Geostrategic Media Political Commentary, Analysis, Security, Defense
Lisa Smith Al Makahleh
In October 2023, the Balticconnector gas pipeline linking Finland and Estonia was severely damaged, cutting off a critical energy supply line for six months. Initial suspicions centered on the Chinese-owned, Hong Kong-flagged container ship, the Newnew Polar Bear. Now, the Chinese government has admitted that the ship’s anchor severed the pipeline—though they insist the damage was accidental, a consequence of stormy weather.
At first glance, Beijing’s acknowledgment seems like a rare instance of transparency. But upon closer examination, the incident raises questions about China’s intentions and whether it marks a new form of strategic cooperation with Russia, particularly in the realm of gray zone warfare.
Historically, Beijing has shown reluctance to admit fault, even in the face of overwhelming evidence. The 2001 collision between a Chinese fighter jet and a U.S. reconnaissance plane off Hainan Island saw China blaming the U.S. for an incident that defied basic aerodynamics. Similarly, in 2011, when Chinese vessels cut the cables of Vietnamese oil exploration ships in the South China Sea, Beijing claimed it was acting in self-defense. Even when China created a massive debris field in space by destroying one of its own satellites in 2007, it took nearly two weeks for the government to offer an unconvincing explanation.
Given this pattern, China’s admission of responsibility for the Balticconnector incident is unlikely driven by a newfound commitment to transparency. Instead, it appears Beijing found it counterproductive to deny involvement when faced with irrefutable evidence. This parallels the February 2023 spy balloon incident, where China eventually admitted ownership of the balloon but maintained that its purpose was innocent and its intrusion into U.S. airspace unintentional.
The Balticconnector incident grows darker when considering the broader geopolitical context. Some investigators, including high-ranking Finnish and Estonian officials, have voiced suspicions that the damage was intentional. After all, how could a ship’s crew remain unaware that their anchor was dragging across the seabed for 180 kilometers?
The timing of the incident is also suspect. Just six months earlier, Finland had joined NATO, angering Russia. At the time, Finland’s Security and Intelligence Service warned that Russia considered Finland a hostile nation and was prepared to take measures against it.
Enter China, a quasi-ally of Russia, with a ship that has significant Russian ties. After the incident, the Newnew Polar Bear traveled along the Northern Sea Route, a strategic corridor within the Arctic Circle that is of great interest to both Moscow and Beijing. During this voyage, the ship’s registered operator was changed from a Chinese to a Russian company with connections to the Belt and Road Initiative.
The Chinese government has a track record of leveraging its private sector for national security objectives, whether through fishing fleets supporting geopolitical aims in the South China Sea or private citizens abroad gathering intelligence. The Balticconnector incident may be an extension of this tactic, suggesting that China is testing gray zone warfare tactics outside its immediate sphere of influence—and in direct support of Moscow’s interests.
If the pipeline damage was indeed intentional, this could signal a dangerous new phase in Sino-Russian cooperation. While North Korea supplies Russia with missiles and artillery for its war in Ukraine, China has so far refrained from such overt support. However, the Balticconnector incident could indicate a willingness to engage in indirect, non-lethal support through gray zone activities.
Should this be the case, it would pose a new challenge to the Western alliance. If Beijing is willing to risk relations with Western Europe to support Russia, what might Moscow offer in return? One possibility is concrete Russian assistance in a potential conflict involving Taiwan or the South China Sea.
In the end, the hope is that China’s acknowledgment of the Balticconnector incident reflects a shift toward greater openness. The fear, however, is that it signals the beginning of a more aggressive and covert partnership between China and Russia, one that leverages gray zone warfare to challenge the global order.
