electricity needs of data centers. The IGU report indicates that rising electricity demand for data centers will lead to an increase in global natural gas demand, and that gas-powered generation for data centers will double by 2035, in line with expectations of an increase in the number of data centers around the world. Hence, the role of natural gas emerged as an important economic factor, parallel to oil. Its importance has also emerged as a key component in operating data centers to achieve digital armament and global governance.
Data Centers and the Amount of Energy Used and Future Expectations
Data centers need large servers that secure users’ real-time information and store and archive all user data, patterns, interactions, and behaviors. These servers operate nonstop and require a high cooling mechanism to avoid overheating and malfunctions. The operation process and the cooling process require constant and safe electrical energy. Therefore, most modern data centers are built with accompanying gas stations because regular power stations cannot meet the high energy needs of these centers.
Data centers in the United States consumed about 4.4% of total electricity consumption during 2023, and this number increased until it reached 6.7% during 2025 (Data Center Energy Used for Data Centers Report). Studies by the US Energy and Research Center indicate that consumption is likely to rise to 12% in 2028.
Data centers in China consume 3.7% of total public electricity consumption. Data center energy consumption is expected to rise to 19% by 2030, in line with China’s development project to build giant data centers (the China Data Research Center).
The total electricity consumption of data centers around the world relative to the volume of global energy consumption is estimated at about 2~3%, with the possibility that consumption will reach 10% by 2030. Therefore, gas is no longer a complementary material in trade exchange, but rather an essential and strategic material in the existing digital war.
China is an Importer, and the United States is an Exporter
By early 2017, the United States had become the world’s leading exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), thanks to shale gas fields and the Permian Basin in Texas and New Mexico. The United States exports LNG via sea tankers, equipped with a high-cooling mechanism, to India, Turkey, South American countries, Japan, most European countries, and most African countries. The United States recently concluded supply deals with Egypt, Kuwait, and Bahrain to ship surplus gas from domestic production, thereby covering the needs of most European and African countries (US Energy Information Administration).
China’s domestic natural gas production covers about 58% of its vital supplies, and the rest of its needs are imported from Australia, Russia, Qatar, and, formerly, the United States. LNG is transported via giant sea tankers from Australia and Qatar to receiving stations at ports on the eastern and southeastern coasts of China. Russian gas is transported to China via two parallel routes: the first is via the Power of Siberia lines, giant cross-border onshore pipelines that carry LNG from Russian fields in Yakutia Province and pass through huge pumping stations all the way to China to maintain flow over long distances. The second route is sea freight via giant offshore gas tankers.
In recent months, China and Russia have agreed on the Russian Far East network, which will allow gas to be pumped through an interconnected waterway and land corridor starting from the Russian island of Sakhalin and ending in the Chinese city of Hulin. Russia is also seeking to develop new land pipelines, “Power of Siberia 2”, to pump larger quantities to China.
In addition to Russian oil and gas pipelines, China increasingly relies on gas pipelines from Turkmenistan. These giant pipelines pass through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, delivering approximately 40 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China. The Turkmenistan oil and gas pipelines are a cornerstone of the Belt and Road project. This geographic extension connecting Turkmenistan to China supports its expansionist approach and imposes a new equation for access to the Levant Basin in the Middle East.
The Belt and Road Project
China aims to revive the Silk Road trade route, enabling it to reach the Middle East, Eurasia, and Africa, while at the same time providing stable energy sources to meet growing gas and oil needs. According to the National Energy Administration, China’s oil and gas wells will peak between 2035 and 2040, after which production will begin to decline. This perceived reality will contribute to creating a real economic crisis, especially in the production, transportation, and industrial sectors.
China recognizes the importance of natural gas and the need to keep this scarce resource readily available. Thus, it is building a land corridor linking it to Russia, the countries of Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan…), and the Middle East (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates…) via oil and gas pipelines. The project also includes the sea corridor along the West China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea, over which China hopes to extend its control to reach Africa and Europe and thus ensure supply chains for abundant Mediterranean gas. Thus, China could guarantee 60% of the world’s total oil and gas (West Asian countries with Russia). China was able to sign non-binding agreements with 149 countries, including countries from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, all of which joined the Belt and Road project.
