Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Sajad Abedi
The likelihood of a war between Iran and Israel has increased dramatically due to the objectives of each of these two and different ways to achieve the goals in this regard. Iran wants access to its goals from Syria and the creation of reliable bases in Syria, and Israel is determined to prevent this happening.
Israel, both in word and in writing, has committed all red lines, and the reddest of these lines is that Israel will in no way allow Syria to become bases for Iran’s operations, and that precision centers will be developed in Syria by Iran will be created.
On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to all its goals and purposes: using Syria as a reliable regional base and creating missile production centers in the country. As a result, the prospect of a conflict between Iran and Israel is highly probable; it is so high that one can be aware of what this war will be like, and in what form the branches and branches of this fatal are conflict. If such a war involves, it means the end of the period between Egypt and Israel in the 1972 Um-Kippur war that led to the establishment of a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, the then most powerful hostile state with Israel in the Middle East, Which was a prelude to the end to hostility and conflict between the Arabs and Israel.
Over the past four and a half decades of this agreement, Israeli conflicts with nongovernmental groups, including the prolonged conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, from the Iranian sect in the region, which led to the 2006 major conflict between them. Regarding the war between Iran and Israel, the first scenario to be considered is whether Iran is struggling directly with Israel or acting through Hezbollah (given that the Syrian army is now busy fighting Sunni opposition forces) In the northeast of Syria to prevent them from re-emerging).
For two main reasons, Iran may launch a direct attack on Israel; first, it will not cost Israel enough to miss its Hezbollah missiles to prevent its attacks on Iran’s bases in Syria. In particular, the risk of Israel’s direct retaliation against Iran is still there. On the other hand, Hezbollah’s fatigue from the war could be another reason to persuade Iran to launch a direct attack on Israel or to directly cooperate in the attack with its large deputy in the region. The result of the Hezbollah activities that began its operation since 1898, as a small group of only two million people, was that Israel temporarily retreated from southern Lebanon in 2000, when another direct war broke out in 2006.
But for a while, the rest was very short for Hezbollah, and six years later, the group again entered the bloody Syrian war that is still ongoing. Demographic data also show that the growth rate of Shia population in Lebanon has fallen to a European fertility rate in 2004, meaning that the population replacement rate is lower than the rate of death and death. This means that it will be very difficult to revive Hezbollah or lose power in the war.
As a result, Iran is likely to launch a direct attack on Israel. Since Iran does not have much air capacity and does not have much capacity to send troops from Iran to Israel, it would be an unlikely event of a missile war that Hezbollah will also in participate. Such a missile war and consequently Israel’s use of its maximum air power can show the weaknesses of both sides of the war, regardless of the huge difference in population and size (Iran’s 80 million against Israel, 8.5 million, Iran 1.6 million square kilometers against Israel With an area of only 212,000 square kilometers).
However, Iran’s huge difference in terms of three basic issues is as vulnerable as Israel. First, 90% of Iran’s oil and gas resources are exported from a south-eastern border of Iran and Iraq, from kharg. The revenue from these exports is 40% of the general government of Iran and about half of Iran’s foreign exchange reserves. At the same time Bandar Abbas in southern Iran accounts for 90% of Iran’s container shipping. The goods imported and exported from this port and in containers make up only 15 to 20 percent of Iran’s total trade, but are goods that are rivaling the difference between the 21st and 19th centuries and are important for many Iranians.
It can easily be guessed that Israel will focus its main focus on Iran’s weakness. As a result, this war will be extremely destructive, because it will not only affect Iran and Israel but also neighboring states. Israel may even attack the Lebanese, Syria, and Iraqi airports to prevent the movement of Iranian forces and equipment.
