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How Turk Stream is forcing Europe on its heels

Russia laid down two gas pipelines from its territory, one from the topmost northern hemisphere, famously named as “Nord Stream” and the most advanced, latest with all rights “Turk Stream”; that passes through Turkey, a nation that now finds pride in being able to connect Russia with the rest of Europe. In recent years, European nations have heavily relied on American natural gas supplies and new set of renewables; while sanctions over Russia in the past decade primarily stalled business on both sides, Europe has now changed its language on Russia’s desire to sell oil to the continent. On paper, Europe is openly welcoming a new source of energy supplies in the name of profitable competition, yet changesare only the tip of deep lying geopolitical stakes. Turkstream was launched in the beginning of January; and so, did a brand-new Russian policy take effect that could change foreign relations in the years to come. But, why is Europe changing course suddenly?

Geographically, between the two pipelines on the north and south is Ukraine sitting ignored by Russia’s willingness, more so; it is also a statement of available options at Putin’s hand. It is well noted that Russian aspirations are serious; investing on two different routes has been costly, but the oil rich nation has caught all eyes. While Turkey is flaunting a newfound friendship on the East, other nations in the region, including Ukraine, are assessing exact Russian interests; a major miss out on economic benefits would not be rational for a set of other rather neutral nations than Ukraine. Consider the politics of language, while Nord Stream is still very vague and could include Baltic and western Scandinavia, “Turk Stream” is a prize won in the eyes of a shared Mediterranean neighborhood. It is like saying that Turkey won the rights to sell Russian reserves to European clients, that also have inhibitions against historical Turkish aspirations in the EU. Still, other reasons are held higher.

Uncharacteristically, China is behind all the insecurities in Europe. There is no secret on whether Sino-Russian ties could yield a similar energy route between two nations, both infrastructural might and President Xi’s willingness to expand the Belt & Road projects could easily accommodate energy linkups. For European leaders have realized that such possibilities could most possibly deteriorate Europe’s energy as well as economic balance. By 2030, Chinese energy needs are going to double from what it is now; Europe does not desire a vociferous Chinese demand taking away Russian reserves to the East. Alarmingly, European nations also realize that soon, a proposition as such is highly likely, given how current competition has taken down prices. After a decade of disturbing sanctions testing Russian sanctions, it will be waiting patiently for an overhaul in the form of ceiling new rate of prices. For Europe, America still might not have been redundant, but the US-Ukraine soft spot, certainly has.

The European dilemma does not end yet, for Russia has played the cards on both sides; it will have to forge a face-saving approach with Turkey, given how it has treated Ankara over issues relating to EU membership. Like an astute capitalist, Moscow is promising to feed Europe, whilst also biting into its wounds, forcing to deal with problems that may allow Russia an affirmation to jump over Chinese demands. On the backdrop of a successful Brexit, Turkey will be teasing at the European sanctity, a group that has continuously reminded it of being unsuitable. For Europe’s dislike, Russian reserves now flow through Turkish territories and might successfully ruin newly established competitors in the energy market. Underestimation has cost Europe again while Russia has lastly taken afoot. It is only the beginning of a grand Russian policy.