After the Muslim Brotherhood

Abdulla Al Junaid

Designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization should be a pillar of the emerging Middle East security architecture.

The United States stands at a pivotal moment in its Middle East policy. As Congress advances legislation to designate the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a foreign terrorist organization, the question isn’t whether this designation is a Middle East critical necessity, but whether its implementation with US regional partners will maximize security benefits while minimizing disruption to domestic politics.

The Muslim Brotherhood isn’t merely a political movement but an interconnected global network with well-established ties to violent extremism. The organization’s Palestinian branch, Hamas, has been designated a terrorist organization since 1997, and former FBI Director Robert Mueller confirmed before Congress that “elements of the Brotherhood, both here and overseas, have supported terrorism.” Additionally, a ground-breaking discovery in Jordan of the Brotherhood’s terror network provided detailed insight into the group’s funding, leadership, and violent activities across the Middle East.

Some US critics have warned that a ban may destabilize regional politics, but the reality is more nuanced. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Russia have already designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, a position supported by significant evidence of the group’s role in incubating and sustaining Hamas, as documented in a 2015 UK government report. These nations aren’t acting in isolation; they’re responding to the MB’s documented history of supporting violence when politically expedient, while maintaining a facade of non-violence and peaceful opposition politics.

The key to successful implementation lies not in unilateral action but in coordinated strategy with regional partners who share US security concerns. And rather than viewing this designation as a binary choice, the United States should adopt a tiered approach.

First, the United States must work with regional partners who have already designated the Brotherhood to develop a shared understanding of which specific entities and individuals truly merit designation by targeting those who actively fund, recruit for the MB, and provide operational support to violent groups.

Second, leveraging this moment to strengthen counterterrorism cooperation with all regional partners, including those who have historically maintained MB ties, such as Qatar. If enforced rigorously, it should bring Doha fully into the counterterrorism mainstream. Similarly, the United States can work with Turkey to better distinguish between legitimate political Islam and support for violent extremism (Syria could serve as a model).

Third, this designation must be accompanied by robust diplomatic engagement to prevent unintended consequences. But at the same time, the US position should be a clear one of “zero tolerance,” sending the desired message throughout and beyond the Middle East.

Critically, this isn’t about choosing sides in the regional rivalry, but about establishing a universal standard. Political participation is acceptable, but not support for terrorism. By working with all regional partners to clearly define these boundaries, it can actually reduce the MB’s utility as a political pawn in regional conflicts.

The timing presents both risk and opportunity. With the Middle East already navigating complex realignments, a coordinated approach to MB designation could become a unifying element in regional security architecture rather than a divisive one. Countries that have long viewed MB affiliates as security threats, such as Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia, can work alongside those with more nuanced relationships, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, to develop a shared framework that minimizes those risks.

The United States has an opportunity to lead not by imposing a unilateral policy, but by facilitating a regional consensus that strengthens security without undermining the political participation that ultimately provides alternatives to extremism.

Done right with careful coordination, clear definitions, and sustained diplomatic engagement, this designation could become a cornerstone of a more effective regional security architecture rather than another source of division. The alternative, ignoring documented terrorist connections while US regional partners take increasingly unilateral actions, is far riskier for both American interests and Middle East stability.

About the Author: Abdulla Aljunaid

Abdulla Al Junaid is a geopolitical columnist and commentator in Middle Eastern and international media. He is the former department head for Analysis and Policies at the National Unity Party in Bahrain, the former deputy director of MENA2050, an advisory board member of the German-Arab Friendship Association (DAFG), and a permanent committee member of the Germany-GCC Annual Conference on Security and Cooperation. He was a guest speaker at the German-GCC Annual Conference on Security & Cooperation, the Herzliya Conference, and the Abu Dhabi Strategic Forum. He is also an executive partner at INTERMID Consultancy (Bahrain).