Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Hiba Malik
Across Asia, governments are pouring billions into artificial intelligence, viewing technological advancement as a path to strategic autonomy and economic resilience. Yet, with massive AI and chip investments, Asia is becoming less, not more, secure in the technology politics. Despite colossal investments by Asia, the most critical control points in the AI ecosystem remain concentrated in the hands of a few powerful actors, primarily the US and its allies. Moreover, rather than technological advancement bringing tech dominance for Asia, it is failing to shield it from the great power competition by entangling and binding Asia more tightly to a system of tech dependence.
Even though many Asian countries lead in advanced chip production, power rests in a small number of chokepoints that define the rules of the game. Taiwan has outcompeted other countries through its Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Ltd., which produces around 90% of the most advanced semiconductors and supplies Apple and Nvidia. Similarly, South Korea’s Samsung is dominating high-end memory tech by becoming the leading supplier of RAM for the iPhone 17 lineup, increasing its share to 60-70 percent. The Dutch company ASML’s EUV lithography technology is indispensable for cutting-edge microchips, making it a key player in the global semiconductor industry. Yet these strengths coexist with a more profound vulnerability: control that governs advanced AI systems remains highly concentrated.
External constraints reinforce this imbalance. The US maintains tight export controls on AI processors and software, restricting sales and the autonomy that comes with them, based on performance thresholds such as memory bandwidth, and allows only conditional exports under strict licensing rules, ensuring strategic control and politically controlled accessibility. At the same time, other critical inputs remain highly concentrated: rare earth materials, which play a crucial role in electronics and clean energy, are heavily concentrated in China, which controls approximately 85-90% of global rare earth refining and processing capacity as of 2024. Together, these dynamics highlight a key paradox for Asia’s AI goals: increasing involvement in advanced technologies without gaining equal control over their accessibility.
However, the deeper constraint for Asia is not hardware or capital, but chokepoints that govern how AI systems are built and deployed, as standard-setting bodies, intellectual property regimes, supplier frameworks, and talent mobility set conditions and shape who can scale advanced technologies. Moreover, political and regulatory mechanisms designed mainly outside Asia determine access to global research networks, cloud infrastructure, and cross-border data flows. It is harder to replicate these forms of control, which increasingly determine who can scale AI at speed, through investment alone. For instance, in an effort to keep US hegemony over AI development, US export controls on AI chips affect Asian countries that act as transit hubs, forcing states like Malaysia to impose new licensing rules on high-end chip shipments. To cater to these structural constraints, Asian countries have continued to accelerate investments in AI and semiconductor capabilities. But Asian AI ambitions illustrate a paradox: massive investments and expanding capabilities bound by accessibility, standards, and leverage.
Notably, Asia’s growing role in AI and semiconductors serves a distinct function for global technology firms seeking insulation from geopolitical rivalry. By spreading R&D and manufacturing across Asia, international firms are reducing exposure to political shocks and underlying geopolitical motivations without challenging the power structure that governs advanced technologies. India’s expanding AI workforce, Southeast Asia’s manufacturing capacity, and East Asia’s industrial base help companies manage risk and growth amid tightening U.S. control over AI hardware. By adapting locally, like Chinese domestic chip producers or cloud operators in Asia, tech giants like Nvidia are also revising market forecasts amid lost revenue. So, while Asia might not be a center of production or rule-setter in AI development, it is definitely serving as a risk absorber for global tech firms facing geopolitical pressure.
The result is an increasingly asymmetric technological landscape in Asia. For Asian governments long accustomed to hedging between major powers, this shift is especially destabilizing. As Asia absorbs investment, talent, and geopolitical risk, the authority in technological flows lies largely elsewhere. As AI becomes more deeply integrated into economic planning and national security, this imbalance is narrowing the room for progress with control for Asian governments. While hedging and diversification still offer tactical flexibility, they no longer guarantee strategic choice. In effect, Asia’s growing technological capabilities are not expanding its freedom of action; they are binding the region more tightly to decisions made elsewhere.
Viewed as a path to autonomy and progress, Asia’s AI pursuit reflects a more sobering reality: innovation and investments increase integration without necessarily establishing control. Today, it is less about who builds more AI labs and more about who sets technology standards and norms. So, the challenge is not about who is catching up technologically but about who manages exposure within a system where the most critical decisions often remain out of reach.
About the Author:
The author is Assistant Manager Research at the NUST Institute of Policy Studies (NIPS) and holds a Master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), NUST. Her research interests include great power competition, South Asia, the Middle East, and International Humanitarian Law