Eastern Mediterranean Gas – The Levant Basin
The Eastern Mediterranean gas, or what geologists call the “Levant Basin,” has attracted global attention, especially from China, following the emergence of geological and geophysical evidence indicating the presence of natural faults that formed over thousands of years and contain natural gas. The USGS reports that the Levant Basin Province covers approximately 83,000 square kilometers (km2) and includes the Eastern Mediterranean region, the Tartus Rift (which includes Latakia and Baniyas), Palestine (Gaza coast), the Nile Delta, Mount Eratosthenes, and the shores of Israel. The USGS estimates that the Levant Basin contains about 122 trillion square feet (tcf) of natural gas and has the potential for 1.7 billion barrels of oil (SEG).
Some natural gas wells have been discovered and developed in Israel (Karish and Leviathan fields), Egypt (Zohr field), and Cyprus (Aphrodite, Kronos, Calypso, and Glaucus – under development), but many wells in the Levant Basin remain underexplored.
The liquefaction and evaporation processes required for importing and exporting gas require equipped ports and modern thermal laboratories. Natural gas infrastructure development in the eastern Mediterranean is still underway, and international oil companies are racing to reach agreements on these infrastructures and wells.
Starting in 2025, Egypt began exporting LNG. Israel uses Egypt’s infrastructure to export its gas production, which is considered important in the region. Israeli gas is transported via pipelines to Egypt and then shipped to European countries. The volume of Israeli gas discovered is estimated at about 34 trillion cubic meters, and Israel shares part of it with Lebanon. Cyprus has contracted with the American company Chevron and the Italian company Eni to operate the Kronos and Aphrodite fields, which are expected to turn Cyprus into an important regional gas center in the future. Both the Calypso and Glaucus fields are also likely to strongly support this proposal, given the expected gas quantities.
The Lebanon offshore gas remains underexplored due to a lack of the necessary infrastructure to produce and export gas. Demarcating the border with Israel and reducing existing geopolitical tensions between the two countries may give Lebanon greater freedom to contract with oil companies. The Gaza offshore gas is no different in condition from the gas fields in Lebanon. Ongoing wars and permanent conflicts prevent any plans to explore or invest in these fields.
The Contest Over the Syrian Offshore Gas
The Tartous Fault in Syria is considered the largest ever. Some preliminary studies indicate that there are approximately 80 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, some of which some is shared by Lebanon. However, the USGS has not adopted this number and has indicated that these studies may be inaccurate. But she stressed that the Syrian coast is considered the most important undeveloped supply in the Levant Basin.
The Tartous Fault is considered China’s first goal, which is what its ally Russia hoped to invest in, especially after the investment contract signed by the Russian company “Soyuzneftegaz” with the previous Syrian government, which requires investment in natural gas in territorial waters for 25 years.
Numerous academic studies have addressed the issue of Levant Basin gas, all of which have focused on a single crucible: “Gas is one of the most important reasons that led to the emergence of conflicts in the Middle East and is the real motivation behind the alliances of Turkey, Israel, Qatar, and the united states to overthrow the Assad regime” (Hüsnü Mahalli 2012, William Engdahl 2012), especially after the gas agreement with Iran and Iraq.
In July 2011, the governments of Syria, Iran, and Iraq signed a historic gas agreement to extend gas pipelines from the southern part of the Pars field in Iran, through Iraq and Syria, to the Lebanese ports, from which the gas would be shipped to European countries. Qatar, which shares the Pars gas field with Iran and has sensed the threat of commercial competition in European markets, especially after discoveries in the Levant Basin, has indirectly helped thwart this agreement by destabilizing peace in Syria and altering the political geography of the global gas market.
The political turmoil and the Arab Spring that the region witnessed, along with a Qatari-Israeli move to control European gas markets, were the factors that led Russia (directly) and China (indirectly) to enter the existing conflict and extend political influence over Syria in order to seize gas.
In 2011, the United States, along with the European Union, imposed significant legal barriers that limited direct and indirect investment in Syria’s energy assets. These sanctions affected all forms of indirect investment, including the provision of technical services, financial facilities, and primary equipment. This approach to sanctions contributed to reduced enthusiasm among oil and gas companies and to a decline in investment in Syrian ports, except in Russia, which controlled the coastal region and concluded agreements regarding it.
