There may be few people who have done more to improve China’s image around the world than Donald Trump. What Beijing could not accomplish through decades of diplomacy, trade and public diplomacy, Trump’s confrontational approach toward America’s allies and partners has, in many respects, helped accelerate.

A recent Pew Research Center survey illustrates the scale of the shift. China is now viewed more favorably than the United States in 25 of the 36 countries surveyed—a striking change from 2023, when the United States enjoyed a clear advantage in almost every country except a handful. Even more revealing is the fact that Chinese President Xi Jinping is now trusted more than Trump in countries that have traditionally been among Washington’s closest allies, including Britain, Canada, France and Australia.

Yet this should not be mistaken for a global strategic realignment toward Beijing. The transformation in public opinion is real, but its geopolitical consequences remain much more limited. In France and Germany, for example, favorable views of China remain relatively low, in the range of roughly 30 to 35 percent. China may have overtaken the United States in public sentiment, but it has done so partly because American standing has deteriorated rather than because Beijing has suddenly become universally trusted.

That distinction is critical.

For many countries, especially those caught between Washington and Beijing, the emerging strategy is not alignment but hedging. Governments are increasingly reluctant to place all their strategic and economic interests in the American basket, yet they are equally reluctant to put them in China’s. They are diversifying their partnerships, expanding commercial relationships and strengthening their own military capabilities while retaining access to the wider Western-led system.

Asia provides perhaps the clearest example.

Countries on China’s doorstep have obvious reasons to be cautious about Beijing. Territorial disputes, economic coercion and the use of so-called gray-zone tactics have convinced governments from Japan to the Philippines that Chinese power cannot simply be ignored. Japan and South Korea are therefore investing more heavily in their own defense capabilities. But despite all the talk about strategic autonomy, the United States remains the only power capable of providing a credible military counterweight to China without forcing these countries into the destabilizing choice of developing their own nuclear deterrents.

Economics complicates the picture even further. Asian countries may resent American tariffs and question Washington’s reliability, but many remain deeply dependent on the United States as a market for their exports. At the same time, China has become the world’s manufacturing powerhouse, accounting for roughly one-third of global manufactured goods. Its dominance in electric vehicles, robotics and other advanced industries means that reducing exposure to China is not simply a strategic exercise. It is also an economic challenge.

For countries trying to protect themselves against excessive dependence on either superpower, diversification is becoming a necessity.

There is another factor that should not be underestimated: transparency.

America may have become a less predictable partner under Trump, but its political system remains comparatively visible. The public can watch American political debates unfold almost in real time. Congressional investigations, elections, judicial decisions and public disagreements within the executive branch are all visible. The United States continues to maintain fundamental civil liberties and regular elections, while Congress and the Supreme Court retain mechanisms—however imperfect—to constrain presidential power.

China offers no equivalent transparency.

The Chinese Communist Party remains, in many respects, a black box. Foreign governments can negotiate with Beijing, but they cannot easily see the internal political calculations that shape Chinese decision-making. For countries contemplating a long-term strategic shift, that uncertainty matters.

This helps explain why the deterioration of confidence in Washington has not produced a corresponding rush toward Beijing.

The emerging phenomenon is better described as compatible diversification: countries reduce their dependence on the United States while simultaneously building relationships with partners that share some of their economic or security interests. On core national-security issues—advanced technology, export controls, defense cooperation and intelligence sharing—many middle powers remain firmly embedded in the broader Western system.

China has certainly benefited from America’s self-inflicted wounds. Xi Jinping has been careful to exploit Washington’s mistakes without returning to the aggressively confrontational “wolf warrior” diplomacy associated with the early Trump years. Beijing’s more restrained posture has allowed China to appear comparatively stable at a time when American foreign policy has become increasingly volatile.

But China’s political and legal opacity places a ceiling on the geopolitical gains Beijing can extract from the moment.

Public opinion can shift quickly.

Strategic alignment does not.

India and the Limits of the China Shift

India is perhaps the most revealing example of this distinction.

For years, successive American administrations have regarded India as a crucial counterweight to China. Washington tolerated New Delhi’s longstanding military relationship with Russia in order to deepen defense cooperation with India. Progress was sometimes frustratingly slow, but the strategic logic remained consistent: bring India closer to the United States without demanding that it abandon its traditional relationships.

