Tereza Felix
The alliance between Russia, China, and Iran in Central Asia is more a marriage of convenience than a solid partnership, driven largely by their mutual opposition to the United States. As the world increasingly shifts toward multipolarity, these three powers are vying for influence in a region rich in natural resources and strategic importance. However, beneath their shared interests lies a web of conflicting ambitions that could ultimately fracture their collaboration.
Security: A Fragile Alliance
Russia, China, and Iran all seek to counter U.S. influence in Central Asia, but their security interests often diverge. Russia, with its significant military presence in the region, views itself as the primary security guarantor, particularly through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). China, however, has been steadily expanding its security footprint through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and other initiatives, wary of Russian dominance. Iran, lacking a military presence, relies on partnerships and cultural ties to assert its influence.
These differences are further complicated by their varying stances on Islamist groups. While all three countries oppose extremism, Iran has historically supported certain Islamist movements that Russia and China see as threats. This divergence hampers trilateral cooperation and leaves Central Asian states cautious of overreliance on any one power for security, potentially opening a door for increased Western engagement.
Energy: Competing Interests
The energy dynamics in Central Asia reveal another layer of complexity. Russia, struggling with sanctions and the loss of the European gas market, has found temporary alignment with China in using Central Asia as an energy source and transit route. Yet, this partnership is more opportunistic than strategic. China, as a key consumer of Central Asian energy, is leveraging its position to secure better deals, while Russia seeks to maintain its influence by preventing Central Asia from accessing other markets.
Iran, meanwhile, faces a different set of challenges. Its limited role in the region’s energy market could be exploited by the West to drive a wedge between Iran and its nominal allies. By supporting alternative energy routes that bypass Russia and China, the West could help Central Asian states diversify their energy partnerships and reduce their dependency on any single power.
Trade: A Window of Opportunity
Trade is where the cracks in the Russia-China-Iran partnership become most apparent. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has increasingly sidelined Russia, focusing on trade routes that connect China to Europe through Central Asia and Iran while bypassing Russia. This shift has eroded Russia’s influence, particularly in countries like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where China’s economic presence is growing.
For the West, this presents a time-sensitive opportunity. By engaging more deeply with Central Asia, the West can offer alternatives to Chinese and Russian economic dominance. This could involve supporting infrastructure projects that link Central Asia to global markets independently of Russia and China, thereby reducing the region’s vulnerability to geopolitical pressures.
Conclusion: A Region in Flux
The strategic landscape in Central Asia is fluid, with Russia, China, and Iran navigating a complex web of competing interests. While they are united in their opposition to the United States, their alliance is far from unbreakable. The West, by carefully exploiting these fractures, can increase its influence in the region and help Central Asian states chart a more independent course. This will require a nuanced approach that balances long-term strategic engagement with immediate support for the region’s economic and security needs.