In 2015, “Soyuzneftegaz” and the Italian company “Eni” decided to deploy offshore drilling rigs off the Syrian coast, but Turkey sent its warships to halt the operations and prevent the companies from completing their work. The war in Syria escalated, leading to the collapse of many oil and gas pipeline infrastructures and the halt of exploration projects. In 2019, Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus signed an agreement to demarcate maritime borders and enable each country to begin surveying and drilling operations, while the Turkish, Syrian, and Lebanese borders remained undrawn and without any agreement.
After exploring the giant Leviathan Basin and exploring the huge stock of gas, Israel and the United States have become more determined not to allow Russia or China access to Eastern Mediterranean gas. The result was permanent tensions in the region and political pressures that led to a significant undermining of the offshore gas of Lebanon and Syria, despite the fact that geological forecasts and seismic surveys prove the presence of gas in these faults, especially with the presence of regional discoveries in the neighboring waters (Israel and Cyprus) and the unity of the rock structure that belongs to the same Mycenaean era.
Syria’s maritime space has been outside the global energy investment cycle for two decades due to regional conflicts, international sanctions, violent wars, and institutional collapse in Syria. However, this dynamic has shifted recently, and the regional political geography of energy may change if the current transitional government of Syria fulfills its obligations.
The Brand-New Gas Contracts
In May 2026, Qatar Energy, Total Energizer, and ConocoPhillips signed an agreement with the Syrian Petroleum Company for the technical and commercial evaluation and marine exploration of the blocks along the Syrian maritime borders. This agreement followed a memorandum of understanding in February 2026 between Chevron International and Power International Holding, on the one hand, and the Syrian Petroleum Company, on the other. The agreement stipulates that Chevron is ready to develop a specific offshore block and begin implementation immediately, which will accelerate gas extraction operations and secure revenues. However, how effective are these treaties, and will these companies be able to begin implementation?
Obstacles that Face Foreign Oil Companies
The Syrian Petroleum Company seeks to establish memoranda of understanding with international partners to conduct the necessary studies and develop action plans for evaluation, exploration, and drilling, but many obstacles limit the Company’s ambitions and delay its efforts.
- International sanctions: The current transitional government has benefited from the easing and removal of some international sanctions, but Syria still suffers from its international classification as a “state sponsor of terrorism” due to its support for cross-border terrorist groups. After the transitional government took over in Syria, President Donald Trump helped lift the sanctions program imposed on Syria and contributed to removing the names of Ahmed al-Sharaa and Asaad al-Shaibani, as well as military leaders from Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, from the terrorist lists. However, the file related to removing Syria from the list of countries supporting terrorism has not yet been decided. The decision requires federal legislation, a complex administrative process, and periodic monitoring of Syria to ensure that it does not support any terrorist entity. This classification poses legal risks that discourage international banks, companies, and development investment institutions from doing business with Syria.
- The Syrian war: The Syrian war greatly affected the import and export of natural gas in Syria and contributed to many oil and gas lines going out of service. This is in addition to the ports, which first need maintenance and rehabilitation, and will then be equipped with thermal laboratories to convert gas into liquid. LNG is likely to be transported either by offshore gas carriers or via offshore pipelines that are likely to be built to transport liquefied gas to Cyprus and then Europe. All of this requires significant capital and investors.
- Demarcation of maritime borders: Syria shares natural gas fields with Lebanon to the south and with Turkey to the north. Demarcating borders with these countries is complex and requires international agreements and legal obligations under the United Nations maritime treaties. Turkey has been working to demarcate the maritime borders with Syria since the transitional government took over the country. However, this government does not meet all the constitutional and legislative requirements that would enable it to conclude major sovereign agreements and treaties without full international recognition and domestic constitutional and legal cover. The current transitional government’s failure to demonstrate full internal and external constitutional legitimacy undermines all treaties concluded during its tenure in the country, and the treaties it signs are considered non-binding.
- Specialized workforce: Geological surveys, drilling, and exploration operations require a specialized workforce. The Syrian war over the past decade has contributed to the migration of oil and gas specialists to neighboring countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Facilitating the return of specialized workers may require a safe environment and a stable economy. Securing a specialized foreign workforce will require additional capital.