Trump’s policies have disrupted that trajectory.

After the India-Pakistan military confrontation in May 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi strongly rejected Trump’s repeated claims that he had mediated a ceasefire. For Modi, acknowledging foreign mediation in such a sensitive conflict would have carried significant political costs at home. Washington subsequently imposed some of its highest tariffs on Indian goods, partly over India’s continued purchases of Russian oil, while also tightening restrictions affecting skilled-worker visas.

Yet despite this pressure, Pew found that Indians still viewed the United States considerably more favorably than China, by a margin of approximately 22 percentage points. That was one of the largest gaps recorded in the survey.

More importantly, Indian officials continue to regard the United States as an indispensable long-term partner.

That may be the clearest evidence that Trump’s policies have encouraged hedging rather than strategic defection.

During a recent visit to New Delhi, Indian officials reportedly approached their relationship with Washington with a new realism. For years, the question had been whether India could trust the United States. Trump’s policies appeared to provide an uncomfortable answer: perhaps not completely.

But India’s response was not to replace America with China.

It was to double down on strategic autonomy.

Modi has strengthened India’s engagement with both China and Russia, including highly publicized meetings with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Photographs of the three leaders together sent an unmistakable political message: India has alternatives.

But alternatives are not substitutes.

India’s relationship with China has hard limits. The disputed Himalayan border remains a source of tension, while economic competition between the two countries continues. India may need Chinese technology in certain advanced sectors, particularly as it attempts to expand its manufacturing capabilities, but Indian policymakers remain deeply cautious about becoming economically dependent on Beijing.

China, for its part, has little incentive to help India become a powerful manufacturing competitor.

Russia presents a different dilemma. Moscow remains an important supplier of relatively inexpensive oil and military equipment, and India’s relationship with Russia stretches back to the Cold War. Modi’s government would like to reduce that dependence, particularly under growing Western pressure, but Indian officials have made clear that they are not prepared to sever the relationship simply to satisfy Washington.

At the same time, Indian policymakers understand Russia’s economic limitations. Russia is not the engine of India’s future growth. India’s long-term economic interests remain much more closely connected to Western markets, technology and investment.

That is why New Delhi is pursuing a careful balancing act: repair relations with Washington while simultaneously strengthening relationships with countries that can reduce India’s dependence on any single power.

India has already accelerated this strategy. Since Trump’s announcement of his so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs in April 2025, New Delhi has completed trade negotiations with the European Union and concluded agreements with Britain and New Zealand. It has also expanded defense cooperation with the EU and with three major American partners in Asia: Japan, Australia and the Philippines.

Trump may therefore have unintentionally done India a favor.

As one Indian official reportedly put it, Trump is profoundly disruptive, but his disruption may have forced India to address structural weaknesses that had been difficult to confront under normal circumstances.

In other words, chaos can sometimes accelerate reform.

The European Lesson: Strategic Autonomy Without Strategic Isolation

Europe has long experimented with hedging and alliance diversification. The most famous example is Charles de Gaulle’s pursuit of French strategic autonomy.

In 1966, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command and demanded that allied forces leave French territory. His argument was not that France should abandon the Western alliance, but that French sovereignty required greater control over its own strategic decisions.

He famously insisted that France’s ability to determine its own destiny was incompatible with a defense organization in which it was effectively subordinate.

Yet de Gaulle did not leave the Western alliance itself.

That distinction remains relevant today.

France eventually returned to NATO’s integrated military command under President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2009. Sarkozy argued that remaining outside the integrated command constrained France’s national independence and reduced its room for maneuver. France could remain an American ally while still being, in his words, a country capable of making its own decisions.

That concept has returned under President Emmanuel Macron.

Macron has repeatedly called for greater European strategic autonomy and a stronger European defense capacity. He has criticized both Washington and Beijing and warned against a world increasingly governed by the “law of the strongest” and a new form of dependency.

Yet Macron has not advocated abandoning NATO.

That is because European strategic autonomy is not synonymous with strategic isolation.