- Operational infrastructure: Gas extraction requires an operational plan supported by efficient, well-equipped infrastructure capable of accommodating large quantities of gas. It is also capable of changing the nature of the gas and its charging. The project entails certified pipelines, thermal coefficients, operating equipment, a shipping fleet, pipe workshops in the Mediterranean, and buildings equipped for operations management. Securing this infrastructure requires investors and agents who are willing to invest in Syria. As the country continues to suffer from political and security instability and its future directions are shrouded in uncertainty, the return of investors may not be certain, at least not at the present time.
- Capital: Bringing capital to a country that lacks stability, security, and peaceful coexistence among citizens will be a major obstacle for the new government. Despite the current transitional government’s efforts to secure support from the United States, European countries, and neighboring Arab countries, it has been unable to enhance the confidence of active countries or even secure the confidence of the International Monetary Fund to attract effective and valuable capital or investment.
- Extremist political Islam: The current transitional government is viewed as an extension of extremist terrorist groups (Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). Despite recycled approaches, behavior, and media statements, and despite conditional international recognition, these groups remain under international surveillance and are included in political, economic, and security stability programs overseen by international organizations.
- Security and stability: Syria still suffers from instability and social insecurity. Add to this societal fragmentation fueled by sectarian strife and divisions. Over the past year, the country witnessed two horrific massacres against religious and ethnic minorities (the mass killing of Alawites in March 2025 and the mass killing of Druze in July 2025), along with repeated individual attacks and ongoing kidnappings.
The Digital Conflict Over the Levant Basin
China is struggling to keep natural gas pipelines open across multiple channels to avoid a monopoly and to diversify import sources. This effort has intensified as the need for natural gas has increased to power data centers. China’s growing need for gas, as well as its need for a corridor and foothold in Asia that would enable it to open to Europe as an important trading market, was the primary motivation behind strengthening relations with Central and West Asian countries and extending trade and economic ties with them. China aims to use these countries as a corridor for gas pipelines that it hopes to draw from the Middle East via Iran and Uzbekistan.
While China seeks to access gas from the Mediterranean basin in every way, the United States seeks to obstruct China’s plans and limit its ability to access this gas. China views this gas as a strategic reserve that helps meet the growing capacity of data centers, while the United States views this gas as a strategic factor that can be used to reduce the number of data centers China could build and to obstruct China’s access to data.
China is seeking to adopt the Belt and Road Project to establish a trade and oil corridor linking it to Syria, which in turn will be a central import and export hub and a trade front overlooking Europe. The United States agrees with China’s efforts to turn Syria into a focal point, but to use it as a transit point for gas and oil to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.
In addition to the US-China conflict in the region, Israel’s expansionist project has become even more significant. Acquiring natural gas blocks off the coasts of Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon will give Israel a pivotal role in exporting gas to Europe. Qatar also hopes to be the official sponsor of Syrian gas, especially after the recent treaty with the Syrian Petroleum Company. Qatar’s ambition goes beyond exports and competition to include data centers that it has begun establishing on its territory by contracting with the United States. The number of these centers is likely to increase, which will require higher energy consumption.
The ongoing conflict in the Levant is not merely a political dispute or a war over a trade corridor driven by economic motives, but rather a digital-technological war whose protagonists are China, Russia, Qatar, and the United States. Whoever secures this gas will control the next generation of artificial intelligence.
There is no doubt that political conflicts, the extremist Islamic regime, the presence of ISIS in Syria, economic and security instability, international ratings, and the need to secure the necessary capital will affect gas extraction and export operations, in addition to the piracy, political ambitions, favoritism, and security chaos that Syria has been suffering from for decades. However, the volume of gas expected to be extracted may be sufficient to encourage the conflicting countries to find practical solutions to these obstacles.
Finally, in a world where energy is controlled by data and data controls political power and global influence, natural gas is emerging as a global governance tool that could spark wars and reshape the maps of many countries. As for the Mediterranean gas, the story has not yet begun. Whoever owns the future of the Levant Basin will wield power and influence in the Middle East and control gas supply chains to both Europe and China.
ِAbout the Author:
Nessrine Mesto-Assaad is a Doctor of Business Administration and a researcher specializing in e-government, e-file, and Generative Artificial Intelligence (ChatGPT applications) research. Her work focuses on taxpayers’ behavioral intentions to use e-government, the electronic filing system, and the adoption of AI conversational tools when e-filing income tax returns. Currently, she focuses on the intersection between digital technology and its influence on global supremacy.