France can seek greater independence from Washington while remaining inside the Western security architecture. Europe can strengthen its own defense capabilities without becoming an extension of Chinese power.

Indeed, the European example reinforces the larger argument: strategic diversification does not necessarily produce strategic realignment.

Despite Macron’s criticism of Trump over tariffs and other issues, France remains committed to NATO. European leaders have simultaneously pledged to assume greater responsibility for European security while maintaining close coordination with Washington.

And Europe’s skepticism toward the United States has not translated into an embrace of China.

Macron has sought a tougher European approach toward Beijing on economic issues, while maintaining that France is not inherently anti-China. The objective is not to replace American dependence with Chinese dependence.

It is to reduce dependence altogether.

Old Alliances Still Matter

This is why the dramatic narrative of an American retreat and Chinese takeover may be premature.

Traditional Western institutions—including NATO, the G7 and the Five Eyes intelligence partnership linking the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—have demonstrated considerable resilience despite Trump’s policies. At the same time, newer coalitions are emerging along broadly similar geopolitical lines.

Washington is attempting to reduce China’s dominance over critical minerals by bringing together dozens of countries to reshape global supply chains. France has used its G7 presidency to promote a critical-minerals resilience and production coalition involving Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain and the United States.

The same divisions are emerging in artificial intelligence.

A U.S.-backed technology coalition involving the European Union and other partners is developing alongside a China-led international AI initiative that includes countries such as Russia and Myanmar. Only a small number of countries currently participate in both structures, suggesting that the technology competition between Washington and Beijing could eventually become as politically consequential as the Cold War competition over strategic industries.

The most visible dividing line remains advanced computing hardware.

Washington has pressured allies and partners to prevent China from obtaining the world’s most sophisticated semiconductors. Beijing has responded by promoting cheaper, open-source AI models that are increasingly accessible outside China. Chinese systems developed by companies such as Alibaba and Moonshot AI are attracting users internationally, including in Western markets.

That presents an uncomfortable dilemma for the United States.

Technology cannot easily be contained through political declarations. If Chinese models become significantly cheaper, more capable and more accessible than their Western alternatives, governments and companies may eventually face economic incentives to use them despite security concerns.

At the same time, concerns over Chinese hardware are increasing. Washington has tightened restrictions on various Chinese-connected technologies, while European governments are examining potential vulnerabilities in Chinese-made systems and equipment.

The underlying problem is trust.

Western governments may be willing to purchase inexpensive Chinese technology, but they remain reluctant to place critical infrastructure entirely under Beijing’s technological influence. The same logic applies to artificial intelligence, telecommunications, data centers, robotics and strategic supply chains.

There may eventually come a point at which Chinese technological innovation becomes so compelling that keeping Beijing at arm’s length becomes prohibitively expensive.

But that point has not yet arrived.

Until it does, most American partners are likely to remain anchored in the broader Western-led system even as they diversify away from Washington.

One Indian official offered a revealing analogy: imagine investors who have placed most of their money in a single stock and then watched poor management drive its value down. They may be deeply dissatisfied with the company, but they are unlikely to sell their entire holdings at a loss. They will diversify, reduce their exposure and search for alternatives—but they will also hope that the stock eventually recovers.

That may be the best way to understand the geopolitical moment created by Trump.

The world is not necessarily moving from America to China.

It is moving away from dependence.

For Beijing, that is both an opportunity and a warning. China has gained enormously from the deterioration of America’s reputation. Xi Jinping has benefited from Trump’s attacks on allies, tariffs and unpredictability. But favorable public opinion is not the same thing as strategic trust, and economic interdependence is not the same thing as political alignment.

The United States may have made itself less attractive.

China has not necessarily made itself indispensable.

The emerging world is therefore neither unipolar nor fully bipolar. It is becoming more transactional, more diversified and more cautious. Middle powers are learning to hedge, build alternative partnerships and preserve room for maneuver.

Trump may have accelerated that transformation.

But whether China ultimately converts America’s diplomatic losses into lasting geopolitical gains will depend on something much more difficult than winning a popularity contest.

It will depend on whether Beijing can persuade the world that dependence on China is safer, more predictable and more beneficial than dependence on America.

For now, much of the world appears unwilling to make that bet.